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# METHODS OF OPINION CONTROL IN PRESENT-DAY BRAZIL

By WALTER R. SHARP

During a recent trip to South America as a Guggenheim Fellow, covering the period from March to August 1940, the author obtained at firsthand some pertinent data on the operation of official propaganda and censorship in Brazil under the Vargas régime. This article presents the results of his observations, based upon both the material collected and personal inquiries made during his stay in Brazil. For many years a member of the faculty of the University of Wisconsin, Dr. Sharp is now Chairman of the Department of Government at the College of the City of New York.

**F**OR MORE than three years, Brazil's *Estado Novo* or "New State" has survived an almost chronic succession of domestic and international crises. At the time when the present régime was proclaimed by the Vargas *coup d'état* of November 10, 1937, there was wide speculation as to whether this dramatic action heralded the establishment of a full-fledged Fascist State or whether it meant merely the emergence of another personal dictatorship in the traditional South American manner. By now the orientation of the régime has become fairly clear. As I have elsewhere written, the Brazil of Getulio Vargas may today be characterized as a mild-tempered, *semi*-totalitarian dictatorship.<sup>1</sup>

In its current context, the Vargas régime reminds the foreign visitor not a little of the stage reached by Italian Fascism up to, say, the middle 1920's. In Brazil, for instance, one finds a partially completed syndicalist structure, membership in which still rests on a quasi-voluntary basis. There is also an officially reiterated emphasis upon "social justice" and "economic democracy," paralleled by an equally pronounced scorn of free elections and the formulation of national policy through a representative congress chosen according to orthodox democratic methods. In the third place, an elaborate apparatus of propaganda and censorship has been evolved. It is with this phase of the Vargas régime that the present article is primarily concerned. It is only fair to warn the

<sup>1</sup> See my article "Brazil 1940—Whither the 'New State'?" in *The Inter-American Quarterly*, October 1940.

reader that any judgment here expressed as to the effectiveness of the Brazilian system of "opinion management" must necessarily be tentative. No foreign visitor, however assiduous or skillful his methods of observation, could hope to fathom the intricacies of such a complex phenomenon within the period of a few weeks.

#### PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES

In order to understand the Brazilian pattern of propaganda and censorship, we must first take note of its professed objectives. In common with other contemporary dictatorships, the Vargas régime is motivated by both negative and positive considerations in its attempt to "mold" popular opinion. On the negative side, the principal objective is to prevent the expression and spread of ideas prejudicial to the maintenance of the present régime. The Constitution of 1937, which accompanied the *coup d'état*, declared (article 186) "a state of emergency for the whole country." Juridically, this state of emergency still exists. It is on this pretext that Getulio Vargas justifies his refusal to hold the "national plebiscite," which, according to the Constitution, must precede the election of a new Parliament. Until this new legislature comes into being, the President "is empowered to issue decree-laws on all matters within the competence of the Union" (article 180). Herein rests the "constitutional" but obviously flimsy basis of his "provisional" dictatorship.

Since organized opposition to the régime might undermine its foundations, no such opposition can be allowed to develop. Thus it was deemed necessary not only to outlaw political parties and labor unions, but also to limit the exercise of free assembly and free press by all actual or potential enemies of the Government. In the main, these measures were directed against the Communists and the so-called "Constitutionalist" party centering in São Paulo—a party which, despite everything, continues to carry on underground agitation against "Vargas and Company" throughout the populous sections of the country. The restrictions have also been applied, albeit less vigorously, to the *Integralistas*, or Brazilian Nazis, especially since their ill-fated attempt to kidnap or murder Vargas in the spring of 1938.

A second negative objective of the censorship has been to enforce a national policy of strict "neutrality" with regard to the current war. This policy is well epitomized by the presidential exhortation which graces the walls of public buildings everywhere: "Citizens may retain their private ideas, but they must do nothing publicly to compromise Brazilian neutrality." The press, therefore, may freely report war news, but it is supposed to follow the "official" line in interpreting such news. To put the matter more concretely, the Vargas government, despite its professed Pan Americanism, feels that it must take into account the possibility of an Axis victory and the consequent pressures upon Brazil's national life. Essentially opportunist in foreign policy, the Government cannot forget the presence in Brazil of large and powerfully organized minorities of Italians and Germans.

The positive objectives of the control system are associated chiefly with propaganda. In addition to insuring the internal security of the régime, this propaganda must build up an active support for its leaders and their policies. Here central emphasis is placed upon the symbol of "national unity." Throughout Brazil's history as an independent country, it has repeatedly been rent asunder by inter-regional strife and jealousy, particularly as between the rival states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. To become strong at home and respected abroad, the nation must therefore move rapidly along the road of Federal centralization. Indeed, concentration of power in the hands of the Rio government has been the most striking feature of the extensive program of fiscal, social, and educational reform enacted by the Vargas régime. The economic crisis precipitated by the *débâcle* of the coffee and cotton market has required action which could be effectively taken only by the national government. Accordingly, all the agencies of education and popular communication are being mobilized so as to inculcate in the population a sense of supreme loyalty to the nation, and at the same time to weaken traditional attachments to locality or province.

Not only this, but the present and future greatness of Brazil as a nation must be so impressed upon the youth of the country that they will be willing to work without question for its economic up-building and cultural progress. National pride counts for much

with all Latin peoples and the Brazilians are no exception. Hence no person or group may say or write anything which will reflect upon the good name of Brazil or its institutions. The study of Brazilian history in the schools must be geared into the channels of exalted patriotism and a colorful ceremonialism must be developed which will make the masses, still sixty per cent illiterate, *nation-conscious*. Such is the credo of the ideological architects of the *Estado Novo*.

#### POLICY-SHAPING AGENCIES

The administrative machinery employed to advance the foregoing objectives includes two civil agencies concerned with what we may call "ideological direction." These are the Department of Press and Propaganda and the Ministry of Education and Public Health. As executive or enforcement arms for these policy-shaping agencies, the political police, certain special tribunals and, ultimately, the Army, are always available for action when necessary, whether openly and publicly or behind the curtains of secrecy. The system of control is centrally administered by the Department of Press and Propaganda, responsible directly to the President and forming part of his executive entourage. This agency has been in existence only a little over a year. It was preceded for six years, however, by a Division of Propaganda and Cultural Diffusion in the Ministry of Justice. According to general report, this earlier agency, largely run by the police, managed censorship operations so ineptly that the President decided to bring their administration under his immediate surveillance. On December 27, 1939, therefore, he issued a decree-law which sets forth in considerable detail the objectives, organization, and powers of the department through which all the operations of opinion management are now coordinated.

The Department of Press and Propaganda, known popularly as D.I.P., was installed in the building formerly used by the Chamber of Deputies, and at its head Vargas placed Dr. Lourival Fontes. D.I.P. is organized into five functional divisions, each of them operating under a chief appointed by the President. These divisions are listed in the organic statute as follows: Division of Civic Education (*Divulgação*); Division of Radio-diffusion; Di-

vision of Cinema and Theatre; Division of Tourism; Division of the Press. There are also some half-dozen auxiliary services whose job it is to take care of such internal "housekeeping" matters as accounts, equipment, supplies, and library, and the custody of motion picture films and phonograph records. As over-all manager of these secondary bureaus there is a chief who also secures his appointment directly from the President.

Except for the high officials, mentioned above, and their private secretaries, the personnel of D.I.P. is recruited and controlled by regular civil service rules. To date most of the staff of 300 have been drawn from other Federal agencies, but in the future appointments to the majority of positions are to be filled by general competitive examination. For the year 1940 the budget of the organization amounted to a little less than \$300,000. This amount, so I was personally assured by one high official, is far from adequate to the needs of D.I.P. and it is likely to be increased as the activities of the agency "necessarily expand."

#### INCULCATING PATRIOTISM

Broadly speaking, the Divisions of Civic Education and Tourism have to do with propaganda operations, censorship falling within their purview only incidentally if at all. The Tourist Division has the obvious task of advertising Brazil as a mecca for foreign travellers and need not concern us here. The major responsibility of the Division of Civic Education is to provide appropriate materials of a patriotic character for use in the elementary and secondary schools and by civic groups generally. These materials consist of posters, pamphlets, and books designed to popularize the achievements of Brazilian national leaders. I saw large stacks of posters, profusely illustrated in color, which were about to be mailed to thousands of interior towns and villages where only a small percentage of the adult population can read or write.

The Division spends much time in organizing patriotic celebrations and ceremonies, most of which are staged with the aid and frequently under the aegis of the Army. While the "New State" has not yet evolved a calendar of new national holidays comparable to that of Italian or German Fascism, it is slowly



moving in this direction. Special efforts are being made to inculcate reverence for the national flag and to encourage mass participation in patriotic songfests—an objective which tunes in nicely with the native Brazilian fondness for folk music.

D.I.P. has had little directly to do with one phase of this relatively mild indoctrination program: the projected national organization of Brazilian youth. Prior to last spring, several tentative steps were taken with such an end in view, but each time the resistance of educational leaders and public opinion generally proved so strong that the Government decided to defer action. Finally, on March 8, 1940, a presidential decree-law ordered the creation of a nation-wide institution under the name of the *Juventude Brasileira*. According to the text of this decree, the new organization is to promote "the civic, moral, and physical education" of all children of both sexes from the age of eleven to eighteen years. For children in tax-supported schools membership is obligatory; for all others, it will be voluntary. A "Supreme Council" presided over by the President and including representatives of the Ministers of Education, War, and the Navy will serve as the national policy-determining body for the movement, while in each state of the Federal Union a coordinating council assumes responsibility for its effective development.

As late as July of last year, the *Juventude Brasileira* remained largely a skeleton organization. It was my impression that the informed public still looked upon the project with a good deal of scepticism, if not actual antagonism. To many people the whole scheme appeared to be nothing but a thinly disguised maneuver on the part of the Army to institute a kind of *pre-military* service for adolescents,—an entering wedge, as it were, toward the general control of education by the military.

#### SUPERVISION OF RADIO PROGRAMS

The Division of Radio-diffusion is charged with two sets of tasks, both bearing upon the use of the radio as a propaganda channel. The first of these jobs is to scrutinize all programs broadcast in Brazil. To this end an agent of the Division is attached to each of the sixty or so broadcasting stations which the country now possesses. About forty of these stations are located in São Paulo



and Rio, two of them being owned by the Federal government. Four others are operated by state authorities and the rest by commercial companies. It is roughly estimated that only about 1,000,000 receiving sets are now in use throughout the entire country. Thus, with a population a third as large, Brazil has but one-fiftieth as many receiving sets as the United States. The reach of the Brazilian radio, however, actually extends farther than these figures might suggest. Hundreds of villages in the hinterland have installed community loud-speakers which permit large groups to listen to important broadcasts and there are similar arrangements in many factories and offices.

Although radio programs transmitted by commercial stations are not subject to advance censorship, official instructions issued periodically by D.I.P. lay down what may be termed "the government line." This may forbid certain matters from being discussed at all or it may merely indicate a particular emphasis or point of view from which broadcasters may deviate at their peril. I was informed by one prominent news commentator that he had been ordered not to include the expression "fifth column" in any future broadcast, even though he had not been using it in reference to any particular country. The sword hangs constantly over the head of every foreign newscaster because he knows that he is liable to warning, reprimand, or expulsion if he disregards official directions. And they are often arbitrarily interpreted *ex post facto*.

The second function of the Division of Radio-diffusion is to promote the development of radio as an instrument of cultural progress and national morale. From eight to nine o'clock every evening a "National Program" is broadcast over a network that includes every important station in the country. This *Hora do Brasil* ("Brazil's Hour") is made up under the immediate supervision of D.I.P. Its content consists of a varying mixture of Brazilian music and literature, light entertainment, official information, patriotic pronouncements, and general news. At other hours special programs are arranged with a view to giving to the backward rural regions an elementary notion of Brazilian history, scientific farming, sanitation, nutrition, child-rearing, and the like. This is a kind of diluted "agricultural extension" service by air in

lieu of any effective field organization comparable to our agricultural experiment-station and county agent set-up.

The Radio-diffusion staff is also responsible for preparing foreign language broadcasts designed to apprise the outside world of the natural attractions, economic possibilities, and cultural achievements of Brazil. All re-broadcasts of short-wave programs originating in foreign countries must secure advance authorization from D.I.P. This requirement makes it easy for the Federal authorities to control the allocation of time as between the competing propagandas of totalitarian and democratic nations. In this regard Berlin and Rome have, until recently, fared fully as well as, if not better than, London and New York.

#### CONTROL AND PROMOTION OF FILMS

We come now to the fourth section of the propaganda and censorship machinery. This is the Division of Cinema and Theatre. Here, again, two different sorts of operations may be distinguished. On the one hand, the officials of this Division exercise a prior censorship over all commercial films. No motion picture, whether imported or domestic, may be shown without the official certificate of approval "D.C.T." A similar stamp of approval is required for all stage productions, including ballets and variety shows, as well as for all public athletic functions. Although pressure from the clergy results now and then in the banning or drastic editing of films on grounds of morality or religion, the influence of Hollywood, for better or for worse, grows apace in Brazil. The Brazilian public appears to be as "movie mad" as North Americans were about twenty years ago. Incidentally, nothing has done more to spread the use of English below the Amazon than the popularity of Hollywood screen stars.

Aware of the potentialities of the cinema in a country where the printed page reaches only a minority of the population, the Vargas government is trying to encourage the development of a native film industry. The Division of Cinema and Theatre plays a rôle here, too,—its second *raison d'être*. Each year it conducts a competition to determine the three best feature films and the ten best short specialties produced in Brazil. From the proceeds of a special tax levied on motion picture theatres, prizes are awarded

to the winners. In addition, small subsidies are given to the favored producers provided they furnish prints of their best films for educational distribution.

Reference should also be made to an Educational Film Institute which was recently set up and attached to the Ministry of Education. This organization has turned out a limited number of rather mediocre films depicting Brazilian flora and fauna, geography, historical episodes, etc. To date, however, the Government's campaign to stimulate Brazilian film production has proved disappointing. Brazil is so backward in technical knowledge of the movie industry and in capital for investment in costly equipment that it is not likely to go very far without assistance from abroad. Here, be it said parenthetically, lies an excellent opportunity for our State Department and Nelson Rockefeller's committee to initiate action along a most strategic cultural relations sector. A thriving two-way traffic in high-grade educational and documentary films between Brazil and this country would do much to widen mutual understanding.

#### CONTROL OF THE PRESS

Even though mass attitudes in Brazil may perhaps be most easily conditioned through pictorial and auditory channels—public ceremonies, the radio, and the talking picture—the printed word remains the single most important determinant of the thought pattern of the articulate urban element in the population. It is from this element, moreover, that the political, economic, and intellectual élite is mainly drawn. The control of publication, therefore, has received more careful attention from the Government than any other phase of the censorship system.

Upon the Press Division of D.I.P. rests the major responsibility for seeing to it that all journalism, foreign as well as domestic, properly "conforms." To facilitate what the official censors like to call the "self-discipline" of the press, a national association of publishers and editors was organized some years ago under government sponsorship. The direction of this association is in the hands of a National Press Council, three members of which are appointed by President Vargas, and the other three elected by the associated journalists themselves. The Director of the Press Division

of D.I.P. acts as *ex officio* president of the Council and has the right to vote in case of a tie. Every publishing concern in Brazil must be registered continuously with the Press Division. This rule likewise applies to all foreign correspondents and news services.

As in the case of radio broadcasts, no continuous prior censorship of printed news exists. The administrative complexities of such drastic control, one official commented in my presence, would create more difficulties than it would solve. Private newspaper ownership, moreover, has not been disturbed, although there are a considerable number of "official" papers at both the Federal and the state and municipal levels. In all, Brazil supports nearly 200 daily newspapers, most of which operate on a shoestring.

#### HOW CENSORSHIP WORKS

How, then, does the government censorship actually work? The first fact to be noted is that a special decree-law, dated December 30, 1939, regulates the conditions under which the publishing business may operate. This law enumerates a series of penalties to which publishers, writers, and editors are liable if they print any matter "of a false or tendential character, or designed to bring disrespect or discredit upon the country, its institutions, the holders of public office, or the armed forces, or likely to provoke conflicts of class or region" (article 11).

From time to time D.I.P. sends to all publishing establishments a bulletin of instructions which construe this article in terms of current issues and events. As listed in the press law (article 135), the legal penalties for violation of these instructions are the following: (1) warning; (2) prior censorship of a given daily paper or periodical during a fixed period of time; (3) seizure of the offending issue, coupled with the temporary suspension or definite cessation of the right of publication; (4) dismissal of the responsible editor or publisher; (5) temporary suspension of the right to exercise the profession of journalist; and (6) the withdrawal of subsidies and rebates (on the importation of newsprint).

For the first offense, unless it be unusually serious, a simple warning is ordinarily given. For the second offense, prior censorship may be imposed. If the offense is repeated, the facts are transmitted by the Director of the Press Division to the National Press

Council. This body has the power to order the guilty newspaper to suspend or cease publication. Such drastic action as this, however, has only rarely been resorted to, although one instance of it came to my attention last June. At that time the temporary suspension of the *Diario da Manhã* of Niteroy, a small industrial city across the bay from Rio, was announced by the Press Council. The confiscation of specific numbers of foreign magazines has taken place on several occasions. Among the victims of this type of interference are *Fortune* and *Life*.

In the event that a suspension or cessation order is not obeyed by the defendant, the matter may be referred to a special tribunal of judges appointed for life by the President of Brazil. No such appeal has ever had to be taken for the simple reason that at any time D.I.P. can effectively invoke the threat of removing rebates on imported newsprint. Since no paper can afford to operate without the benefit of these quite substantial rebates, it prefers to conform or, at the very least, to confine its deviations from the official line to minor, non-controversial items.

While foreign cables do not have to be submitted in advance to the D.I.P. authorities, a copy must be sent them without delay. Furthermore, telegraph companies may hold up dispatches for fear of being fined if they allow a doubtful story to go over the wires. Even airmail communications do not entirely escape the long arm of the censor since the sender always faces the risk of being severely reprimanded, or expelled, if the printed story displeases too much. To my knowledge, it is only fair to say, the Vargas régime has not yet gone to the point of ejecting any foreign journalist.

#### CHARACTER OF OPINION CONTROL

As we conclude these observations, the question naturally arises: what kind of press does such a system of control produce? Is the result a completely servile, regimented journalism? Or does Brazil still retain a modicum of free public discussion of political and economic problems? No simple answer is possible. Every national censorship system is necessarily set in the matrix of a particular national culture. Brazilians are by nature and environment an easy-going, tolerant people who do not take readily to regimenta-



tion. In addition to this, the Vargas régime differs sharply from its European counterparts in that it has not as yet evolved any consistent *uni*-party ideology.<sup>2</sup> It would be nearer the truth to call it a "no party" régime built around the astute, ambitious opportunism of one man—Getulio Vargas. Cutting across its face are the scars of internal dissension: left versus right wing in the Cabinet and the pro-Axis element, centering chiefly in the military bureaucracy, struggling for ascendancy against the Vargas-Aranha pro-American group in the center. Apart from all this, every governmental system of opinion control is, at best, shot through with administrative stupidities. Possessing neither the tradition nor the experience of an efficient public administration, the Vargas dictatorship reflects rather more than less of this managerial ineptitude in the day-to-day conduct of its censorship policy.

From the corps of English-speaking journalists in the Brazilian capital, the most typical comment that one hears about this policy is that it is uneven, spasmodic, or even "crazy" in its impact. Perhaps a few concrete notations from my own experience will help to clarify the reasons for this attitude. The censors themselves take pride in assuring the inquirer that there is no desire to suppress criticism of public policy. But, they hasten to add, it must be "honest" criticism. And they are the sole judges of what is honesty. On the basis of my daily perusal of the metropolitan press over a six weeks' period, I would say that domestic political criticism has to be circumscribed within rather narrow limits. Neither the propriety nor the good intentions of the existing régime can be editorially questioned. Of its concrete policies and administrative acts, a good deal of temperate criticism may be publicly expressed without official interference.

When, for example, a leading newspaper ventured to observe that the government subsidies being paid to coffee-growers were too small in amount, the arm of the censor did not move. Contrariwise, another paper was penalized for implying, in its comment on a postoffice robbery, that there might have been maladministration, if not dishonesty, on the part of certain postal

<sup>2</sup> The nearest approach to a consistent statement of doctrine is to be found in a recent book by Francisco Campos, the reputed author of the 1937 Constitution, entitled *O Estado Nacional: Sua Estrutura, Seu Contendo ideológico*.



officials. The extent to which the press dares to go in criticizing governmental behavior may be said, perhaps, to vary according to how influential are the political or financial connections of a given newspaper. That even this generalization has its exceptions was illustrated about a year ago by the forced change of editorial direction of a powerful São Paulo daily—allegedly because it was too openly “pro-democratic.”

#### IMPACT OF WAR ON ATTITUDES

Press treatment of the current war and its impact upon Brazil conveys to a foreign observer the distinct impression that the vast majority of Brazilians are definitely pro-democratic in their sympathies. Throughout the *Blitzkrieg* in Western Europe last spring and summer, all but the two or three Nazi-subsidized papers in Rio funnelled the news to their readers in such fashion as to reveal, obliquely if not directly, their strong hope for an Allied victory. I am convinced that most papers went beyond the “official line,” as of that period, in their handling of international news. But, of course, with a régime in which conflicting factions struggle constantly for position and prestige, even this official line shifts unexpectedly—like a man walking a tight rope.

During recent months, what with our concrete moves to strengthen the military and economic defense of the Western Hemisphere, the Brazilian press has been allowed to voice unqualified approval of Washington's policy and to condemn severely the Axis threat against the New World. In January of this year, when certain papers apparently exceeded bounds in criticizing Britain for refusing to grant Brazil a navicert to transport armaments purchased from Germany before the war, Dr. Lourival Fontes, the Director of D.I.P., called a meeting of newspaper publishers and warned them that this controversy must not be used as a pretext for attacks against the United States. All of which would suggest the inference that, for the time being at least, the influence of the Director with Getulio Vargas is on the wane, since Fontes' pro-Nazi bias is an open secret.

The future trend in government propaganda and censorship will depend largely upon the course of the war. If the Axis should gain the ascendancy, or appear to be on the verge of it, the Fascist

military clique is almost certain to carry Vargas along with the current. This will mean a tightening of censorship and an intensification of anti-democratic propaganda. In other words, Brazil will then become vulnerable to large-scale Nazi penetration, in spite of our "good neighborism."

Short of an Axis victory, the Vargas régime is likely to continue its mild, elastic policy of opinion manipulation. Even this has already reduced freedom of inquiry by scholar and scientist, at all events in the social sciences, to a travesty. Teachers and professors alike enjoy only a precarious tenure and the schools and universities live constantly under the threat of political interference by administrators who come and go at the President's bidding. His political opponents feel the whip of his political police, though the weapons they employ are a far cry from the terroristic types imposed by a Hitler or a Stalin.

The private citizen can still wax satirical about Getulio and the régime, however, provided he does it discreetly. There is no all-inclusive regimentation in Brazil. Nor is opinion confined within a tight doctrinal straight-jacket. The combination of Latin temperament and tropical climate militates against any such system of society. Only *force majeure* from alien sources can completely "nazify" Brazil. To quote from one of the wisest of my Brazilian friends: "Germany has its Nazism; Italy, its Fascism; Russia, its Bolshevism; but we in Brazil get along with 'Getulio-ism,' and Getulio, fortunately, still enjoys a good joke on himself!"

# CITIZENS' COMMITTEES: THEIR RÔLE IN INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT

By LOUIS G. SILVERBERG

The activities of citizens' committees in the American industrial scene during the past fifty years have been of more than passing significance. Today, they may play an even more significant rôle as social tensions increase. Mr. Silverberg is Assistant to the Director of Information of the National Labor Relations Board. He had previously done graduate work in Labor Economics at American University.

FOR THE past five years a Senatorial investigation has been bringing to light evidence which makes it clear that violations of basic civil liberties have become an all too commonplace feature of the American industrial scene. The La Follette Committee has subjected commercialized espionage and strikebreaking services to public scrutiny, and remedial legislation has already been introduced. One of the greatest threats to civil liberty, however, has been uncovered in the "citizens' committees," which are an active and sometimes decisive factor in industrial conflict. "Citizens' committees" and "law and order leagues" are no new phenomena. For the past half century the "citizens' committee" and the "law and order league" have been utilized with increasing frequency by American employers as a weapon in industrial warfare with considerable success. Nor were the "citizens' committees" of an earlier day "merely sub-committees of the local chambers of commerce and other businessmen's organizations," as it has been suggested. Present-day "law and order leagues" and those of the past differ not in kind, but in degree. In origin, purpose, leadership, sources of finances, and operational techniques, they display fundamental kinship.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Wherever possible the author has cited the exact designations and language used by the active participants in these movements. Thus, citations, wherever they appear in the article, have been taken from original and authoritative sources such as the following: *A Report on Labor Disturbances in the State of Colorado*, Senate Document No. 122, 58th Congress, 3rd Session (1905); *A History of the Labor Movement in California*, Ira B. Cross (1935); *The Labor History of the Cripple Creek District*, Benjamin M. Rastall (1908); *Report of Commissioner to Investigate the Recent Disturbances in the City of San Diego and the County of San Diego, California, to His Excellency Hiram W. Johnson* (1912); *Industrial Relations in the Chicago Building Trades*.

During the past half-century, when industrial conflict, militant unionism and mass hysteria have produced acute social tension, citizens' committees have not been absent. They either supplement statutory law, the courts, and private and public police, or they function in areas where, in the eyes of employers, these alone are ineffective. They have appeared particularly in those localities in which a single or a group of related industries dominate. In such industrial districts the life of the community is largely dependent upon a single or several corporations. Employing interests display unusual cohesiveness, and the middle-class group of professionals and small businessmen are as dependent upon the corporate overlord of the economic fief as the workers on its payroll. To strike a blow at the business interest is to attack the entire economic structure of the community. Such localities, where the mode of life makes for quasi-pathological social conditions, are peculiarly susceptible to group warfare and violence. In them the lines of social and economic cleavage tend to become strikingly clear-cut. In such a setting, law and order leagues flourish and operate with decisive effectiveness.

In such communities the citizens' committee lives and functions through a pattern of contradictions: Seeking peace, it creates violence; in protecting law and order, it resorts to disorder; in preserving democracy, it denies its every corollary.

#### MASSILLON LAW AND ORDER LEAGUE

The Massillon (Ohio) Law and Order League, forged in the heat of the Republic Steel Strike in 1937, offers a sharply etched picture of the origins, purposes, and activities of the typical citizens' committee of the past as well as of today. Republic Steel with assets valued at over a third of a billion, employed almost 60,000 people in the spring of 1937, two-thirds of them in its Ohio plants, of which Massillon employed 3600 workers. Bitter hostility to "outside" unions and encouragement of com-

Royal E. Montgomery (1927); *The Centralia Hub* (1919); *Report on the Steel Strike of 1919*, Interchurch World Movement (1921); *Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor*, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, United States Senate, pursuant to S. Res. 266, 74th Congress; Transcript of Testimony *In the Matter of Republic Steel Corporation and Steel Workers Organizing Committee*, National Labor Relations Board (1937).

pany unionism marked Republic's labor policy. It answered the organizing campaign of the Steel Workers' Organizing Committee with the declaration that "Republic stands for the 'Open Shop' principle," insisting that every "employee owes a duty of loyalty to the Company so that its best interests may be served." The conflict between the management and the S.W.O.C. came to a head on May 20, 1937: Republic shut down almost all the mills in the Massillon works, locking out virtually all its employees. The S.W.O.C. countered by calling a strike, and between May 25 and July 1, when troops of the Ohio National Guard were ordered into Massillon, Republic's plants in and outside the city limits remained closed.

During this period Republic worked feverishly to get the Massillon police department to break the strike. This offered difficulties because there were only thirteen regular police available for strike duty, and the department had no supply of armaments. Furthermore, city officials, including the chief of police, insisted that the city could not afford to purchase equipment or hire extra police and did not wish the police to be employed to break the picket lines. Considerable sentiment in the community supported both the position of the city officials and the strikers.

In a Back-to-Work Committee which it inspired on May 26, the first day of the strike, and in a law and order league, Republic found two instruments to overcome these difficulties in the way of breaking the strike.

A day or two after the strike began, a temporary committee, composed of businessmen and citizens of Massillon, was organized by the Board of Directors of the Massillon Chamber of Commerce for the alleged purpose of serving as a clearing house for strike information as it affected Massillon's business community. Growing in size, this committee was variously known as the Citizens' Committee, the Citizens' League, the Labor Relations Committee, and, most commonly, the Law and Order League of Massillon. Its most active public members were not directly tied to Republic Steel, but were the secretary of the local Chamber of Commerce, the president of the Massillon Rubber Company, and the manager of the Erie Chevrolet Sales Company. The League fostered the



impression that it was an independent body wholly concerned with the maintenance of law and order. Before long, however, it was evident that it was being manipulated by Republic Steel for strike-breaking purposes.

Two weeks after its inception, the Law and Order League, together with officials of Republic Steel, began to bring pressure upon the city officials and the chief of police to change their position on the strike, warning that if the strikers were not controlled, Massillon would lose its steel works. On June 13, Chief of Police Switter, invited to a meeting of the League at the Chamber of Commerce, was asked if he would secure additional police and strike-breaking equipment if money were raised to cover the cost. At a meeting of the League on the following day the mayor was exhorted to accept the League's view of the proper functions of the Massillon police force. In Switter's words, "They put the heat on the Mayor about appointing some special police . . . this group said they could raise the money . . . \$8,000 to pay for 50 policemen for two weeks and the equipment considered necessary. . . ." The mayor agreed to appoint additional police on condition that they would not be stationed at the picket line. The law and order leaguers, however, were dissatisfied, and returned some \$1,200 they had already raised to the businessmen who had made donations.

#### CAMPAIGN OF PRESSURE

After the middle of June, the League worked hand in hand with the Back-to-Work Committee, which had been quiescent since its inception. The two groups continued to exert pressure upon the city officials, and also attempted unsuccessfully to induce National Guard officers to discover some basis for intervening. As part of the League's campaign of pressure upon the city officials, a petition was circulated among civic organizations and leading citizens. In the course of its presentation a lawyer retained by the League spoke of the breakdown of law and order, arraigned the city officials for their failure to appoint additional police, and castigated them for refusing money raised by the League. Declaring that the strike was costing Massillon a payroll of \$40,000 a day, he asserted that "he had it straight that if something wasn't



done the Republic was going to move their plant out of Massillon." The League also inspired reports of an impending C.I.O. mass invasion of Massillon, although the intelligence division of the National Guard could find no evidence of such a movement. Its support also made possible the effort of the Back-to-Work movement to register the number of employees who wished to return to work, providing headquarters, physical equipment for registration of workers, mimeographed petitions, and money for the Committee's newspaper advertisements.

When Governor Davey ordered General Marlin and four companies of the State National Guard into Massillon on the night of July 1, the complexion of the strike changed. On the following day the plants reopened, men began to return to work. The National Guard could not be kept upon the scene indefinitely, and General Marlin urged the formation of "home guards" who would take over when the troops left. The Law and Order League immediately pressed upon the city officials the necessity of appointing special police and deputizing armed "home guards" drawn from Republic's employees. The League also supplied the man to organize and command such "home guards."

On the morning of July 7, the leaders in the Law and Order League again verbally assaulted the city officials, "demanding," said Chief of Police Switter, "that we do something about this situation. . . . They just climbed all over us and demanded some action be taken and threatened to impeach us, talked about getting rid of the Mayor . . . they wanted something done, wanted some action . . . (they) said we could get plenty of men there . . . Republic Steel men . . . and I told them that I didn't want those men, that if I was going to have any special police, I wanted to have men on neutral sides that had no argument in the strike." In answer to this, the law and order leaguers declared that the steel mill and the economic life of the city were at stake.

Finally, the mayor and chief of police capitulated to these demands. It was agreed that the Law and Order League, leading businessmen and city officials were to cooperate in dealing with the strike. Furthermore, a special police force of sixty-six men was to be created to restore "law and order" in Massillon. With

this the active work of the League came to an end. It had already served to set the scene for the violence which followed and which cost the strikers so dearly. It had utilized every resource to help Republic Steel break the strike, effectively employing to this end the threat of economic disaster to the economic life of the city. In its Republic Steel decision, the National Labor Relations Board adequately stated the rôle of the citizens' committee as an appendage of the company in its attempt to stamp out the right to self-organization: "In sum, what the respondent (company) was unwilling and unable to do openly, it accomplished in part through the businessmen of Massillon, acting under the guise of establishing law and order."

#### REAL AND STATED OBJECTIVES

Regardless of location, specific objective and mode of creation, the citizens' committees never are what they purport to be, and their names are their primary and most obvious disguise. The Citizens Protective League of Centralia (Washington) appeared in the guise of a "special organization to protect rights from the encroachment of all foes of the government." By public declaration these organizations stand ready to fight for "the right to work," "public interest," "the right of free contract between men," and the destruction of a "labor monopoly." Without exception they are disinterested "impartial" bodies dedicated to the protection of the "public." In San Francisco, in 1921, the Citizens' Committee, which supported a broad effort to introduce the open shop in the building trades, became the militant and infamous Industrial Association of San Francisco. Its avowed purpose was "to promote the happiness and prosperity of the people of San Francisco," and to make that city, through *harmony*, a great metropolis.

Without exception, the activities of the citizens' committees contradict their declared purposes. Sixty years ago the Citizens Protective Union of San Francisco pledged itself to "the preservation of public peace; the protection of property; the restoration of confidence in the security of life. . . ." To achieve these ends it armed hoodlums and incited them to violence. The constitution

of the Citizens' Alliance of Denver pledged it in 1903 "to promote the stability of business and the steady employment of labor by encouraging friendly relations between employers and employees," but it never hesitated to instigate boycotts against groups accused of friendly relations with the Western Federation of Miners or local trade assemblies.

It is a mistake to assume that the citizens' committee does not receive support from those who take sincerely the slogans of "law and order." Many of these may never discover, as did Rabbi A. M. Granowitz during the Johnstown (Pennsylvania) struggle of 1937, the wide gap between the real and the stated objectives of the Committees. "There were," he testified before the Senate Civil Liberties Committee, "possibly, or probably, three objectives; one, law and order; two, constitutional liberties for all people; and three, conciliation and mediation between the parties to the strife. These were the stated objectives of the Committee. As the result of my experiences and observations, in the two days, or three days, that I had been connected with the Committee, I became convinced that the actual objectives were different from the stated objectives. The actual objectives, the purposes, in my opinion, were, first, to get as many men back to work as possible, and to get them back as soon as possible. Second, to break the strike. Third, to break the union."

Normally the creation of an employers' association, the citizens' committee itself sometimes fosters, directs, and dominates the activities of employers' organizations. In Chicago in 1921, for example, the Citizens' Committee to Enforce the Landis Award organized and financed the anti-union activities of the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce. When the headquarters of the Citizens' Alliance, which operated vigorously during the 1934 truckdrivers' strike in Minneapolis, were raided by the National Guard, Governor Olson declared that "the evidence seized corroborates my charges that the Citizens' Alliance dominates and controls the Employers' Advisory Committee." It also appeared that the Alliance had compelled other employer groups to perform its bidding.

**PERSONNEL AND LEADERSHIP**

The citizens' committee endeavors to maintain the fiction that it is not merely another expression of employer anti-labor activity, and, therefore, it attempts to show that the personnel of the committee, having no direct interest in a given labor dispute, represents the "public interest" jeopardized by the struggle between employers and workers. An examination of the composition of citizens' committees, however, makes it clear that while their apparent sponsors may not be immediately involved in the labor struggle in question, stemming from permanent interest groups they are vitally interested in its outcome. Over three decades ago, the Constitution of the Citizens' Alliance of Denver provided that "members of the alliance shall be persons, firms, associations, or corporations owning property or engaged in business in the State of Colorado and who are not members of labor organizations." In our own day, the Canton Citizens' Law and Order League drew its support from the local Chamber of Commerce, the Canton Exchange Club, the Retail Merchants Board, the Independent Grocers Association, the Clearing House Association and the American Legion.

Financial sponsorship and official leadership for the law and order leagues are drawn from the leading anti-union elements in the community. The Citizens' Protective League of Centralia (1919) had an "avowed union smasher," G. F. Russell, as its secretary-manager, its chairman was F. B. Hubbard, President of the Employers' Association in the State of Washington, and chief executive of the Eastern Railway and Lumber Company. When "citizen mobs" of Johnstown (Pennsylvania) evicted union organizers at the point of guns in 1919, they were led by H. L. Treddenick, President of the local Chamber of Commerce. When the Johnstown Citizens' Committee was organized in the summer of 1937 it received messages of sympathy and support from Chambers of Commerce, employers' associations, corporations and individual employers, and other citizens' committees throughout the country. Its secretary was also secretary and managing director of the Johnstown Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber of Commerce of Warren, Ohio, wrote that it was "anxious to cooperate."

One may choose at random in the past and present parade of patriotic "John Q. Public Leagues" and citizens' committees—their leadership is always either drawn from or tied to financial and industrial anti-labor groups. The Citizens' Committee to Enforce the Landis Award, the Citizens' League of Anderson (Indiana), the Flint Alliance, the Massillon Law and Order League, the Johnstown Citizens' Committee, the Jones and Laughlin Constitutional Defense League—all are the same in this respect.

#### FINANCIAL RESOURCES

The size of the funds which the citizens' committees have at their disposal (where such information has become public) throws further light upon the individuals and groups who sponsor and utilize them. The initial meeting of the Johnstown Citizens' Committee was held on June 14, 1937. Eight days later, forty leading newspapers throughout the country carried a full page advertisement describing its *raison d'être* and virtues. It is estimated that some \$65,000 was necessary to buy the space. The Citizens' Alliance of Minnesota declared that the expenditure of \$25,000 to smash a drivers' strike in 1916 "had been well worth it." In 1921 a California law and order league was pledged one and a quarter million dollars to fight the unionized building trades. In the following four years it spent some two millions to destroy labor unions, and is supposed to have raised a sum thrice that amount. In the same year, the Chicago Citizens' Committee to Enforce the Landis Award—a creation of the Illinois Manufacturers' Association, the Chicago Chamber of Commerce, the Chicago Employers' Association, and important industrial and mercantile establishments—announced that it was raising a fund of \$3,000,000. This sum was to be spent for strikebreakers and protection for open-shop jobs with the purpose of instituting the open shop in all building trades which rejected the Landis Award. Four years later the Committee stated that its activities had been financed to the tune of \$2,000,000.

The real purpose of the drives, levies, initiation fees and assessments by which these huge funds are raised is normally not indicated. Expenditures for guns, ammunition and, in recent years, gas bombs and guerillas, are kept secret. Where possible



the anti-union purpose of the citizens' committee is hidden behind a mask of virtuous veneer. The Chairman of the Citizens' Committee to Enforce the Landis Award confessed that "the Committee never made a drive for money on the open-shop appeal, but on the appeal that it was trying to clean up the rottenness in the building industry, which did not need any argument." Its argument took the form that the open shop was "the only method permanently to establish protection against strikes and graft."

#### PERMANENT GOAL

Normally the citizens' committee has a prolonged life-span which goes beyond the particular circumstances leading to its birth. This can be ascribed to its financial resources and to the nature of its sponsorship and membership. Once created, and founded upon a long-range identification of interests, the citizens' committee makes its appeal upon an extremely wide front. The mercantile, financial, industrial and middle-class groups responsible for its emergence or attracted to its fold continue to sustain the committee after it has performed its initial and specific function. The law and order league is not tied to a single industry, and can be easily employed in anti-union work in any field. From an initial purpose of the disruption of a strike in a particular activity, it normally tends to broaden its goal to embrace the weakening or destruction of unionism in a municipal, local or state area.

In Sedalia, Missouri, the Citizens' Alliance emerged from its victory over the local labor movement in 1901 to seek wider fields of operation. By the following year it had established secret alliances in nine cities of four States, exacting the following pledge from members: "I hereby make application for membership in the Citizens' Alliance and I affirm that I am not a member of any labor organization which resorts to boycotting, or any form of coercion or unlawful force, and fully agree to discountenance strikes and schemes of persecution."

Confident that it could perpetuate the Landis principles, the Committee to Enforce the Landis Award continued to function when the term of the award expired in 1926. On September 1 of that year the New York *Evening Post* reported that "The Citizens'



Committee to Enforce the Landis Award will make no surrender. It is very well organized and is likely to consider the time as fortuitous to break the strength of the unions in Chicago." The Committee, with "victory" in sight, held that if it disbanded it would betray "the public and its contributors" and cause irreparable damage. In July 1937, a spokesman for the Johnstown Citizens' Committee, indicating a comparable growth of purpose, disclosed that detailed plans had been drawn for a national organization whose purpose was "searching out instances where men cannot go back to work" and "stimulating the Citizens' National Committee to support a back-to-work movement."

#### PROPAGANDA APPEALS AND OBJECTIVES

Organized propaganda plays as vital a rôle in present-day industrial conflict as it does in modern warfare. An executive of one of the leading radio manufacturing corporations testified before the La Follette Committee that, "The old method of using strikebreakers and violence and things of that kind were things of the past . . . the way to win or combat a strike was to organize community sentiment." If it utilizes sufficiently significant symbols and is effectively projected, organized propaganda may take shape as organized public opinion, and thus become an instrument for controlling the community. Participants in industrial struggles are fully aware of this, and the formation and manipulation of opinion is a primary concern of the citizens' committee. Furthermore, propaganda is not only a weapon used in conflict, it is a means of intensifying the conflict. It thus serves to prepare the ground for the injection—and justification—of violence into the dispute. If formal recognition of the value of propaganda were necessary, it could be found in the now famous Mohawk Valley Formula of James H. Rand Jr., which devotes eight of its nine procedural steps to the manipulation of opinion.

The targets at which the propaganda of the law and order leagues is directed are obvious. It apes the war technique: befriending neutrals and gaining their support is the concomitant of the attempt to win over the middle-class elements and demonstrate their solid identification with employer interests; alienating the enemy is transformed to discrediting the objectives, leader-

ship, and tactics of labor; splitting the enemy's front becomes a steady campaign to drive a wedge between the rank-and-file and its leadership, and otherwise to demoralize labor.

Since industrial conflicts broadly affect the social and economic environment of the participants, the rôle played by the middle class is critical. To win it to the side of the employer, the collective egotism, ideals, values and sentiments of the middle class are appealed to. Evidence, logic, and honesty of presentation play little part in this work; the propaganda battle is pitched on quite a different level. The citizens' committee, projecting itself as the defender of the commonweal and appealing to such values as "fair play" and "Americanism," seeks to rationalize a specific economic struggle into either the preservation of the "American system," the "capitalist system," of "civilization" itself, or the protection of the "public," the "consumer," and the "citizen."

#### USE OF PATRIOTIC SYMBOLS

In promoting itself, the citizens' committee invariably appeals to nationalist and sentimental symbols. The citizens' committees attack "foes of government," crusade in defense of "fundamental principles of government," and condone—where they do not advocate—the suppression of civil liberties in order to "preserve the constitution." A resolution circulated by the Citizens' Alliance of Cripple Creek, for example, urged that "the persons most active in the work of deterring and retarding the wonderful advancement and prosperity of . . . the United States . . . should be lawfully restrained, that such an act will conserve the best interest of all true American-loving citizens."

In addition, this same Committee characterized one corporation, from whom the union was attempting to obtain recognition of the right to self-organization, as a "custodian of a sacred trust, consisting of the investments of thousands and in the aggregate of millions of dollars, representing the interest of people from the richest to the poorest and perhaps persons now dependent upon such dividends for maintenance."

The law and order leagues, aware of the successful employment of propaganda techniques, know that ambiguity of statement and the invocation of patriotic symbols are far more effective in

winning middle-class support than any blunt assertion of basic purpose. The National Association of Manufacturers was told in 1903 that its "duty is to arouse the great middle class to realization of what trades unionism really means. It is to show why it is a system that . . . (is) a bar to all true progress, a danger to the state and a menace to civilization."

The propaganda techniques employed by the citizens' committee to alienate the community from striking workers and to break the morale of the latter have been very fully developed in recent years. Propaganda directed to this end seeks to turn public sympathy against the strikers, shut off the sources of outside aid or relief, and thus bring additional pressure upon the labor organizations involved. The community is reached in a vital spot by a flood of statements detailing the current economic losses incurred by union activity and the permanent loss of economic opportunity which must follow. This is accompanied by sensational accounts of labor violence and lawlessness, which are always pointed up so as to make unionization and violence to life and property synonymous in the public mind.

The labor groups involved are directly attacked by a propaganda barrage designed to split the rank-and-file from the strike leaders. The former are represented as being wholly satisfied with working conditions. The latter are painted as "foreign" agitators or outsiders who inspire social conflict for their own personal and dishonest ends. "Citizens' meetings," newspapers and house-to-house interviews have all tended to make these views an integral part of community opinion. The Sherwood Detective Agency, for example, was found by the Senate Civil Liberties Committee to have developed successful techniques for the mobilization of "community sentiment." To a prospective client they displayed "enrollment slips" of a "Citizens' Welfare Committee" it had organized and "a large full page ad . . . they handled. . . . They sent men from door to door to get citizens to sign these membership slips, and if possible to get them to contribute to advertisements which would be run over the name of the so-called citizens' welfare organization, saying good things about the company and endeavoring in that way to promote a friendly public attitude to support the company."

### PRESSURE TACTICS

It is only a small step from the manipulation and control of community opinion during labor disputes to organized intimidation. And between the latter and the application of economic coercion and violence it is impossible to draw any precise line. In the extension of pressure tactics into physical force the citizens' committee plays a vital rôle. Violence is invoked not only directly to intimidate the workers, but also to secure publicity and cause a revulsion of feeling among the "respectable" groups of the community. Through its propaganda the law and order league increases social tension. The stage is then set for violence and permits the law and order league to function in behalf of the "public welfare." It then becomes an organ of repression working hand in hand with the police and the courts and, where troops have been called out, with the military authorities.

This type of behavior pattern appears time and time again in the history of American labor disputes. It is clearly apparent in the industrial strife in Washington prior to the World War, where there occurred, with the connivance of the civil authorities, what history has recorded as the "Everett Massacre," in which seventeen lumbermen were killed. A law and order league was set up, and shortly expanded its activities from Everett to Centralia. The inspired conflict which ensued led to the calling out of troops to "wipe out" the "foes of government." Soldiers in uniform crowded the courtrooms while labor leaders were sentenced at the behest of the citizens' committee.

There can be no disagreement among citizen, striker, or observer that the purpose of the citizens' committee is to create a social tension if it is to achieve its purpose. It can justify its existence or program only on the assumption that law and order have broken down. Its task is thus clear: a fiction of violence and disorder is to be established. On June 20, 1937, when the Massillon Law and Order League was in full swing and demanding fifty armed policemen, Colonel Lawler, an observer for the National Guard, informed the city officials that he had "ridden around the picket lines and that from his observations, Massillon was in fine condition, everything was pretty peaceful. . . ." He

ended by complimenting the city officials, saying that "they had it well in hand. . . ." According to the claims of the Johnstown Citizens' Committee it had "only one purpose to accomplish, that of re-establishing law and order through normal governmental agencies." If law and order are not lacking, and the citizens' committees feel it necessary to aid the arms of government to establish what already is present, either their idea of "law and order" differs from the normal concept, or their real intentions are not stated, or both.

The number of instances in which the citizens' committee has functioned as an extra-legal military organization is often overlooked. The "Citizens' Committee of Five Hundred" of Leadville, Colorado, formed in 1880 as a semi-military organization to disrupt labor unions, "asked all businessmen to close their stores, take arms in their hands, and, by force . . . disperse the strikers." In the 1870's the Committee of Safety of San Francisco collected all the available arms and ammunition in the city within forty-eight hours of its inception, and federal military authorities "agreed to supply it with rifles, carbines and ammunition." The Committee of Safety thought it inadvisable to equip its members with firearms for fear they might "riot and pillage under cloak of the organization," and an effective substitute was found in hickory pick-handles which the Committee purchased and distributed among its membership. In 1937 the Johnstown Citizens' Committee was the medium by which weapons were placed in the hands of the police.

#### ORGANIZED INTIMIDATION

In some instances citizens' committees, in order to provide a basis for the suspension of civil liberties, have even created conditions which give warrant for the charge of insurrection and the erection of a military junta. Once a state of insurrection has been declared, they have felt themselves free to invade homes, make arrests without warrants, imprison men without charges of crime and suspend the writ of habeas corpus.

When the owner of the largest industrial plant in Ilion (New York) informed the little businessmen in 1936 that the town *had been* a "very good manufacturing place" until the union came



into the picture, they knew what was expected of them. They launched a program which, within two weeks, broke a strike of 1800 employees. A rumor—later proved to be untrue—was spread that 500 men were marching on the town. The mayor was coerced to declare "a state of emergency in the Village of Ilion and that all roads and entrances be blocked and nobody allowed to enter the village." With that declaration "law and order" broke loose: Ilion became an armed camp, separated from the outside world. Deputies and special police armed with shotguns patrolled the streets. Headquarters of labor unions were padlocked. Homes of striking workers were visited by foremen; the men were given a deadline by which to return to jobs. With the village thus turned into a fort, these measures could have but one effect: the workers were demoralized and the strike was broken. The suspension of civil liberties was merely part of an attempt to make Ilion once again a "very good manufacturing place." Characteristic was the reply given to the contention that these actions were unlawful: "Legal or not, we done it," said the authorities.

A common device of the citizens' committee is the deportation of union organizers or members. Organizers in the course of the 1919 steel strike had such experiences, and in recent years union representatives and organizers have been forcibly expelled from many communities. Such deportations normally follow well-directed emotional incitements to violence. The Citizens' Protective League of Colorado warned the populace that "Moyer is coming to Idaho Springs tomorrow . . . that if the people allow him to land his feet in Clear Creek County they are dirty, arrant cowards." No less incendiary was the statement of the Citizens' Protective League of Centralia that "It's a damned shame that these men should be permitted to remain in town. Law or no law . . . they wouldn't stay here twenty-four hours if 'the committee' had its way."

It is not always possible or feasible to dump destitute union workers miles from habitation or to deport union organizers. Sometimes the citizens' committee operates as a terroristic body within the city to effect its end. Thus, the Citizens' Committee

to Enforce the Landis Award had a "protection department" of several hundred guerillas under the direction of an ex-army officer. Chicago was divided into districts, each under the surveillance of a squad of guards equipped with high-power automobiles. The normal concomitants of the activities of such "protective" agencies are sluggings, bombings and obviously the destruction of the most basic civil liberties.

#### IT CAN HAPPEN HERE

When such acts of violence are not actually supported by the civil authorities, they are frequently overlooked. On occasion a hostile or recalcitrant local government has been coerced and even supplanted by the law and order league. A Senate investigation some thirty years ago reported that in Teller County, Colorado, in 1904, a "mob, organized and acting with deliberate forethought, headed by prominent citizens, but none the less a mob pure and simple, was overthrowing city governments, destroying property, arresting and forcibly deporting citizens" in the name of "law and order." The Special Commissioner appointed by Governor Hiram Johnson to investigate the disturbances in San Diego in 1912 was "frank to confess that when he became satisfied of the truth of the stories . . . it was hard for him to believe that he was not sojourning in Russia, conducting his investigation there."

Many years later, in 1936, the California lettuce strikers broke the word to the outside world with a telegram: "Sinclair Lewis should be informed that it did happen in Salinas. It was directed from outside the affected zone of Monterey County. It embraces all civil governments, including courts. The State Militia and State High Patrol are directed by a civilian local committee acting as the head of a provisional dictatorship. It indicates long preparation, prior rehearsal and the work of men who know law and understand public psychology. . . ." At about the same time Governor Benson of Minnesota, was lecturing the leaders of a citizens' committee: "You people pose as the defenders of law and order, but you are the criminals and should be behind bars."

Where the press has stood in the way of vigilante activities conducted by citizens' committees, it has been sharply handled. The records show that editors have been threatened, kidnapped and arrested. Press censorship has been exercised in the most ruthless fashion. Because *Il Lavatore Italiano* had stated that the Citizens' Alliance had contributed \$30,000 for the maintenance of troops in the southern coal fields of Colorado, its office was seized and entire editions confiscated. In the widespread outcry for blood and vengeance after the Centralia bombing the *Seattle Union Record* dared to write an editorial, "Don't Shoot in the Dark," pleading that calm justice be extended to the accused members of the Industrial Workers of the World. This led to the arrest and indictment of several members of the staff and the closing of the plant by the Federal authorities.

#### ECONOMIC WEAPONS

The law and order leagues are also generally able to muster effective economic weapons to implement the program of propaganda and violence. The boycott is successfully used against recalcitrant employer, middle-class and working-class elements. Where small businessmen are dependent upon industrial lords for their economic life—their stores, their banks, and their loan associations—they can nearly always be forced into the anti-labor camp. A Senate investigation disclosed that in Colorado some thirty-eight years ago "many persons joined the alliance because they believed that if they did not they would be boycotted by the members of the alliance. It is also certain that there were many members of the alliance who were not in sympathy with its methods." The Citizens' Alliance of Cripple Creek furnished its members with a periodical list of firms which did not belong to the organization with the admonition: "You can govern yourself accordingly." Foreshadowing more recent tactics was the policy of the Citizens' Committee to Enforce the Landis Award which urged Chicago bankers not to lend money for building projects unless the builders would agree to enforce the terms of the award.

Close cooperation between those who control the channels of newspaper advertising and the citizens' committee has given the latter great power. There are cases where firms failing to

cooperate with the committee have been shut off from advertising in the local newspapers. The working agreement between the Denver Advertisers' Association and the Citizens' Alliance had the support of the largest mercantile interests of the locality. The Alliance urged upon the Advertisers' Association "the importance of cooperating" and requested the Association "to so place its advertising matter as to assist in upbuilding, instead of tearing down, business interests, to the end that a just and conservative policy may be adopted and advocated by the daily press." These two organizations instituted a rigid boycott against two daily newspapers which offended by their disapproval of the blacklisting and deportation policies of the Mine Owners' Association and the Citizens' Alliance.

In exerting financial pressure against striking workers, the citizens' committee endeavors to stop loans and to encourage foreclosures. In mining areas, it attempts to make cash the only medium of purchase; the striking miner, who is paid fortnightly when he is employed, is forced to choose between starvation and his union. Pressure of this type was employed in Johnstown, and is poignantly illustrated by the letter sent by the proprietor of a general merchandising store to the wife of a striker at the Bethlehem Steel plant.

"I guess you have heard about it. We are very sorry, because we have to stop all accounts. Because the wholesaler they have stopped all of our accounts and put us on a cash basis.

"So since we have to pay cash for everything we must get cash for everything too. So please don't feel offend, because we can't help it. We want to stay in business.

"After this is all over, we will gladly open your accounts again. . . . I feel very, very sorry."

During the Remington Rand strike of 1936, members of the citizens' committee used their economic power to coerce city officials. The Mayor of Ilion, one of the largest property owners

in the town, explained to union leaders "that he was compelled to do things that he didn't want to do, because . . . he could easily be a ruined man and have nothing left but his hat, coat and pants if these people were to clamp down on him as they were able to do and in a manner which he felt fearful they would do."

#### A LAW UNTO ITSELF

According to its public pronouncements, the citizens' committee serves only the community and its welfare. Actually, the "public" of the community remains inarticulate. Created by employer interests, the committee always remains faithful to its progenitor. When violence appears in the locale where the committee operates, the committee sets itself up as a law unto itself, presenting the argument that laws and courts are inadequate in a particular crisis. The Citizens' Protective League of Idaho Springs, for example, arrested, imprisoned and banished a score of men without a warrant or proper legal procedure. In the decision granting an injunction against the Protective League, the presiding judge said, "The action of the Idaho Springs mob—I take pains to use that term—in running out of town, with threats of violence, the officials of the miners' union was sheer anarchy, an outrageous violation of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the humblest person."

The Denver Citizens' Alliance, however, characteristically defended this recourse to the law of the jungle: "The recent action of the Citizens' Protective Alliance of Idaho Springs, which, while technically speaking, was without due process of law, yet, nevertheless, from the standpoint of expediency and self-defense, was calculated to save lives, liberty and property. Now, therefore, we . . . believe that the businessmen of Idaho Springs acted within that higher and unwritten code of self-preservation to which resort must always be had by men when there is no speedy and adequate remedy at law." In defending the destruction of free speech by physical coercion, it was even argued that "If the sword of our own law is turned against us we claim the right, under the unwritten law, to resort to the law of nature."



**THREAT TO CIVIL LIBERTIES**

The hearings and reports of the La Follette Committee have made available a wealth of information concerning the character and the work of the citizens' committees which have operated in recent years, and remedial legislation has been introduced. But this may not lead to a decline in the employment of the citizens' committees device. It may result in the development of more subtle and effective techniques used by organizations of this type. As organized labor grows in numbers and militancy, as the Federal and State governments equalize the power of participants in industrial conflict through laws and administrative agencies, and as the cry of defense is raised to obscure partisan attacks, the employers' need for appealing to the "public" or community will increase.

It is, therefore, likely that the citizens' committee, or the equivalent of employer-fostered lawlessness, will become a more marked and significant element in the pattern of industrial strife than it has been for the past half-century. If this occurs, the citizens' committee will play an even more significant rôle than its obvious and direct one in industrial conflict. It will undoubtedly affect the worth and meaning of traditional American civil rights and liberties which are under fire from other quarters. This is clear, for its actions and avowed sentiments imply an initial denial of the basic worth of those very civil rights and liberties. Furthermore, the history of the citizens' committees of the past makes it plain that a vast portion of our people are so unconcerned with the preservation of civil liberties that they can be easily induced to withdraw them from what, at the moment, "public" sentiment stamps as an objectionable group in the community.

# PROPAGANDA BY SHORT WAVE: LONDON CALLING AMERICA

By HAROLD N. GRAVES, JR.

Reviewing British broadcasts from the beginning of the war, the author concludes that they seem to have followed American opinion more than they have attempted to lead it. Mr. Graves is Director of the Princeton Listening Center, which records and transcribes short-wave broadcasts from Europe. Readers of the *QUARTERLY* will recall that in the December issue he analyzed German broadcasts to the United States, and in September described Lord Haw-Haw's radio campaign against Britain.

**T**WO DAYS before the British Government itself, the British Broadcasting Corporation went to war. Home listeners were reduced from two program services to one. New programs for European audiences were instituted. Telecasting was suspended; fittingly, the last image thrown on English video screens was a Disney caricature of Garbo which sighed, "Ay tank ay go home."

From September 1, 1939, the BBC concentrated on the sound of persons and people at war. The despondent voice of Neville Chamberlain explaining the "bitter blow" of German aggression, the hollow clatter of life in the vaults of the Maginot Line, the complacent words of British officials, the ear-splitting noises of aircraft factories, the voices of Frenchmen pleading for help, Englishmen themselves asking for succor, the brusque accents of Winston Churchill, the imperious and perhaps inspiring commands of "*moi, le Général de Gaulle*," the roar of Hurricanes in flight—all these have become part of the record.

Perhaps not at the beginning of the war, but certainly by the end of the conflict's first year, the BBC was the most prodigious broadcasting enterprise in the world. In September 1940 it was broadcasting nearly 70 news bulletins a day to audiences outside the United Kingdom. From one midnight to the next, its total output amounted to 200,000 words. It spoke in two dozen languages, including French, German, Italian, Norwegian, Danish, Spanish, Portuguese, Afrikaans and American.

Abandoning peacetime etiquette, the BBC has struck across frontiers closed by war. Its speakers have urged Germans and Frenchmen to revolt; its linguistic proxy for Churchill has intimated to Italians that now is the time to get rid of Mussolini. To Americans, the BBC has said, "Grow not weary in well-doing, nor tarry. The hour is dark; the peril is great. The danger will be met and surmounted. Help us to help the world breathe the breath of freedom." This was in the dark days of last June; five months later, a BBC speaker contended that "the real comradeship between the British Empire and America is now beginning to be created . . . the third stage when the faults on both sides are recognized as inevitable, when there comes that delightful realization that now we know everything about one another we can receive no more shock."

Possibly, no official of the Corporation realized during the early months of war that such words might be sent overseas. No distinctions were made for American listeners. The repetitious broadcasts of the Overseas Service were beamed first to one section of the Empire and then to another. The United States appeared to receive programs incidentally; it only happened to lie along the same ethereal path as Canada and Bermuda.

Wartime emphasized that the BBC was not a private corporation, but actually lay somewhere between this estate and that of a government agency. The Postal Ministry's peacetime power of censorship over broadcast material had been largely hypothetical. When this prerogative passed into the hands of the wartime Ministry of Information, British broadcasters began to operate under the same limitations as American radio correspondents in London, who were never told what to say, but sometimes were instructed what not to say. Further back even than the process of censorship lay official reticence, and both operated to the detriment of the BBC. On April 6, 1940, for example, London's audiences in America were told that Allied notes just handed to Norway and Sweden consisted "for the most part" of inquiries into the Scandinavian diplomatic position following the conclusion of the Russo-Finnish war. On the next day, Allied naval units mined Norwegian waters.

**OPTIMISM AND CONFUSION**

In the BBC's tradition of education and intellectual betterment of the masses, a parade of authorities passed before the microphones of the Empire Service. Oxford University professors discussed the niceties of international law and the significance of economic warfare. Retired army officers spoke of the Buddhist hierarchy in Tibet and the marriage customs of Nepalese royalty. Consular visitors outlined the geography of Trinidad and Cyprus. Various aspects of British life were discussed by a contingent of political and other group spokesmen. Most of the BBC speakers, indeed, were experts, but not in the field of broadcasting. Sir Walter Citrine, trade-union leader, for example, began a talk on March 5, 1940, "Well . . . I don't suppose anybody wants to bother about the history of trade unionism. . . ."

As a matter of policy, the BBC was more jealous of Britain's reputation than the censors themselves. American press dispatches from London frequently carried overtones of doubt or difficulty which did not filter through the microphones of Broadcasting House. The "propaganda of optimism" disparaged by Sidney Rogerson, the British publicist, was the chief stock in trade of London stations. A nostalgic remembrance of what the BBC was saying to its English-speaking audiences in the winter of 1939-40 will illustrate: "Figures were issued tonight to show that there are now six times the number of munitions factories than there were two years ago. . . . I have just returned from Australia. I find everyone doing the same thing—working their fingers to the bone to win the war. . . . In India, so many people have offered themselves for service that they have had to be refused. . . . The Maginot Line is the most powerful fortress in the world. . . . The millions of Frenchmen who today mount guard along the Rhine receive deep satisfaction from seeing alongside them a British Army which also counts its soldiers by the millions. . . ."

The propaganda of optimism and the confusion of censorship began to reach a climax on April 8, one day after the Allied violation of Norwegian neutrality and one day before Germany invaded both Norway and Denmark. Said a news broadcast on this day: "British submarines sank a German troopship . . . the

*Rio de Janeiro* . . . only this afternoon just outside Norwegian territorial waters in the Skagerrak. . . . This activity by the British Navy is in striking contrast to the conduct by the German Navy, which continues to stay in the comparative safety of its own ports. All day, there have been reports that German warships were steaming northward as if to take action in response to the Allied stoppage of ore traffic from Narvik, but tonight, it was officially denied in Berlin that . . . warships had ventured out of port. . . . Whether true or not, tonight's German denial does nothing to remove suspicions caused by the presence of a German troopship off the Norwegian coast. . . . The official communique issued in Oslo . . . which demanded the immediate removal of the Allied mines . . . has not satisfied Germany. The demand was described by the German wireless tonight as 'not strong enough.' . . . But beyond tonight's Berlin radio suggestion . . . there is no sign of German action in reply to the Allied move."

Along with the British and American press, the BBC reported the Norwegian campaign through rose-colored glasses. On May 1, the BBC reported a German retreat at one point of "more than 50 miles"; on May 2, the evacuation of British forces from southern Norway was announced; and on May 3, the evacuation from central Norway began.

#### "BRITAIN SPEAKS" MORE DISTINCTLY

During the Battles of France and Flanders, more heroic measures were clearly required. On May 28, the BBC took a step unprecedented in its history. It inaugurated a thrice weekly (now daily) talk entitled, "Britain Speaks." Ostensibly aimed at "North America," it was nevertheless directed to listeners in the United States. From this nucleus there eventually grew a new "North American Transmission," inaugurated on July 7, after the capitulation of France, and increased in length from five hours to six on September 29.

Canadian announcers were borrowed to broadcast in American style. News "bulletins," which had been half an hour in length, were reduced to 15 minutes. Simultaneously, a change took place in the type of commentators employed by the BBC. The experts, although some were retained, were for the most



part discarded in favor of a corps whose *métier*, in one guise or another, was language. At present, scratching a BBC commentator is likely to reveal either a novelist, a playwright, a journalist or an actor. The following list is representative: Herbert Hodge and William Holt, a London taxi-driver and a Yorkshire weaver, respectively, but veteran broadcasters both; J. B. Priestley, novelist; Clemence Dane, playwright; George Slocombe, a newspaperman who has been publicly commended by Cabinet Ministers and mentioned in a White Paper for distinguished journalism; and Leslie Howard, whose playing of Romeo to the American public retains some of the quality of his performances on the American screen.

The story, perhaps apocryphal, is told that when the BBC began its service in Arabic in 1938, it led off with announcement of the execution of a popular Arab chieftain. By contrast, virtually the first words spoken by Vernon Bartlett, journalist and Member of Parliament, in introducing "Britain Speaks" were these: "But of course I'm a propagandist. Who isn't? Passionately, I want my ideas—our ideas—of freedom and justice to survive." Americans may also be reassured by the frequent demonstrations on the part of London commentators of familiarity with and understanding of the American scene. Priestley, for instance, has sighed for "some of America's noblest produce, including a flask of rye or bourbon." Howard has broadcast soliloquies about "the New York skyline at dusk . . . the hoot of the Santa Fe train . . . those grand open spaces west of the Rockies . . . and most of all the golden land of California."

#### OBJECTIVES OF COUNTER-PROPAGANDA

As a group, the BBC commentators work at direct cross-purposes with the Berlin broadcasters who also talk to North America. They seem most likely to appeal to a literate, middle and even upper class audience which can provide opinion leadership. They may unite sentiment and relieve group tensions. Their symbols—Christianity, civilization, democracy, freedom, honor, the English-speaking peoples—are broad enough to spread umbrella-like over a multitude of geographical sections and political attitudes. Although they may stress different ideas at different

times and even radiate contradictory theses, they apparently feel no necessity for volatile and opportunist shifting of arguments from day to day.

From the point of view of the Berlin commentators, it is enough to provide incentives for Americans to stand still. The BBC speakers must provide incentives for forward movement for aid to Britain. This may be clearly appreciated if the themes of the BBC are cast in the form of rebuttals to obstructive arguments.

*Britain is losing the war.* Of all ideas, this is perhaps the most prejudicial to the British cause, since Americans have shown the strongest tendency to support aid for Britain in moments of confidence. In news programs and talks alike, the BBC spends well over half its time on various efforts to create confidence.

In news programs, the chief elements of British strength are tangible assets, either actual or on order: the activities of defense units and of the armed forces at home and abroad, the subscription to war loans, the arrival of or contracting for war supplies from overseas. Here the twin forces of optimism and censorship have survived. For many months during last summer and fall, for example, the BBC made virtually no mention of heavy losses of merchant shipping. In commentaries, too, it has been only recently that any impressive evidence of the hardships caused by German bombing has been given.

For many months, the excellence of British morale has been unquestionably the dominant theme of British commentaries. According to J. B. Priestley on June 7, "There is something in our nature that will not allow us to be beaten. . . . If necessary, we will die, but we will never give in." When new and unprecedentedly intense bombings were visited on London in the middle of September, an anti-aircraft gunner welcomed them: "Frankly, we were getting rather bored." In a characteristic mood, Herbert Hodge mused on October 12, "We are getting on with our jobs. The air raids haven't stopped us. We're still managing to keep our wheels turning. And when you come to weigh it up, it is us millions of ordinary folk, turning our million little cogs, who are going to decide the issue in the end."

On December 3, Major L. M. Hastings visited a restaurant in a railroad station; he described his experience two days later:

"I found a window seat next to an old lady who had reached the coffee stage and had taken out her knitting. A minute or two after, just after I sat down, up came the howl of the banshee air-raid warning. What a beast of a noise! This particular siren was close to the window and sounded like the scream of a cow elephant. . . . What happened? Nothing. Nobody bothered. Nobody moved. . . . Waitresses went on their quiet rounds. The old lady, spectacles on nose, was she interrupted? Not she. Did she drop a stitch? Not on your life." Against the air raids, Hodge testified again on January 5, "The spirit of the people rose like a giant."

*Britain is attempting to muddle through.* Perhaps the feeling prevails in many American minds that British unpreparedness and complacency are still at work. The BBC labored most vigorously to dispel this feeling in June and July. During the days of Dunkerque, Miss Lloyd George, daughter of the former British Prime Minister, declared: "A miraculous change has taken place. The whole sentiment of the nation has altered. . . . This battle has taught us not to underestimate the quality of the enemy we have to defeat." "We have to admit," said Bartlett on June 16, "we've been slow in realizing the size of the job ahead of us." Relatively frank self-criticism has survived, together with the appreciation of difficulties and dangers that lie in the future. Said Priestley on December 8: "It's no secret that we shall have to cut down our scale of living. This isn't going to be an easy winter. . . . In spite of our recent successes in the eastern Mediterranean . . . the . . . duties of our Navy have been immensely increased and extended. It can do with a great many more destroyers. Recent sinkings . . . have been considerable."

*Britain is a plutocracy not worth aiding.* In opposition, the BBC has placed constant stress on the war effort of humble men and women. Consider, for example, a news item broadcast on December 7. It concerned war-fund collections made in a leprosarium of British Guiana: "One attendant gave nearly 20 per cent, and one patient gave all he earned one month. An old man from India, who was very poor, produced 24 cents wrapped in a piece of paper when the appeal was translated to him."

In addition, many BBC commentators have at one time or another expressed disapproval of privilege and excessive wealth. According to Priestley, "The kindest way to deal with the very rich is to stop them from being very rich." A peer of the realm, Lord Elton, testified on July 5, "It is clear that this war is going to put an end to what there is left of economic privilege." "At last," said Sir Hugh Walpole on December 8, "I think that we are . . . becoming the kind of democracy that we ought always to have been. . . . We shall never, I firmly believe and hope, be a snobbish country again. Class differences are breaking down everywhere, and for good. And we will never allow after this war the conditions of housing horrors, malnutrition of children, the (despair) of the distressed areas. No one will perhaps be ever very rich in England again, but I hope and pray to God no one will."

*This is a European war; it has nothing to do with America.* On this point, the BBC has been very voluble, asserting for example, that "this is a world conflict or it is nothing." Said Wickham Steed on June 18, "This is a civil war, not national, not imperialistic, certainly not capitalistic, but a war for the right of men to lead decent, law-abiding lives, to think their own thoughts, to speak their own minds, to be able to call their souls their own." Herbert Hodge meditated on October 5, "When I got to weighing it all up, I saw it wasn't simply a case of being pro-British or pro-German. This was a world affair, and the only way a man could see it clearly was by looking at it as a citizen of the world."

Furthermore, the BBC has maintained, America and Britain have everything to do with each other. In material matters, Britain's men and women are "a first line of defense for the other side of the Atlantic." "As Mr. Roosevelt has so rightly said," said commentator A. G. MacDonell on October 13, "to further aggressors by withholding aid from those who stood in their way would merely hasten the attack on the Americas." Harking simultaneously to John Donne and Ernest Hemingway, Leslie Howard declared on December 10, "There are men and women in London tonight who know well for whom that bell tolls. There are men and women in Birmingham, and in Bristol and Southampton, and

Portsmouth and Coventry who have heard it tolling. And perhaps across thousands of leagues of the ocean, in the country where the tongue of Shakespeare, Milton and John Donne is still the . . . speech of the people . . . the bell tolls, too, and in your heart, an English poet out of the heroic past utters his prophetic warning: 'It tolls for thee.'"

#### ACCENT ON COMMON INTERESTS

Ideology is the chief basis for the common interests which the BBC describes. A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, declared on July 13, "I would urge . . . that the great American nation consider and recognize that the fight we wage today is as much a fight for the preservation of their national heritage, and for all the sacrifices evoked by such men as Jefferson and Lincoln, as it is a fight for the preservation of England's green and pleasant land." Ignoring Magna Charta, Wickham Steed has proclaimed the Declaration of Independence to be the fountain of liberties enjoyed by Americans and Englishmen. George Washington, American listeners are told, was a "British colonial officer" at the time of the outbreak of the American Revolution.

"How idiotic it is," Leslie Howard suggested on October 28, "that the citizens of the British Commonwealth and the United States, drawn towards each other as they are by language, common form of government, freedom of speech and literature, justice and equality before law, political and religious total liberty, individualism and ways of life—how idiotic it is that these great and enlightened peoples should still regard each other politically as foreigners. . . . Today, when the fate of the English-speaking peoples stands against a violent attempt at destruction, (the) great principle of union is being openly and hopefully discussed. Our own Prime Minister has hinted at it."

Subsequently, literature and language have begun to support the burden of this BBC argument. A Captain Hamilton, in ordinary life a publisher, asserted on December 10 that contemporary American writers "have made America so vital a reality we can live in it through the din of bombs and AA guns. . . . Few British philosophers have affected thought in this country more deeply than George Santayana. The historical studies of James



Truslow Adams, the poetry of Robert Frost, Vachel Lindsay and Edna St. Vincent Millay have all made a direct appeal to British sympathy." "Maybe it's no accident," speculated Ronald Cross, Shipping Minister, on December 18, "that in every country where English is the nation's language you find free people enjoying self-government under democratic constitutions. As we look back, we see the English language and self-governing institutions going hand in hand down the ages. . . . With our own resources and with American supplies, we can see our way to the end." Leslie Howard added on December 23, "One thing we have contributed to the civilization of the world that was new and our own—something of which the Germans have never known the meaning, something called tolerance. All the English-speaking nations have planted that flower of civilization wherever they have taken up their government."

*There is something to be said for other special points of view.* Various leaders and opinion groups who disagree with the BBC have occasionally received special attention. A lifetime pacifist was presented on one occasion to argue against pacifism. Although they did not mention Anglo-Irish issues, Catholic priests have given at least four talks in support of the British cause.

Speakers have been especially severe with American isolationists and defeatists, among whom the BBC has included Colonel Lindbergh and the late Senator Pittman. "Good God!" Priestley exploded on July 14, "when we think of the misery brought to such decent simple folk all over Europe, perhaps soon all over the world, by these power-crazed Nazis and their hordes of screaming, demented followers, it makes us wonder why the whole world doesn't rise up in its wrath and put an end to these lunatics once and for all. All this patter about non-belligerence is like sitting down and doing crossword puzzles in front of a pack of ravening wolves."

A week later, Priestley implored Americans "to ask your commentators to spare us and you some of their ringside manners and remarks. People who are not prepared to fight for anything anywhere should not rebuke others because they can't undertake to fight for everything everywhere. . . . The isolationists aren't

particularly admired. . . . (Isolationism) is foolish because it denies the most obvious fact about the modern world, that is, the complete interdependence of all its parts. Isolationism is really taking a mental rocket to the moon. It just won't work, as our isolationists soon found out. . . . To imagine that the United States has no interest in this world of evil is like pretending in an earthquake that you may only be feeling a trifle giddy."

Of the Germans, the BBC has said with ostensible respect, "They still may do much by propaganda." "Britain Speaks," according to Bartlett's introduction, was instituted to provide a channel for more or less direct counter-propaganda. During his early weeks as a commentator last summer, Priestley repeatedly warned his audience, "Don't play the game *their* way." Those who accept non-British points of view still run the risk of being labeled real or unwitting German propagandists. On December 7, for example, one speaker acknowledged a letter from a friend in America: "'Dear Wes—I can only hope and pray you are alive and unharmed when this reaches you.' That's how you started, and the rest of your letter was even worse—ghoul stuff, with *crêpe* on it. Holy smoke, man, cheer up. . . . You must have been listening to old Joe Goebbels and believing him."

#### DRAMATIZING THE WAR

In presenting these themes, the BBC has attempted to quicken the responses and emotions of the listener by giving him a sense of the actuality of the war, and perhaps even the sense of being a participant in it. Dramatizations have taken Americans to war-time Germany (where there was grumbling about a food shortage), have allowed them to ear-witness the opening and de-capping of a magnetic mine still in the water, and have allowed them to participate in an R.A.F. bombing raid over Berlin.

BBC observers with recording units have visited battle-fronts and brought back the story in sound; one of the truly outstanding broadcasts of the war was the BBC's blow-by-blow, eyewitness report, complete with the sound of machine gun and anti-aircraft fire, of an actual air battle over the Channel. "Radio News Reel," a daily feature for Americans, frequently contains these so-called documentaries.

News and commentaries alike have been invested with a wealth of anecdote. Perhaps a majority of London's commentators function principally as roving reporters who dramatize the human-interest side of the war. There was the street vendor, for example, who took advantage of empty sidewalks during an air-raid alarm to set all his mechanical dolls going at once—"to give them an airing, the poor little blighters." There was the shop which, having suffered some damage from bombs, posted a sign: "Hitler was our last customer—will you be our next?"

The literary artistry of BBC commentators is put to full play. Listen to Richard Llewellyn on last January 11: "Come with me to a shelter in the East End. It's a perfect night for the bomber. London is white with moonlight and jeweled with the yellow diamonds, the rubies and the emeralds of the traffic lights. The roofs of some of the houses are warmly pink, reflecting a fire far over in the East End . . . where the sky blushes as though in shame of the stupidity going on below. Anti-aircraft fire throws a loose necklace of vicious pearls 'round and about. . . . As you travel, notice the gaps on either side of you . . . the roofless houses, fronts that are mere rags of bricks, loose electric signs. . . ."

#### APPEALS FOR AID INCREASING

Having presented motives for action, the BBC occasionally tells Americans what they should do. The frequency of requests for aid and cooperation have varied with circumstances; the latest idea to be presented is that help from the United States is the *sine qua non* of Allied victory. Last June, there were at least eight appeals for aid within a space of twenty days; but in a like sample of broadcasts there was only one in each of the four following months. On June 11, André Maurois, the French author, voiced an urgent appeal: "To hold on, we must receive help from our friends at once, the greatest possible help. It is not in 1941, it is not next autumn, it is not even next month that our friends should help us. It is now." On July 17, Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert asked for "aircraft, and after that, pilots." On October 2, he mentioned, more vaguely, that "anything you can do toward helping us . . . will be greatly appreciated."

Possibly because of greater need, possibly because of greater confidence in the receptivity of the American audience, requests for help and cooperation began to increase again as winter approached. On November 30, Sir Hugh Dalton, Minister for Blockade, declared that his countrymen were "deeply grateful . . . for the friendly cooperation which we have had from you already, both from the Administration and from American business men. Your shippers and ship owners have helped us to work the machinery of the blockade and the navicert system. This is most valuable help. . . . But there is much that you might do if you felt able, much more which you might do. You could refuse financial facilities to our enemies in your country. You could refuse to buy anything from them. That would deprive them of dollars which otherwise they might use for propaganda and spying and sabotage in your midst. You could demobilize all enemy ships in your ports. You could deny facilities to those neutral ships which we have publicly listed as likely blockade runners. . . . You could decline to trade with those firms in neutral countries whom we have blacklisted as friends of the enemy. . . . Last and most important, you could extend and tighten up your export control so as to ensure that no vital material gets through to the enemy."

Another guest speaker declared on December 7, "Believe me, we are grateful. . . . But we are not too polite to ask for more. . . . We say thank you from the bottom of our hearts, but we also say, *keep it up*. We can use all those things that you can send, and some cargo ships wouldn't be out of place, either." "The day will dawn," promised Leslie Howard on December 16, "when we shall be victorious, *if, if* you do not waver, if you do not lose faith, if you do not listen to the doubters, if you speed your great organizations to send us what we need."

Although the intimate and direct address of BBC speakers today is as different from their early tone as acquaintance is from marriage, the British radio appears to have followed American opinion more than it has attempted to lead it. At the outbreak of the Russo-Finnish war, for example, Wickham Steed somewhat timidly suggested that Soviet aggression might have repercussions

in the United States. On last January 4, the BBC reported a contrasting item: "A message from Washington says that the Democratic Senator from Virginia, Mr. Glass, who celebrated his 83rd birthday yesterday, declared in an interview that the United States Navy should be sent over to blast hell out of Germany."

Possibly, the BBC's greatest problem in approaching its propaganda-shy American audience was to keep opinion moving in a suitable direction without giving offense by too overt pressures. But now, said Leslie Howard on December 16, "The united British Commonwealth and the United States have surely got beyond the point of . . . niceties. We have arrived at the stage at which we must tell each other openly what is in our hearts and minds. . . . I say to hell with whether what I say sounds like propaganda or not. I have never stopped to figure it out, and I don't think it matters any more."



# THE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS AND THE 1940 ELECTION

By DANIEL KATZ

What factors make or break the polls in predicting elections? Why did Gallup, with his achievement of the lowest state-by-state error in polling history, regard the presidential contest as too close to justify a definite prediction? How did the *Fortune* Survey again predict almost the exact percentage of votes received by the President? What did the 1940 polling experience contribute to the science of public opinion measurement? In discussing the answers to these questions, Dr. Katz, a social psychologist at Princeton University and a pioneer in the field of attitude and opinion measurement, inquires into the polling methods used to forecast the 1940 election.

BEFORE November 5, 1940, when the figures of the Gallup poll showed that President Roosevelt would be reelected, General Hugh Johnson in a diatribe against public opinion polls promised to eat his column if the Gallup poll were correct. Upon being reminded of this promise, he countered that it would not be difficult to swallow his 600 words since Gallup had already eaten his own figures the day before election.

A similar attitude toward the polls, more seriously expressed, was the evaluation of Arthur Krock in the *New York Times* on November 10, 1940, to the effect that if the polls had a four per cent margin of error they were of no use in a close election. And, he argued, since they were unnecessary in elections that were not close, they were of no use at all. On the other hand, the magazines *Time*, *Life* and *Tide* gave fairly discriminating praise to the work of the polls in 1940.

The student of public opinion, however, is interested in a more careful analysis of the polls than journal-

istic accounts can give the week after election. The problem of the accuracy of public opinion polls is a basic one, for unless they correctly reflect the state of the public mind there is little point in relying upon them for knowledge about trends of public opinion in relation to events, nor need they be considered as a device for extending the democratic process. Moreover, a study of the predictive performance of the polls should yield significant information for evaluating methods of research, both in the applied fields of public relations and in the general social science field.

For example, the experience of the polls in 1936 definitely proved two things about measuring the opinions of people. In the first place, they demonstrated that it is possible to set up a small stratified sample, representing a cross section of the population, which will yield more accurate returns than a large sample taken without regard to its representativeness. In the second place, they showed that the mail ballot is definitely inferior to the interview tech-

nique because of the selective error which the mail ballot introduces in eliciting a greater return from upper-income groups.<sup>1</sup> The better polls in 1940 did not employ the mail ballot. Research in the social sciences owed much to the polls of 1936 for their effective demonstration of these two points. The practical result has been an improvement in attempts to sample adequately and accurately. Have the polls of 1940 made similar contributions?

The first question to be answered about the 1940 public opinion polls concerns the nature of their predictive performance. How good were they in their forecasts of the outcome? This leads naturally to a more fundamental type of inquiry: why did the various polls achieve different records of prediction? What techniques led to good performance and what techniques to poor performance? What new knowledge of polling grew out of the 1940 experience as compared with polls of the past? In an attempt to answer these questions, some attention must be given to the reasons for the Roosevelt victory not in terms of a complete motivational analysis but in reference to the way income, age, and other groupings of the population divided on election day.

#### Major and Minor Polls

The predictive performance of the polls can be analyzed according to accuracy in predicting percentage of major party vote, number of electoral votes, state-by-state percentages and state-by-state pluralities. Before making such a detailed analysis, we may

consider first the general characteristics of the various polls and the general type of election they foresaw.

The three polls which entered the lists in 1940 with reputations for serious research are: the American Institute of Public Opinion, also known as the Gallup poll after its director Dr. George Gallup; the *Fortune* Survey conducted for the magazine *Fortune* by Elmo Roper; and Crossley Incorporated, a national research organization directed by Archibald M. Crossley.

All three organizations have now been in existence for more than four years, all use interviewers rather than the mail ballot, and all operate on the principle of the stratified sample. The stratified sample is a cross section, selected on the basis of its representativeness to the general population according to such criteria as income, age, place of residence, sex, and past voting behavior.

In addition to these three established polling organizations, some publicity was given in the 1940 election to the predictions of the *Pathfinder* magazine whose poll was conducted by its publisher, Emil Hurja; to Opinion Forecasts, Inc., directed by Edward Wall; and to the Dunn survey, the work of Rogers Dunn.

Though Emil Hurja was well aware of the disastrous experience of the *Literary Digest* with mail ballots, he relied heavily upon this technique in his *Pathfinder* poll. To avoid the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. D. Katz and H. Cantril, "Public Opinion Polls," *Sociometry*, 1937, 1:155-179; and G. Gallup and S. F. Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940).

upper-income bias of the old *Digest* poll he sent ballots to a supposedly representative cross section of the population. This procedure still presented two major problems: (1) finding lists of people thoroughly representative of the lower-income groups and (2) correcting for the bias in return from the more literate and verbally indignant people. Hurja's capability in the polling field is well known, but the difficulties of the mail ballot raise some question concerning the seriousness of the *Pathfinder* research.

The Wall poll is new to the field. It utilized the services of some of the interviewers of the Ross-Federal organization. Wall aspires to be a competitor of the American Institute of Public Opinion. Since Gallup sells his news releases to only one newspaper in a town, the Opinion Forecasts of Wall is seeking to sell to competing papers. In 1940 it publicized no state-by-state figures for the election and presented an estimate of only the national total. Its final release read not at all unlike an abbreviated version of the release of the American Institute. The Opinion Forecasts of Wall has yet to establish itself as an independent research organization on a par with the American Institute, the *Fortune* Survey, or the Crossley service.

Finally, the Dunn survey became known in 1940 through the eagerness with which Republican papers seized upon its findings. The Dunn survey, however, is not a poll in that it does not ask people to voice their opinions either in a mail ballot or in an oral interview. Rather, Dunn attempts to

estimate the opinions of people through measures of such secondary factors as newspaper circulation and amount of W.P.A. employment. These secondary sources are assumed to be determinants or correlates of public opinion.

#### Type of Election Foreseen

The three well-established polls, the *Fortune* Survey, the American Institute and the Crossley service, were in agreement that the election would be close in terms of the national vote. The figures of all three polls agreed, moreover, in forecasting a Roosevelt victory.

For Roper the outcome was not quite as close as Gallup and Crossley estimated. Roper thought the election might range between a very narrow victory for Willkie to a very substantial decision for Roosevelt with the chances, therefore, definitely in favor of the Democrats. Though his last figure showed Roosevelt ahead with 55.2 per cent of the major party vote, Roper held that the late trend was toward Willkie. Since his last figure was based on interviewing done in October, he was willing to concede that the trend away from Roosevelt might permit Willkie to squeeze by—but he regarded this as unlikely.

In a similar fashion Crossley held that the odds were definitely in favor of Roosevelt, since he needed to carry only the states which were on his side of the ledger; whereas Willkie needed not only to carry all the states credited to him but, in addition, a fair number of the states which the Crossley poll gave to Roosevelt by close margins.

Gallup presented his figures with a rather similar interpretation with the exception that he refused to make a definite prediction. Like Roper and Crossley he contended that if Willkie were to win he must get all the breaks, whereas Roosevelt needed only a single break to carry the election. Gallup, however, called attention to the error which attends all measurement whether of physical attributes or of public opinion. On the basis of the American Institute's previous experience in forecasting elections, he held that a 4 per cent margin of error should be allowed. This was a wholesome note to introduce into polling results as predictive devices, since it was an effective way of calling the attention of the public to the non-magical nature of all measurement. Nevertheless, to accept 4 per cent as the margin of error in sampling surveys of public opinion is scarcely justified, as will appear in subsequent discussion of reasons for poll inaccuracies.

Although the figures of the American Institute, the Crossley poll and the *Fortune* Survey were correct in predicting the outcome, the election itself was not as close as Gallup and Crossley anticipated. The electoral landslide can be discounted as not representing the proportion of voters preferring the Republican candidate. Nonetheless, the national popular vote gave Roosevelt 55 per cent of the major party vote—a decisive enough margin. Yet Roosevelt did not carry enough states by over 54 per cent to insure an electoral victory. He carried 26 states by more than 54 per cent of the major party vote.

These states gave him 225 electoral votes, or 41 less than needed to win in the electoral college. In this sense the election was close. But it does not appear close if we look at it from the Willkie side of the picture. Willkie carried only 5 states by over 54 per cent of the vote, with a total of 27 electoral votes. Hence though it is not correct to call the Democratic victory a landslide, neither was it a very narrow margin of victory or as close a proposition as the three leading polls made it out to be.

#### Conservative Stand of AIPO

The failure of the American Institute to make a prediction on the basis of a 4 per cent margin of error was very conservative in the light of its published data. The Institute gave Willkie 8 sure states with 54 electoral votes as against 21 sure states in the Roosevelt column with 198 electoral votes. The remaining 19 states were, according to the Institute's poll, within the 4 per cent margin of error. But since they were fairly closely divided in their election preferences, the chances that Willkie would have picked up the vast majority of them to raise his 54 votes to a majority of the electoral vote were exceedingly doubtful.

Especially is this true if we consider that six of these 19 were for Roosevelt by 53 or 54 per cent and only one of the 19 was for Willkie by as large a margin. The other 12 representing the high electoral total of 236 votes were divided in each instance by no greater than a 52-48 split. Of these states Willkie had to corral enough to pick up 208 elec-

toral votes; Roosevelt needed only 54 additional votes. Willkie needed at least 9 of the 12 borderline states to win, and moreover, not *any* 9 of the 12, but the 9 with the biggest electoral vote. Thus he had to have New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Missouri and one other state to obtain his 208 votes. On the other hand Roosevelt needed only New York and one other sizeable state, or failing New York any combination of two large states or three medium-size states. Thus the statistical odds on Roosevelt were very high even allowing for Gallup's margin of error.

#### Failure of Dunn and Hurja

Every election has its interesting and unorthodox prognosticators. In 1940 when the accepted polls were in general agreement about the odds against Mr. Willkie, Dunn's startling prediction of a Republican electoral landslide was given more space in Republican papers than the facts that Dunn had predicted a Landon vic-

tory four years before and that the Dunn survey is not a poll of people. In all fairness to Mr. Dunn it should be said that he never claimed to be conducting a public opinion poll. Moreover, he made several predictions during the campaign based upon different assumptions. The forecast which he emphasized unfortunately derived from incorrect premises. The other conspicuous failure of the 1940 election was the *Pathfinder* poll of Emil Hurja. Hurja gave Mr. Willkie a heavy margin of electoral votes with a narrow margin of the popular vote.

#### Predictions Vs. Results

To make the evaluation of the polls more specific, their figures can be compared with election results in a number of ways. The first gross measure of accuracy is the error in predicting the percentage of votes received by the winning candidate. In 1940 President Roosevelt received 55.0 per cent of the major party vote. Table I presents the predictions and errors of the various polls.

TABLE I  
Error in Percentage Points from Percentage of Major Party  
Vote of Winning Candidate

	Prediction	Error
Fortune (Roper)	55.2%	0.2
American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup)	52.0	3.0
Opinion Forecasts (Wall)	52.0	3.0
Pathfinder (Hurja):		
November 2	48.4	6.6
November 9	51.1	3.9
Dunn Survey	42.0	13.0

The Crossley poll reported percentages only for the 17 states which were close. In these states Crossley estimated that Roosevelt would receive about 50.4 of the major vote—an underestimation of about 2 per cent. The *Pathfinder* estimate which appeared in the November 9th issue was based upon returns received before November 5th according to the magazine. It is included here as a matter of record.



The *Fortune* Survey was remarkably accurate in forecasting the total vote. It named the correct percentage of votes Mr. Roosevelt received and duplicated its 1936 record (when it was off by only 1 per cent) in leading all polls in estimate of national vote. Gallup and Crossley were fairly close to the final total, whereas Hurja and Dunn obviously missed the boat.

The prediction of total national vote, however, should be the grossest and easiest prediction to make. If an organization covers most of the country in its survey, it can be fairly inaccurate in many sections and still come close to the final figure. Some of its mistakes in one direction should cancel out mistakes in the other direction. It is easier, for example, to predict the percentage of games a baseball team will win over a season than to name the outcome of each specific game. In the same way it is easier to name the national total fairly accurately than to be precise in predicting the vote of each of the forty-eight states.

The amazing accuracy of the *Fortune* prediction of the national vote becomes more amazing when its national total is broken down according to section of the country. Roper does not sample large enough numbers to justify a state-by-state prediction, but in the past election the editor of *Fortune* against Roper's judgment released the sectional figures which gave Roper his average of 55.2 per cent. They are presented in Table II in comparison with the figures of the American Institute of Public Opinion.

It is apparent from Table II that section by section the American Institute was much closer to the election results than *Fortune*. In no section of the country did the *Fortune* poll have as good an estimate as the Gallup poll. Moreover, in no section of the country was Gallup off by more than 4 per cent while Roper missed the Mountain States by 10 per cent and the East South Central by 12 per cent. Nevertheless, Roper's errors were more compensating in that in the South he overestimated the Democratic vote whereas in the rest of the country he underestimated the Democratic vote. Gallup, on the other hand, was consistent in underestimating the vote for President Roosevelt in all sections save the South Atlantic.

The first interpretation that comes to mind is that Roper had only variable or chance errors in his poll (and chance errors cancel out as do his North and South figures), while Gallup, though cutting down on chance error in remarkable fashion, ran into a constant error of overestimating the Republican vote. Certainly this is true of Gallup's figures, but closer inspection will show that Roper's data reveal a constant bias. In six of the sections, totalling 32 states, he overestimated the Republican strength and to a greater degree than did Gallup. Only in the southern states did he compensate by an overestimation of the Democratic vote.

Now this is not a case of chance errors cancelling themselves out. Roper's overestimation of the Democratic vote in the South would not balance

TABLE II

## Sectional Accuracy of the American Institute and Fortune Polls

	ELECTION RESULT	GALLUP POLL		FORTUNE POLL	
	% for Roosevelt	% for Roosevelt	Error	% for Roosevelt	Error
NEW ENGLAND	53.0	50.5	-2.5	48.4	-4.6
MIDDLE ATLANTIC (N.Y., N.J., Pa.)	52.3	49.3	-2.8	48.1	-4.2
EAST NORTH CENTRAL (Ohio, Ill., Ind., Mich., Wisc.)	51.0	47.8	-3.1	47.0	-4.0
WEST NORTH CENTRAL (Minn., Iowa, Mo., N.D., S.D., Neb., Kan.)	48.4	46.5	-1.8	41.6	-6.8
SOUTH ATLANTIC (Del., Md., Va., W.Va., N.C., S.C., Ga., Fla.)	67.7	67.8	+0.4	76.0	+8.3
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL (Ky., Tenn., Ala., Miss.)	67.9	65.0	-1.8	80.4	+12.5
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL (Ark., La., Okla., Tex.)	73.6	72.5	-0.6	81.5	+7.9
MOUNTAIN (Mont., Idaho, Wyo., Colo., N.Mex., Ariz., Utah, Nev.)	55.6	51.6	-3.9	45.1	-10.5
PACIFIC COAST	57.8	56.0	-1.8	50.8	-7.0
AVERAGE			2.3		7.3

his underestimation of the Democratic vote in the North, if proper allowance were made for the size of the voting population in these sections in relation to their total population.<sup>2</sup> The actual vote in the South is much smaller in proportion to its population than the vote of the North or West. In the 1940 election over 40 per cent of the population voted in almost every northern state, whereas only 5 per cent of the population of South Carolina, 8 per cent of Mississippi, 10 per cent of Georgia, Alabama and Arkansas cast ballots in the presidential election. This accounts for the large compensating

error which gave the *Fortune* Survey such an accurate forecast.

The sceptic, therefore, may question the nature of Roper's accuracy. It should be remembered, however, that Roper also hit the nail on the head in 1936. The odds are against one accurate chance estimate, but they are very high against two successful chance hits. Moreover, *For-*

<sup>2</sup> The nature of Roper's compensating error in the South is apparent if his national total of 55.2 is compared with his sectional figures. Allowance for the voting population of the South would reduce his national over-all prediction by at least 2 per cent.

tune surveys on public questions, taken from time to time, agree fairly well with those taken by the American Institute of Public Opinion. The answer may be that Roper realizes the upper-income bias in his northern sample and hence does not correct adequately for the voting population in the South. A month before the publication of his final returns, Roper stated that he expected to underestimate the Roosevelt vote in the North and overestimate it in the South. Since in 1936 these errors compensated nicely to give the right answer, Roper apparently thought it safer to stand by his data than to attempt corrective adjustments.

#### Forecast of Electoral Votes

In addition to predicting the national vote of the winning candidate, an adequate forecast should include some estimate of the number of states the winner will carry. The President of the United States is not elected by popular vote but by the vote of the electoral college. An accurate esti-

mate of the popular vote in a close election might fail to name the winner because a candidate could conceivably receive as much as 53 per cent of the popular vote and be defeated. In 1888 Cleveland received 51.4 per cent of the popular vote and yet lost to Harrison.

In Table III are the predictions of the number of states and the number of electoral votes made by the polls together with their errors.

The American Institute and the Crossley poll were both correct in assigning states to the rival candidates in about 83 per cent of the cases. But the eight states in which they erred were the states with the heavy electoral votes. Thus their predictions concerning electoral votes were only a little over 60 per cent correct.

In assigning electoral votes the *Pathfinder* poll and the Dunn survey were again wide of the mark. They were wrong more often than they were right, whereas a chance prediction would have been right

TABLE III  
Prediction of Electoral Vote

	NO. OF STATES AND ELECTORAL VOTES				<i>Electoral prediction</i>
	<i>Correctly predicted</i>		<i>Wrongly predicted</i>		<i>for Roosevelt†</i>
American Institute	40	358	8	173	276
Crossley*	40	379	8	152	297
Pathfinder:					
November 2	29	260	19	271	178
November 9	31	280	17	251	198
Dunn	21	206	19	282	124

(No study of 8 states totalling 43 electoral votes)

† Actually received 449 electoral votes.

\* Crossley's predictions about Connecticut and New York were not very clear. They were both called 50 minus for Willkie. In the above table this was interpreted in Crossley's favor to mean that these states showed less than 50 per cent of the major party vote and therefore were in the Democratic column.



TABLE IV

State-by-State Percentage and Plurality Errors  
of the Gallup and Crossley Polls

	<i>Election Result</i>	<i>Error in Percentage Points</i>		<i>Plurality Error</i>	
	<i>% for Roosevelt</i>	GALLUP	CROSSLEY	GALLUP	CROSSLEY
Alabama	85.6	+0.4		.8	
Arizona	63.8	-2.8		5.6	
Arkansas	79.0	+3.0		6.0	
California	58.1	-2.1		4.2	
Colorado	48.7	-3.7	+0.3	7.4	0.6
Connecticut	53.6	-0.6	-3.6	1.2	7.8
Delaware	54.8	+1.2		2.4	
Florida	74.0	-2.0		4.0	
Georgia	85.1	+1.9		3.8	
Idaho	54.5	-5.5		11.0	
Illinois	51.2	-3.2	-2.2	6.4	4.4
Indiana	49.3	-4.3	-2.3	8.6	4.6
Iowa	47.8	-2.8		5.6	
Kansas	42.7	+0.3		0.6	
Kentucky	57.6	-3.6		7.2	
Louisiana	85.9	+0.1		0.2	
Maine	48.8	-5.8		11.6	
Maryland	58.8	+0.2		0.4	
Massachusetts	53.4	-2.4	-3.4	4.8	6.8
Michigan	49.8	-1.8	-2.8	3.6	5.6
Minnesota	51.9	-0.9	+0.1	1.8	0.2
Mississippi	95.8	-1.8		3.6	
Missouri	52.4	-3.4	-0.4	6.8	0.8
Montana	59.4	-2.4		4.8	
Nebraska	42.8	-1.8		3.6	
Nevada	60.1	-4.1		8.2	
New Hampshire	53.2	-4.2	-6.2	8.4	12.4
New Jersey	51.8	+0.2	-0.8	0.4	1.6
New Mexico	56.7	-3.7		7.4	
New York	51.8	-2.8	-1.8	5.6	3.6
North Carolina	74.0	-2.0		4.0	
North Dakota	44.5	+1.5		3.0	
Ohio	52.2	-3.2	-1.2	6.4	2.4
Oklahoma	57.6	-1.6		3.2	
Oregon	54.1	-0.1	-2.1	0.2	4.2
Pennsylvania	53.5	-4.5	-3.5	9.0	7.0
Rhode Island	56.8	-2.8	-7.8	5.6	15.6



	Election Result % for Roosevelt	Error in Percentage Points		Plurality Error	
		GALLUP	CROSSLEY	GALLUP	CROSSLEY
South Carolina	95.6	+1.4		2.8	
South Dakota	42.6	-1.6		3.2	
Tennessee	67.5	-3.5		7.0	
Texas	80.8	-1.8		3.6	
Utah	62.4	-7.4		14.8	
Vermont	45.1	-3.1		6.2	
Virginia	68.3	+1.7		3.4	
Washington	58.9	-1.9		3.8	
West Virginia	57.1	+1.9		3.8	
Wisconsin	50.9	-2.9	-1.9	5.8	3.8
Wyoming	53.0	0.0	-5.0	0.0	10.0
Average State-by-State Error		2.4	2.7	4.8	5.4

but even then its state-by-state error was 4.6 per cent.

Crossley like Gallup had a low percentage error for the 17 states for which he gave specific figures. In these 17 states Gallup averaged 2.4, as he did for the other 31, while Crossley was slightly higher with 2.7. The curious thing about both the Gallup and Crossley results is that with such a low state-by-state error they missed the national total by a figure as great or greater than their average state-by-state error.

With a state-by-state deviation of 2.4 Gallup should have hit the national total within a fraction of 1 per cent. He had, however, a constant bias in his figures with very few compensating errors. In 35 states his prediction underestimated the Democratic vote and in only 12 did he overestimate it. Moreover, only one of the 10 errors in overestimating the Democratic vote was an error of more than 2 per cent, whereas 24 of the errors in underestimating the Democratic vote were over 2 per cent.

In other words, the large errors in prediction were almost all in one direction—that of overestimating the strength of the Republicans. Crossley's sample showed a similar bias.

#### Sources of Error

The releases of the American Institute consistently refer to a 4 per cent margin of error in sampling surveys of public opinion. Since the American Institute, the Crossley poll and the *Fortune* Survey (in its national estimate) were well within a 4 per cent margin, is there any problem in accounting for their inaccuracies? Are not these inaccuracies due to a sampling error inherent in all opinion measurement? The affirmative answer suggested by the Gallup emphasis upon a 4 per cent margin of error is, however, a misapprehension. Arthur Krock fastened onto the 4 per cent figure as if it were a margin of sampling error. As a matter of fact, however, this 4 per cent represents the average error of the American Institute in its election

surveys since the 1936 election and prior to the 1940 election and is not an expression of sampling error.

Now two types of error creep into most measurement. The first is variable error, or sampling error, commonly called probable error, and is the result of chance factors which bias the measurement as often in one direction as in another. The second type of error is constant, or systematic, error due to some loaded factor which consistently biases the sample in one direction. The first type of error can be taken into account by simple formulae which establish the probable accuracy of the measurement. The second type of error can not be taken into account by probability formulae. It results from some defect in the measuring instrument or conditions of measurement and can be corrected for only if some true measure is available for comparison.

Sampling error, the first type of error, is not a rigid 4 per cent. It varies according to the size of the sample and according to the degree of unanimity of opinion within the sample.<sup>3</sup> Dr. Gallup's estimate of the national vote in the last election was based upon a sample of about 40,000 cases. The sampling error for a population of this size is under 1 per cent at the usual confidence level. His error of 3 per cent in underestimating the Democratic vote, therefore, was not due to chance fluctuation or sampling error. For any single state the sampling error would be much higher since the number of people interviewed would be smaller. But even with a large individual sam-

pling error in each state, the state-by-state error should sometimes be over and sometimes under the prediction.<sup>4</sup>

The sectional and state-by-state errors, already considered, show conclusively that the inaccuracy of the three good polls in 1940, small as it was, was not due to sampling, or variable, error but to a constant or systematic bias.

The American Institute showed this bias in that all but one of its state errors of more than 2 per cent were in the direction of underpredicting the Democratic vote. *Fortune* had the same error for all sections but the South. Crossley similarly underpredicted the extent of the Roosevelt victory.

Interestingly enough, the errors of any consequence in public opinion polls have always been due to loaded factors rather than to sampling error. The *Literary Digest* failed so spectacularly in 1936 because of its sys-

<sup>3</sup> Cf. S. S. Wilks, "Representative Sampling and Poll Reliability," *PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY*, June 1940, pp. 261-269 and 332-338.

<sup>4</sup> The American Institute in its 4 per cent margin of error is combining both sampling and constant errors. The reason for this procedure is the difficulty of publishing complex explanations in a service which papers buy for its news value. Gallup was in a dilemma in that to say nothing about sampling error is unscientific and yet merely to state sampling, or probable, error would lead to false confidence in the accuracy of the poll. He compromised and combined the two on the basis of the Institute's error in the past. For the public the compromise was the best way out, but students of the polls have been misled into accepting 4 per cent as the sampling error in public opinion polls.

tematic error in covering too many upper-income voters. Its sampling error was less than 1 per cent whereas its constant bias threw it off about 20 per cent. The American Institute and the Crossley Survey predicted the 1936 election correctly but had a 6 per cent state-by-state error and again this was a consistent underestimation of the Democratic vote.

Why, then, in 1940 did not the polls correct for this error? The answer is that they did correct but they did not correct enough. Both Gallup and Crossley dropped from a consistent state-by-state overestimation of the Republican vote of 6 per cent to about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. But why did they not correct more adequately? The reason is that from available evidence the constant bias had apparently been conquered. In the 1938 Congressional elections the American Institute made an error of less than 1 per cent in popular vote in predicting that the Republicans would elect 165 representatives when they actually elected 170. Similarly, in the 1938 New York gubernatorial election it missed by only one-half of 1 per cent in predicting the reelection of Governor Lehman. In the September Maine elections a warning signal did appear, however, in a 4 per cent underprediction of the Democratic vote for governor and for senator. But with its polling machinery functioning so well, on the whole, since 1936 the American Institute seemed to have the problem of a correct cross section of the population pretty well in hand.

### Factors in Underprediction

What factor or factors did the polls fail to take into account, then, which led to their underestimation of the Democratic vote? Since there was this consistent bias in the surveys of Crossley, Roper and Gallup, is the explanation perhaps in some one thing which they do wrong? A comparison of the errors made by the three polls, however, shows that the bias can not be traced to one simple factor. Their errors do not correspond closely enough to indicate that a single common factor is at work.

Crossley's largest error came in Rhode Island, New Hampshire and Wyoming while the American Institute was most inaccurate in Utah, Idaho, Maine, Indiana, Pennsylvania and New Hampshire. Apart from the South, *Fortune* made its biggest errors in the two sections of the Mountain and Pacific Coast States. The Mountain States, too, were the section of Gallup's greatest inaccuracy but on the Pacific Coast his figures were quite precise. Finally, a comparison of Gallup's errors in 1936 with his errors in 1940 correlate —.11. Apparently the same factors which gave him his bias in 1936 were not operative in the same fashion in 1940. It is necessary, therefore, to inquire into a number of possible sources of error, five of which are described below.

### Estimating Voter Turnout

1. *The Difficulty of Estimating the Turnout of Voters.* The representative cross section which the

straw poll sets up must be representative not so much of the potential voting population as of the population which actually votes. In 1940, according to the estimate of the United States Census Bureau, there were 80,500,000 potential voters. About 20,000,000 failed to register or otherwise failed to qualify for voting in the November election. Almost 50,000,000 people did vote on November 5 and 10,000,000 eligible voters stayed at home. The 50,000,000 who voted were not thoroughly representative of the total voting population. More eligible male voters exercised their franchise than female voters. Hence the cross section for the straw poll must, if possible, take into account the distortion. The tendency in the past, furthermore, has been for the lower-income groups to turn out on election day in proportionately smaller numbers than the upper-income groups. A cross section thoroughly representative of the voting population would, therefore, actually misrepresent the voting strength of income groups on election day.

The polls correct for this on the basis of their own data and all other available information concerning past elections. The problem is that the present election does not exactly duplicate the social forces of past elections. Hence the turnout of various groups in the population is not easy to predict. For example, though there has been an income-group differential in the turnout on election day, the trend since the depression has been toward a decrease in this differential. Dr. Gallup names this as one of the factors in the American Institute's underprediction of the Democratic vote. In 1936 the ratio in turnout of lower-income to upper-income groups was 5 to 6. For 1940 the ratio may well prove to be close to equality.

Some idea of the difficulty in building a cross section which is representative of the active voting population can be seen in the American Institute's figures on the sources of support of the rival candidates in the last election (see Table V). The American Institute estimates that

TABLE V

The American Institute's Estimate of the Source of the  
Roosevelt and Willkie Vote\*

From	Roosevelt	Willkie
1936 Roosevelt voters	19,400,000	4,700,000
1936 Landon voters	900,000	13,300,000
3rd-Party supporters in 1936	300,000	400,000
First voters (too young to vote in 1936)	3,000,000	1,900,000
Failed to vote in 1936	3,500,000	1,900,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>27,100,000</b>	<b>22,200,000</b>

\* From the release of the American Institute, December 8, 1940.

3,500,000 potential voters who failed to vote in 1936 did cast their ballots in 1940 for President Roosevelt, whereas only 1,900,000 voters who failed to vote in 1936 cast their ballots for Wendell Willkie in 1940.

Thus over 5,000,000, or about 10 per cent of the voters in 1940, were people who did not exercise their right of franchise in 1936. On the other hand, about 3,000,000 who did vote for Roosevelt in 1936 failed to vote at all in 1940; and 2,500,000 who voted for Landon in 1936 failed to vote at all in 1940. More than 12 per cent of the active voters in 1936 failed to put in an appearance at the polls in 1940. Death accounts for about a half of this group absent from the polls in 1940. In other words, in four years' time the active electorate is not a constant population even if the factor of the new voters is left out of the picture.

The new voters must be considered, however, because they are numerous enough to affect seriously the results of an election. The American Institute estimates that about 5,000,000 new voters, who were too young to vote in 1936, cast their ballots in 1940. About 3,000,000 voted for Roosevelt and 1,900,000 voted for Willkie. The 1940 election was thus almost decided by shifts in the personnel of the active electorate. Roosevelt received only 19,400,000 votes from his supporters of 1936. Another 900,000 came from Landon supporters. Willkie received 18,500,000 from the active voters of 1936—those who returned to the polls in 1940 splitting about 52 per

cent for Roosevelt and 48 per cent for Willkie. And this incidentally is the division of vote between the candidates which the American Institute expected. But the 4,900,000 new voters and the 5,400,000 old, inactive voters of 1936 split 63 per cent for Roosevelt and 37 per cent for Willkie to give Roosevelt his clear-cut majority.

The lesson in these figures is that the actual voting personnel changes greatly from one presidential election to another. The problem is not so knotty as it seems at first glance. Some of the changes are compensating, that is, some old Democratic supporters who did not vote in this election were replaced by previously inactive Democratic supporters. It is not necessary to have the identical people appearing each year to make a prediction. The important thing is to have the proper proportion of groupings preserved in terms of age, income, sex, etc. Even though the relative incidence of a group changes from election to election, it can be predicted if the change follows some regular trend.

The problem in setting up a representative cross section of the active voting electorate can not be solved completely by past performance. Every election has its novel features which affect the turnout. Women come to the polls less frequently than men, but in a given election with many women candidates on the ticket they may turn out in greater numbers. Some indication of the likely turnout can be obtained by questions aimed at the intensity



of the voter's political convictions and at his intentions of registering his vote in the coming election.

If the Crossley survey had built its cross section without trying to correct for voting behavior in 1936, its prediction would have been even closer than it was. If, instead of using past trends to make his sample representative of the probable turnout, Crossley had taken people's voting intentions in 1940 to correct his cross section, his prediction would have been very precise. Tinkering with corrective weights in estimating turnout is risky and can be a source of error in itself. On the other hand, the American Institute would have been less accurate in 1940, if it had not weighted its cross section according to turnout estimated on the basis of past elections.

Some factors will probably always defy precise prediction of the turnout. The weather is the well-known example of a factor affecting turnout differentially in that it handicaps the rural Republican vote more than the urban Democratic vote. Its differential effect may not always be important, however. Universal car ownership, better roads and other improvements of a machine culture may lessen its significance.

In general the problem of setting up a cross section representative of the people who will come out on election day will continue to plague the poll predictor as a source of small errors. But it should not contribute a large error because the situation is loaded in a double-barrelled way against large errors. The greater the number of eligible voters who

appear on election day, the more the active electorate resembles the total voting population and the less important become the few indifferent people who stay at home. Conversely, however, the greater the political apathy the fewer people who show up at the polls, the less difficult becomes the problem of setting up differentials for a sample.

With the population basically unconcerned about the outcome, group allegiance does not loom as a strong factor distorting the sample. This was why the *Literary Digest* with a highly unrepresentative sample did so well in the 'twenties. When the election becomes bitterly contested among the people, as well as among the politicians, sectional, occupational, religious, and income groupings become important differentials. Then it is very important not to err in estimating the turnout of these groupings on election day. But as the population becomes divided into opposed camps, as feeling grows more intense, more people come to the polls. The turnout becomes more and more uniform as it approaches a complete vote. Moreover, as the division becomes more decided, it becomes more obvious and more susceptible of measurement.

### Setting Up Cross Section

2. *The Difficulty of Setting Up a Precise Cross Section of the Population.* It is one thing to accept the stratified sample as a good theoretical principle. It is another to work out the exact proportions of people in income groups for each state and for subdivisions within the state.

The data on income distribution vary from state to state in completeness, in accuracy, in availability and in age. The 1930 census carried no income information. Available data are often old and no longer apply. In many states it is difficult to get adequate and accurate information about subdivisions within the state.

In short, the general state of statistical information concerning income groupings makes it difficult to be accurate in the cross section within a few per cent. If such errors were of a chance nature they would compensate and be unimportant. But in the field of social relationships we continually find loaded or constant errors. For example, when income figures go back to the 'twenties, they may introduce a constant error toward overestimating the middle-income groups.

It will be possible to check this factor of incorrect proportions in the income groups now that the 1940 census data are available. Election returns for given areas can be checked against poll figures and against income breakdowns.

The income differential is perhaps the most serious problem in setting up a cross section since voting does follow income divisions. Other problems which are not so difficult of solution pertain to shifting factors in the population such as proportion of age groups. Age groups do not divide in their political preference in the same ratio as the whole voting population. Young people are more likely to be Democratic in political affiliation. Of the new voters in 1940 who

came of age since November 1936, 3,000,000 voted for Roosevelt and 1,900,000 for Willkie. The correlation between age and voting preference is in part a function of the correlation between income and age, but not completely so. At any rate the political situation of the past eight years contains this problem for the Republicans: as the old people die off and youngsters come of voting age the Republicans lose adherents and the Democrats gain supporters. The Republicans have the advantage, however, that with a declining birth rate and a declining death rate our population is moving toward a higher average age; and older people may be more susceptible to Republican persuasion than younger people.

Nevertheless, the calculation of the right proportions of age groups in the sample is not a likely source of error. The income weight, however, is. The poor are still with us and in numbers which we are inclined to underestimate.

### Problems of Interviewing

3. *Defects in the Measuring Instrument or in the Interview-Situation.* Attention has so far been directed to the difficulty of setting up an accurate cross section and to the difficulty of estimating how closely the actual voting electorate will resemble the potential electorate. Errors in either task will make inaccurate a perfect interviewing job. But as much if not more attention must be given to the problem of interviewing itself.

The characteristics of the interviewers become of central importance, since they are a good part of the measuring stick which the research office applies to the public. The physical scientist has the advantage of working with a dependable, impersonal instrument of measurement. Interviewers, as human beings involved in the social scene they are reporting, present a personal equation which must be carefully watched.

What, then, are some of the important characteristics of interviewers which can introduce a bias in the results of the poll? First is the matter of allegiance to political party. In an election as bitterly contested as the last one, even an amateur psychologist would distrust a poll that employed only Republicans as interviewers. The American Institute constantly checks on the accuracy of the individual interviewer and in addition enlists both Republican and Democratic interviewers in proportion roughly comparable to the strength of the parties on election day. On the whole their system is very effective. If a presidential election were held every six months, sufficient data would be available to insure a highly accurate report from interviewers. The American Institute, however, does not use full-time interviewers and the turnover is fairly large. Hence in a presidential campaign not all the inaccurate reporting can be discovered until after the election is over. Moreover, an interviewer who has a good record up to the election may lose his objectivity in the heat of the campaign.

Although interviewers correctly reflected the strength of the parties in an over-all way for the entire sample, a particular part of a state was sometimes heavily represented by interviewers from one party. This may not have been without effect, but statistical comparison of the errors of interviewers by party affiliation by state shows no systematic error.

A second important characteristic of the interviewer is his socio-economic status. A poorly dressed, manual laborer with ungrammatical speech will have difficulty in interviewing along Park Avenue. Similarly, the Harvard graduate with a Harvard accent may not win the confidence of the miners in the Pennsylvania coal fields. Both theory and fact in social psychology assert that ideally the interviewer should have membership-character in the group he interviews and yet be personally unknown to the group. The polls so far have not been able to meet this criterion of membership-character in a systematic way. Their interviewers succeed remarkably well, in spite of this fact, because they are mostly middle-income people who can adapt to other groups. They naturally represent a higher educational level than the average citizen. Roper employs full-time interviewers selected because of their education and training. Gallup and Crossley employ people interested in the polls who, in addition to their duties of teaching school or writing for papers and magazines, can spend a few hours a week in interviewing. Gallup also uses a small home-office staff of

interviewers for special jobs and for checking on resident interviewers.

It is still true, however, that the poll interviewers as representatives of an average-plus income group are better dressed, more academic in speech, and more bourgeois in outlook than the majority of people they interview. This can distort their interviewing in two ways. In the first place, in some working-class quarters a well-dressed stranger who comes snooping around to find out how people are going to vote may not get frank answers from all respondents. Union members may sometimes fear company spies and may be suspicious of prying interviewers.

In the second place, the interviewer, because of his belonging to a middle-income group, may not sample according to instructions. A school superintendent, for example, is told to interview twenty people in the poor group and fifteen in the poor plus group. He is familiar with the criteria for income grouping which relate to occupation, type of residence, car and telephone ownership. But these criteria are not exact indications of income. Moreover, the judgment of the interviewer is bound to enter. The school superintendent, because of his own higher standards of living, may put some people into the poor plus group who are really average, and some poor plus people into the poor category. The probability of such an error increases if the school superintendent has to go further out of his way to get poor families, living in shacks in the rear, than to find average-income people.

That membership-character in the group contacted is important is evidenced by the interviewing in the five boroughs of New York by the American Institute in the past election. In general the staff was allocated to the districts on the basis of religious and national characteristics. The results of the poll, borough by borough, were within a fraction of 1 per cent of the final election returns. Experimentation is now under way under the auspices of the Princeton Public Opinion Project to find out if accuracy of interviewing among low-income groups is increased if members of these groups are included on the interviewing staff.

It has been assumed so far in this analysis that voting behavior is related to income. Hence any underestimation of lower-income groups is an underestimation of the Democratic vote. Studies of the popularity of New Deal measures are indirect proof of this assumption. Professor Kornhauser has shown that social legislation receives greater support as one goes down the income scale.<sup>8</sup> Direct proof can be found in Table VI which gives (1) the economic grouping of the voters sampled by the American Institute in 1936 and in 1940, and (2) the occupational groupings of the voters sampled by the American Institute.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. H. Kornhauser, "Analysis of 'Class Structure' of Contemporary American Society," Chap. II of *Industrial Conflict*, 1939 Yearbook of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (New York: Cordon Co.).

**TABLE VI**  
**The Voting Behavior of Income and Occupational Groups\***

	Per cent for Roosevelt	
	1940	1936
<b>INCOME:</b>		
Upper Income (\$50 and over per week)	28	42
Middle Income (\$20 to \$50 a week)	53	60
Lower Income (less than \$20 a week including all relief categories)	69	76
Relief, WPA and Old Age Assistance	80	84
<b>OCCUPATIONS:</b>		
Business	34	47
Professional	38	49
White collar	48	61
Farmers	54	59
Skilled labor	59	67
Semi-skilled	67	74
Unskilled	69	81
All labor	66	74

\* From the release of the American Institute, December 8, 1940.

The American Institute figures show how important the income differential has been in the past two presidential elections. In 1940 income grouping was even more significant as a correlate of voting behavior than in 1936. Between the people who earn \$50 a week and over and those who make less than \$20 a week, there was, in 1940, a difference in support of Roosevelt of 41 percentage points as compared with a difference of 34 points in 1936.<sup>6</sup>

#### Undecided Vote

4. *The Allocation of the Undecided Vote.* A puzzling problem for the polls was the fairly high percentage of people who refused to commit themselves when inter-

viewed. During October about 9 per cent of the people contacted by the American Institute either were undecided or just were not saying for whom their ballots would be cast. This group dropped to 6 per cent in the last days of the election.

The undecided straw-vote raised many questions. Did it represent the indifferent people? (After all 16 per cent of the registered voters did not turn out on November 5.) Did it represent a truly undecided vote? And if it did, how would the undecided people divide on election day?

<sup>6</sup> For further data on political preference by population groups, see Edward G. Benson and Paul Perry, "Analysis of Democratic-Republican Strength by Population Groups," *PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY*, September 1940, pp. 464-473.



Or did it represent people who thought it easier not to tell the interviewer how they were going to vote? Finally, did it contain all three groups, the indifferent, the undecided, and the intimidated? The last question suggests the true answer save that it was hard to tell the proportions of these three groups.

Both the American Institute and the Crossley poll experimented to find the real answer. Half of the voters, sampled in a community, were approached in the usual way, and the other half were asked to mark a ballot, seal it, and deposit it in a ballot box carried by the interviewer. The secret-ballot procedure did reduce the size of the no-opinion vote but its results were equivocal. In some sections of the country the American Institute found a higher Roosevelt vote, in others a higher vote for Willkie. In the South the Willkie vote was increased; in the Middle West and in the Far West it made little difference, in New England and the Northeast generally Roosevelt gained. The Crossley experiment made in two key cities favored Willkie. The lower-income groups were slightly more favorable to him on the secret ballot.

The American Institute returns suggest that where public pressure opposes a candidate, the secret ballot will increase his strength as in the South. Crossley's experimental results for urban centers do not agree with Gallup's, but the particular cities chosen may make a great deal of difference. Among particular foreign-born and lower-income groups,

the invitation to use paper and pencil in the secret-ballot procedure may have increased rather than allayed suspicion.

Before the election some writers like Professor Crum held that the polls would underestimate Willkie strength because the W.P.A., the A.A.A., relief rolls and patronage generally, kept people from publicly opposing Roosevelt. This interpretation, however, missed the point that recipients of relief and of federal patronage are not eager to vote their supposed benefactors out of power. The New Deal has its strength among the lower-income groups.

On the other hand, prestige in the last election attached to voting for Willkie. With the upper-income groups solidly behind Willkie, save in the South, and with the relievers strongly for Roosevelt, public pressure in the middle-income groups was against public declarations for Roosevelt. It seems plausible, on the basis of all considerations including the American Institute figures, to conclude that the undecided vote in the North and East was largely a Roosevelt vote.

Another consideration concerns the people who were not sure of their own minds until the day of the election. In the light of the international situation, to vote for Willkie seemed to many of them a greater risk than to vote for Roosevelt. The evidence that this factor influenced the undecided is indirect. On October 22nd when the American Institute found Roosevelt with 54 per cent and Willkie 46 per cent of the popular vote,

they asked this question of their cross section: "If there were no war in Europe today, which presidential candidate would you vote for, Roosevelt or Willkie?" Roosevelt's percentage dropped to 47 and Willkie's increased to 53. Moreover, the Institute tries to measure the president's popularity even in non-election months. After France was invaded his popularity never fell below the 50 per cent line, though it had so fallen a number of times before the invasion of France. Granting that people do rationalize their answers to such questions as *if there were no war in Europe*, it still seems probable that among some middle-income people who were torn by conflicting loyalties national loyalty predominated on election day.

#### The Problem of Trends

5. *The Problem of Trends and Shifts in Opinion.* Another problem which plagues the poll predictor is the factor of trends. His polling machinery may be functioning perfectly. Nevertheless, his forecast may miss the final election percentages because his machinery has to stop some time before the election begins if his results are to be tabulated and published. The American Institute has the handicap that newspapers want its final results the day before election, because the release has more news value the day before election than on election day itself. Hence Gallup's final interviewing was done Sunday morning and the results telegraphed in for inclusion in the final pre-election release. Roper is even

more handicapped in that his polling machinery functions for a monthly magazine. His October survey was published in the newspapers and represented interviewing done a few weeks before election.

In the past campaign the American Institute found that Roosevelt started with an advantage (52 per cent) in July which was fairly stable until the end of August. In September Roosevelt's popularity began to increase; it reached 55.5 per cent and remained stable until October 12 when it wavered. It dropped to 54.5 on October 21 and in the next ten days stabilized around 53.5 per cent. All of these changes would not be great enough to be statistically significant, if each merely represented the return from a single sample. But the American Institute in a single release summed up a number of samples, and the above changes were significant in that they represent the trend of a series of samples.

Trends are difficult to correct for in opinion surveys since they are not simple linear functions. That is, one can not rely upon projecting the curve based upon past findings into the future because a trend may be fairly suddenly arrested and reversed. It may accelerate or decelerate more rapidly than the figures from past samples would indicate. Moreover, the sampling error of a single sample can be greater than the difference in trend from one ballot to another. Hence the problem of correcting on the basis of a last-minute poll leaves a great deal to the judgment of the poll predictor.

### Overemphasis on Late Shifts

In the 1940 election it can be argued that the polls underestimated the Roosevelt vote because of a late swing toward Roosevelt. The Democrats had started their heavy campaigning relatively late. The President's speeches came in the last two weeks of the campaign. According to the polls, Willkie's stock had been going up as October wore along. If the Willkie trend continued, it seemed to the poll predictors that Roosevelt's lead would be completely wiped out. The Democratic measures to stop the trend came so late that their effect was not thoroughly felt until the very last days of the campaign. The argument, in short, is that the polls were unsuccessful in measuring the last-minute changes of the campaign.

Two possibilities are really involved here. First, the polls may have been accurate in their last samples but opinion may have changed in the last two or three days to reverse the trend by about three per cent. Therefore, if the polls could have functioned up to the moment of election they would have made a much more accurate forecast. The second possibility is that opinion did not show much change in the last four days but that the poll directors, apprehensive about the changes, made mistakes in their last-minute measurements and in their attempts to correct for a fictitious trend.

The second possibility seems much more probable. Campaigns as a rule are not decided during the eleventh hour. The evidence indicates that the

importance of last-minute trends is generally exaggerated. In late October Crossley found that the great majority of the voters were firmly identified with one side or another. About 90 per cent stated that they had made up their minds at least three weeks before, and 81 per cent had reached their decisions over a month before. Even a powerful leader like John L. Lewis, with a strong personal and labor following, was not particularly effective in swinging votes to Willkie in the closing days of the campaign. In fact more than one political expert was wrong in his prognosis about Pennsylvania because Lewis failed to bring large numbers of miners and other union members into the Republican camp.

The change during the course of the campaign is often more apparent than real. In a contest involving genuine issues, people are pretty well identified with one side or another. They often lack the rationalization to support their position and may remain silent and apparently open-minded. The function of propaganda is to give them the rationalizations justifying what they want to do anyway. In 1936 Gallup's poll showed that, although there were apparent shifts back and forth, the final figures agreed well with the figures taken at the start of the campaign. Similarly the figures of the Gallup poll at the beginning of July 1940 gave Roosevelt 52 per cent. And their final figures did not show a much higher percentage.

An interesting experiment conducted by Roper and Lazarsfeld in

Erie County, Ohio, is pertinent to our problem. About 500 people were used as a panel and re-interviewed a number of times during the campaign. Though there were individual changes from interview to interview, the final vote was very close to the original division between Willkie and Roosevelt.

This is not to say that the temporal factor should be given no weight during the campaign. Significant shifts may sometimes occur. Last-minute campaign efforts may not so much win converts as hearten one's own followers and make them more active in getting out their families and friends on election day. It seems to the writer, however, that the poll predictor attaches too much importance to last-minute shifts. It is natural that he should, because he has seen his percentages shift up and down a few points during the campaign. A shift of a few points may throw his prediction completely off. But in the long run, his predictive performance may be better if he gives less weight to his last poll and stabilizes his estimate on a smoothed average of all ballots taken within ten days of the election.

The second possibility of error—that the excessive concern of the poll predictor leads to mistakes in his forecast—stands out as the important one in the problem of last-minute shifts. Both Dr. Gallup and Edward Benson, his research director, assign major importance in their underestimation of the Democratic vote to their telegraphic poll taken on the Sunday before election. They were eager to discover whether the Willkie

trend was slackening and Sunday was the last day they could obtain data in time for publication. But their organization, unaccustomed to interviewing on Sunday and rushed for time, may have been less accurate than usual in the last poll which gave Roosevelt 52 per cent of the major party vote. The polls taken the week before averaged between 53 and 54 per cent for Roosevelt, which was a decline from the week before that. The telegraphic poll therefore was interpreted as evidence that the long-time trend to Willkie was continuing and the American Institute estimated Roosevelt's vote on election day to be 52 per cent.

This was giving too much weight to the last poll. The one just before it, which came in on Saturday, gave 54.6 per cent of the vote to Roosevelt. The average of the last five samples had Roosevelt leading with 53.5 per cent of the vote. The average of the last three samples gave Roosevelt 53.3 per cent of the vote. Conservative projection of the curve would have given Roosevelt at least 53 per cent instead of 52 per cent of the major party vote. It is one thing, of course, to make this judgment after the event and another thing to make it *before* the event.

#### Evaluations and Conclusions

1. The predictive performance of the 1940 polls compares favorably with predictive measurement in the social sciences. The outstanding achievement was the 2.4 average percentage error for the 48 states made by the American Institute of Public Opinion—the lowest state-by-state er-

ror in polling history. The Crossley survey was not far behind in its average state error for 17 pivotal states. The *Fortune* Survey again made an amazingly accurate forecast of the popular vote, which is the only prediction it attempts in a presidential campaign. The polls, however, erred in their estimate of the closeness of the election because of a consistent underestimation of the Democratic vote.

2. The constant error of the polls was not a function of one simple factor, because their state-by-state errors did not correlate well. The two factors to which the constant error can be attributed are: (a) the failure to represent the lower-income groups properly in the cross section, either through underestimating their voting strength or through middle-class interviewers who failed to elicit the true responses from these groups; (b) the attempts to correct for last-minute changes of the voting public.

3. The 1940 polling experience confirmed the 1936 results in the superiority of the interview technique over the mail ballot. The *Pathfinder* poll, utilizing the mail ballot, was a conspicuous failure.

4. The unorthodox methods of predicting voting behavior on the basis of remote secondary factors has yet to prove itself. Rogers Dunn, attempting a forecast on the basis of newspaper circulation and W.P.A. enrollment, was wide of the mark in 1940 as he was in 1936. Methodologically, the attempt to measure determinants or correlates of public opinion is sound. If we can get accurate measurements of basic factors related

to public opinion, we may be able to predict changes in the trend of opinion. All we do now with the usual polling procedure is to predict a continuation of a trend. Dunn's general method of approach should not, therefore, be lightly dismissed, although some of the specific factors he seeks to measure, such as newspaper opinion, seem to be poor indices of political behavior.

5. Conclusive answers to questions about differences in the methods of the American Institute and the *Fortune* Survey can not be made on the basis of the 1940 returns. Elmo Roper employs a small staff of 81 highly qualified interviewers, George Gallup uses 1,100 part-time interviewers most of whom are trained through the mail. The problem is whether the *quality* criterion of Roper is better than the *quantity* criterion of Gallup.

For purposes of election prediction the Gallup method seems to the writer the better procedure. For state-by-state prediction, a large staff of interviewers is necessary, and American Institute interviewers possess sufficient skill to find out how people will vote. The obstacle of lack of membership-character in lower-income groups applied to Roper's interviewers as well as to those of the American Institute. For purposes of social research generally, however, Roper's emphasis upon quality is undoubtedly sound. To obtain significant information from people requires skilled interviewers.

Another difference between the two organizations is in type of question used in the interview. Gallup



prefers the categorical question, i.e. the simple question which can be answered by yes or no. Roper prefers the attitude scale which permits people to express gradations of opinion. Again, for purposes of election prediction the categorical question is the safest. People fall into the yes-no dichotomy on election day, so there is a real advantage to placing them in it in advance. But for purposes of research in public opinion the attitude scale is the better instrument. It gives a more complete picture of the ideas and feelings of people and permits of more refined measurement. It thus has the greater potentialities but is also the riskier instrument since it makes possible new errors of interpretation. Roper's interesting comparison of the two methods (see page 89) suggests the desirability for controlled experiments on the problem. His results, which favor the attitude scale, do not establish the greater accuracy of this method since his scale may have merely compensated for a Republican bias in the sample.

On the whole, the American Institute is set up to do a better sociological job of quick sampling on an adequate and representative cross section. The *Fortune* Survey is better organized for an intensive study of a more narrow but psychological type of problem.

6. The student of polling procedures may draw the interesting inference from the experience of 1940 that the less the tinkering with the original data the greater the chance of accurate prediction. If Crossley had not used corrective weights in

estimating the turnout on election day, he would have achieved an almost perfect score. If Gallup had stood firm on his stabilized average and not corrected on the basis of a last-minute telegraphic poll, he would likewise have closely approached a perfect performance. Roper did not correct for late trends or for voting turnout and he named the precise percentage of votes President Roosevelt received.

The problem of applying corrective adjustments to the original data, however, is not so simple. The *Literary Digest* could have saved itself in 1936, if it had used corrective weights for its income bias. Instead it followed its policy, previously successful, of not tampering with its data. The real solution lies in no simple rule of either refraining from all tinkering with one's data or of applying many rigid and complex formulae of correction. Rather it lies in constant experimentation during the campaign to broaden the base of relevant data upon which the prediction is made. The American Institute, the *Fortune* Survey, and the Crossley service did well in 1940 because they *did* experiment to check upon the reliability and meaning of their figures. In the future the more thorough the research, the easier will the problem of corrective adjustments become.

7. The performance of the polls in 1940 brings to focus three research problems in public opinion measurement.

First, what is the exact effect of the membership-character of the interviewer, in relation to the group in-

interviewed, upon his findings on various types of question?

Second, what can be learned about building an accurate cross section of the voting population from a detailed study of election results in relation to the 1940 census with its data on income and rent?

Third, what can be learned about the relation between word and deed

from follow-up studies of the sort made by Lazarsfeld and Roper?

The polls have conclusively demonstrated the reliability, or stability, of the responses of the public to verbal questioning. The systematic relation of these responses to people's actions is the next and the most exciting chapter to be written in public opinion research.

# STUDIES IN SECRET-BALLOT TECHNIQUE

By LAWRENCE E. BENSON

The author, an associate of Dr. Gallup in the Princeton office of the American Institute of Public Opinion, reports the surprising results of some experimental studies conducted by the Institute in the fall of 1940.

THE SCIENCE of public opinion measurement is still very young, as has been pointed out many times by Dr. George Gallup, Director of the American Institute of Public Opinion. It is true that this scientific research has shown much progress in recent years, as evidenced by the record. In the case of the Institute, an average state-by-state error of 6 per cent in the 1936 Presidential election survey was reduced to an average state error of only 2.4 per cent in the 1940 Presidential election survey.

This progress toward an increasingly accurate measurement of public opinion has come about largely because of experimentation which has resulted in improved techniques—experiments which found the answers to some of the unsolved problems of opinion research. Further experimentation will play an important rôle in improving opinion research methods so that a high degree of accuracy can be maintained.

Last fall, during the Presidential election surveys, the Institute conducted a number of experimental studies, several of which are briefly reported here.

## The Secret Ballot

Just prior to the Maine state election last September, a crew of inter-

viewers was sent to Lisbon Township, Maine, to make a complete census of all persons of voting age in that township, to determine which candidates for certain state offices they planned to vote for, and also which Presidential candidate they favored.

Half the interviews were made with secret ballots, and the other half were made in the usual way with the interviewer recording the respondents' answers. The use of the secret and the ordinary ballot was alternated to insure comparable sample groups. Every other person interviewed was asked to fill out a secret ballot and to place it in a sealed ballot box carried by the interviewer. This procedure was continued throughout all interviewing, until all the homes and places of business were covered. In order to include each person of voting age in a family, interviewers had to call back on some homes to obtain opinions of family members who were out at the time of the first call.

After practically all of Lisbon Township's eligible voters had been contacted and their opinions obtained,<sup>1</sup> the secret and non-secret bal-

<sup>1</sup> For obvious reasons it was impossible in a short period of time to obtain interviews with *every* voter in the township. However, about 95 per cent of the voters were contacted, so that those excluded would probably not affect the results.

lots were tabulated separately, and these interesting facts were revealed:

1. The number of "undecided" voters was greatly reduced on the secret ballot.

2. This reduction in the undecided vote resulted in increased strength for the Democratic candidate.

Exactly what happened is shown in the following table which gives the figures for the Senatorial contest between the major-party candidates.

#### SENATORIAL CONTEST

	<i>Personal Interviews</i>	<i>Secret Ballots</i>
Brann		
(Democrat)	51%	56%
Brewster		
(Republican)	49	44
	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 100
Undecided	21%	9%

The official returns for Lisbon Township in the State election, which was held shortly after this study was completed, showed that the secret ballots in this instance were more accurate, for Brann received 58 per cent of the vote in Lisbon.

Note that the undecided vote dropped from 21 per cent on the personal ballots to 9 per cent on the secret. Since both samples were alike, these differences could not be due to composition of the samples. The only logical explanation for the difference is that a large number of people who were interviewed in the usual way actually had a choice but were reluctant to state it. Their reluctance may have been due to any number of factors, but in this case the interviewers felt that fear of possible reprisal for supporting the wrong candidate was the predominating reason.

This reluctance to express a choice seemed to lie almost entirely within the Democratic ranks, for on the secret ballots where more persons gave a choice the Democratic candidate's strength increased 5 per cent. This was a most important finding, and it immediately raised these questions: Does the same thing hold true in the Presidential race? Does it operate to the same extent? Does it hold true in all sections of the country and, if so, to what extent?

The following table answers the first question raised by the findings of the Senatorial contest survey: Does the reduction of the undecided vote help the Democratic candidate in the Presidential race?

#### PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST

	<i>Personal Interviews</i>	<i>Secret Ballots</i>
Roosevelt	54%	55%
Willkie	46	45
	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 100
Undecided	16%	2%

Here the number of undecided voters was even more drastically reduced by use of the secret ballot than in the Senatorial survey. In the latter, the number of undecided voters was more than cut in half, but in the Presidential survey it was shaved to one-eighth. This clearly indicates that a greater proportion of voters, who said they were undecided on the Presidential question, actually had a candidate in mind. Therefore it follows that there was proportionately more reluctance to express verbally a choice for President than for Senator.

The most significant point in this sizeable decrease of the undecided vote, however, is the fact that opinions divided more evenly between the two candidates than was the case in the Senatorial contest. In this instance, Roosevelt picked up only one point on the secret ballot, whereas the Democratic Senatorial candidate's percentage was raised five points. It is possible that local factors may have accounted for the rather large differences in Democratic gains, plus the fact that one was a national and the other a state contest.

The findings in this study clearly emphasized the importance of knowing more about the undecided vote, for it showed that this vote could directly affect the results.

The third question posed by the Senatorial survey was pertinent to the Institute's nationwide pre-election surveys. Similar studies were therefore conducted in other sections of the country. These additional studies disclosed that there were sectional differences in the effect that the secret ballot technique had upon the popularity of the respective Presidential candidates. For example, in some areas Roosevelt's percentage was increased by more than was the case in Lisbon. In others, the effect was just the opposite, so as to increase Willkie's popularity; and in still different areas, the secret ballots showed no difference in either candidate's rating over that found on personal interviews. It can be said without question that the undecided voter will receive his fair share of attention in future experimental studies.

#### Sampling Erie County

A somewhat similar study was conducted by the Institute in Erie County, Ohio, long considered one of the best political barometer areas in the country. Its record, as far back as the election of Grover Cleveland in 1884 and up through 1936, showed an average deviation of only 1.6 percentage points from the national Presidential election results. In only one election during this period did it vary as much as four points from the national percentage, and it was never on the losing side. This naturally made it an appropriate place in which to conduct a pre-election experiment.

Instead of following the regular Institute procedure of controlled sampling in this study, a different approach was used in a modified random sampling method. In other words, no attempt was made to get the exact proportion of interviews in each age group, economic group, racial group, political group, etc. All sample controls were discarded except one—proper geographical distribution of interviews according to the total 1936 vote for President in each of the county's political units.

Here again, the technique was to make half the interviews on secret ballots, and the other half by personal interviews. The first person an interviewer approached gave his opinions in a personal interview, and the second person contacted was handed a secret ballot, which he filled in and dropped in a sealed ballot box. The ballot, in addition to asking for a little information about the respondent, contained only two



lots were tabulated separately, and these interesting facts were revealed:

1. The number of "undecided" voters was greatly reduced on the secret ballot.

2. This reduction in the undecided vote resulted in increased strength for the Democratic candidate.

Exactly what happened is shown in the following table which gives the figures for the Senatorial contest between the major-party candidates.

SENATORIAL CONTEST

	<i>Personal Interviews</i>	<i>Secret Ballots</i>
Brann (Democrat)	51%	56%
Brewster (Republican)	49	44
	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 100
Undecided	21%	9%

The official returns for Lisbon Township in the State election, which was held shortly after this study was completed, showed that the secret ballots in this instance were more accurate, for Brann received 58 per cent of the vote in Lisbon.

Note that the undecided vote dropped from 21 per cent on the personal ballots to 9 per cent on the secret. Since both samples were alike, these differences could not be due to composition of the samples. The only logical explanation for the difference is that a large number of people who were interviewed in the usual way actually had a choice but were reluctant to state it. Their reluctance may have been due to any number of factors, but in this case the interviewers felt that fear of possible reprisal for supporting the wrong candidate was the predominating reason.

This reluctance to express a choice seemed to lie almost entirely within the Democratic ranks, for on the secret ballots where more persons gave a choice the Democratic candidate's strength increased 5 per cent. This was a most important finding, and it immediately raised these questions: Does the same thing hold true in the Presidential race? Does it operate to the same extent? Does it hold true in all sections of the country and, if so, to what extent?

The following table answers the first question raised by the findings of the Senatorial contest survey: Does the reduction of the undecided vote help the Democratic candidate in the Presidential race?

PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST

	<i>Personal Interviews</i>	<i>Secret Ballots</i>
Roosevelt	54%	55%
Willkie	46	45
	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 100
Undecided	16%	2%

Here the number of undecided voters was even more drastically reduced by use of the secret ballot than in the Senatorial survey. In the latter, the number of undecided voters was more than cut in half, but in the Presidential survey it was shaved to one-eighth. This clearly indicates that a greater proportion of voters, who said they were undecided on the Presidential question, actually had a candidate in mind. Therefore it follows that there was proportionately more reluctance to express verbally a choice for President than for Senator.

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questions to find out (1) how persons voted in 1936, and (2) whom they preferred for President—Roosevelt or Willkie.

After the assigned number of interviews was gathered from the cities, hamlets, and rural areas, they were tabulated by secret and non-secret ballot, producing these results on the Presidential preference question:

	<i>Personal Interviews</i>	<i>Secret Ballots</i>
Roosevelt	44.5%	44.0%
Willkie	55.5	56.0
	100	100
Undecided	13%	4%

As shown above, the undecided vote on the secret ballot was only about one-third of that on the non-secret ballot. Moreover, it is interesting to note that both samples show practically the same results. Assuming that both samples are entirely comparable, this would seem to indicate that those who would not venture a choice on candidates divided in just about the same ratio as those who expressed an opinion.

The most surprising thing of all about the findings in the Erie County study was the fact that they did not agree at all with what regular Institute nationwide surveys showed at the time as Roosevelt's popularity.

The best political barometer in the country was showing Willkie winning the election, while the nationwide surveys showed Roosevelt ahead. Something was obviously wrong. Was the theory of "barometer areas" unsound or were peculiar factors at work in this county during the 1940 election?

Upon searching for the answer, one fact was disclosed which would largely explain the reason for the difference. Erie County's population was composed of about 26 per cent foreign-born or first-generation Germans and Italians.<sup>2</sup> Nationwide surveys showed that this group's political affiliations had greatly changed in the past four years. Many of them were deserting Roosevelt and voting for the Republican candidate in 1940.<sup>3</sup>

The final official election figures for Erie County gave Roosevelt only 45 per cent of the vote, confirming the Institute survey findings within 1 per cent, and definitely removing Erie County from the political barometer classification.

<sup>2</sup> Figures obtained from the 1930 Census.

<sup>3</sup> Institute studies show that between the 1936 and 1940 elections there was a shift away from Roosevelt amounting to 25 per cent for voters of Italian descent, and 16 per cent for voters of German descent. These were the largest shifts found in any of the voting groups.

## METHODS TESTED DURING 1940 CAMPAIGN

By ARCHIBALD M. CROSSLEY

Mr. Crossley describes the methods used in testing opinion in nineteen pivotal states, and reports the trend of voting decisions. He is president of Crossley Incorporated, a national research organization.

AT THE NADIR of his popularity many of us concerned with polling had little idea that Willkie would win. But close analysis of state-by-state figures even then indicated the possibility, as many of the popularity figures for individual states were within striking distance of the 50-50 line. So for poll administrators it was a case of taking a deep breath and then the long jump. We knew that poll limitations were such that we could not be sure of assigning to the right party any state three percentage points from a tie. As the election came out, 230 electoral votes fell within this zone.

With the outcome so evidently dependent upon what polls must regard as the tie zone, it was natural to set up as many safeguards as possible and to explore new techniques. In planning our own poll, it seemed practical to confine ourselves to those states which might swing either way. States like Mississippi, for example, did not seem to have the remotest possibility of swinging to Willkie, because such a tremendous majority of the voters in these states invariably vote Democratic.

Small test polls and studies of past elections convinced us that out of the 48 states only 19 were pivotal. In the remaining 29 states it seemed that the only purpose a poll would

serve would be to forecast the extent of leadership. We preferred, therefore, to conserve our available sample and to use it in the pivotal states. We happened to assign correctly the 29 "sure" states, but in Maine and a very few others the closeness of the final result indicates that luck was with us. Further test polls should have been conducted late in the campaign as a check on the certainty of some states.

### Reliance on Population

In the course of operation within these nineteen pivotal states we utilized certain methods which we would use again, and others which, on the basis of experience, we should not want to use again in the same form. Our most important departure from technique used in 1936 lay in the distribution of our sample.

In 1940 we departed completely from the effort to estimate the way voters would divide into various groups, and placed full reliance upon cross-sectioning the population of voting age. Studies in the course of our regular marketing research activities had offered what seemed to be adequate proof of correct cross-sectioning of population. To estimate voter distribution, however, meant dealing with a whole series of major variables. The simplest thing to do

was to assume that people would vote as they said they would. Actually, more people intended to vote than did vote, but in general we believe that the simplest thing to do proved to be the best.

In the instances of machine cities we did make some adjustment based upon a projection of voting history. For example, in the State of New York, we estimated the ratio of New York City voters to upstate voters and put these two groups together in that ratio. As a safeguard against the difference between what people say they will do and what they actually do, we would again set up voter ratios, but only in the case of very large cities. Otherwise, we would utilize population of voting age as our guide for sample distribution.

In 1936 we thought it necessary to adjust our samples so that the figures on the way these people voted in 1932 came out right. In 1940 we utilized the same principle, but with some doubt as to its validity. Because of deaths, changes of residence, and a variety of other reasons, it seems now established that those people who constituted a true cross section in 1936 would not of themselves, and among those available, constitute a true cross section in 1940. And vice versa, the people who constitute a true cross section in 1940 would not necessarily represent the true cross section of 1936. The raw figures for 1940, without adjustment for 1936, came out more for Roosevelt than did the adjusted figures.

In 1940 the close situation in many states, the intensity of the campaign,

and the war situation meant a close watch upon shifts of opinion. In ordinary elections, a very high percentage of voters decide early what they will do, and the remainder fall into line during the campaign. Our data indicate that in this election many had their minds well made up at the start of the campaign, and we are inclined to doubt whether these did much real shifting about. But undoubtedly some of these so-called "sure" voters entertained some doubts during the campaign, and many of the pivotal voters had their emotions swayed in both directions as the weeks went by, with heated campaigning at home and fast-moving events abroad. The issue of the undecided voter received a great deal of attention in comments upon the polls while they were in progress.

#### The Undecided Voter

In 1940, as in 1936, we attempted to measure the undecided vote by means of a series of check questions. To avoid the possibility that a person would give a "don't know" answer to sidestep the question, we used a fairly long interview leading gradually to the naming of choice for president. The interview was begun with the effort to measure the number of people who voted in 1936 and the number expecting to vote in 1940, with reasons for not voting. This gave us some indication of the degree of apathy in relation to lack of qualification for voting.

Once the intention to vote in 1940 had been expressed, a question was asked as to whether a decision had been reached. After the decision had

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been stated, the informant was asked whether this was considered as final or tentative. Finally, the reason for the choice was asked and the strong or mild expressions of feeling one way or the other served as checks on the other information. If no decision had been reached, the informant was asked to state his more likely selection.

Through this series of questions it became possible to delineate fairly closely the certain voters for a given candidate, the probable voters, and those "on the fence." The extent of the purely undecided vote was still further cut by the use of a secret ballot when hesitancy was shown. Comparatively few "no choices" remained in the closing weeks, and our problem centered upon the possibility that the pivotal voters might vote on November 5 differently from the way they believed when interviewed.

#### Trend of Voting Decisions

The 1940 experiment which has seemed most important in determining the final result consisted of a question as to when the decision had been reached. By October 29, the day of the last poll, nearly all of those interviewed expressed a definite preference. Eighty per cent said their decision had been reached a month or more previously; 12 per cent, three to four weeks previously; 4 per cent, two weeks previously, and 4 per cent in the past week.

The trend was of considerable significance. Our story appearing on November 4 showed that, of all those decided up to approximately October

first in the 19 pivotal states, Roosevelt had 54.5 per cent. In roughly the first half of October only 41.9 per cent of those deciding were swinging to Roosevelt. In the following week, of the 4 per cent deciding only 35.2 per cent were swinging to Roosevelt. But between October 22 and 29, with the Roosevelt campaign moving into high gear, the President drew 49.0 per cent of the decisions—the two candidates breaking even on last-minute decisions, but with Roosevelt having the greater backlog.

The trend in the campaign for the 19 pivotal states is shown by the following table:

	% fairly definite	% Roose- velt
<i>Decided before Oct. 29</i>		
More than 4 weeks	80	54.5
3 to 4 weeks	92	52.9
2 weeks	96	52.1
1 week	100—	52.0

Thus, a definite slowing up of the Willkie trend was observed. Projected, this seemed to indicate that those who changed their minds in the final week would probably equalize or even swing toward Roosevelt. In any event, as the remaining 29 states included mostly the South, Willkie could win only on the basis of these figures with a tremendous last-minute burst of speed. Allowing a three-point margin of error, the figure for the 19 states seemed likely to be at least 49 per cent Roosevelt and for the country as a whole at least 51 per cent Roosevelt. With the trend apparently toward Roosevelt, Willkie's election seemed unlikely.

The above figures were as reported from the field without any adjust-

ment to 1936. Except for a few tenths of a point they coincide with the final election average for these states. But, as noted above, the state-by-state figures given for the final poll were adjusted to 1936. On this basis, the error was 1.8 points. While our results were close by either method, we would still maintain that any figure closer than two percentage points is largely coincidence. The trend study given above is presented as nothing whatever but an experiment which on this first occasion seemed to work.

#### Additional Checks Used

Checking further against the indications above, callbacks were made on those who had previously said they were uncertain as to how they would vote. These confirmed the late swing toward Roosevelt. Telegraphic polls were carried on only in a few key cities on the final Saturday with mixed results, which, in general, confirmed other indications.

Secret ballots nearly threw us off the track. Analysis indicated a ten-

dency for people in large northern cities to vote more for Willkie on secret ballots than in interviews. Later study of this situation indicates that some people, who were unable to write easily, refused the secret ballots in larger proportion than others, so that we seem to have had some race- and income-distortion here. The best practice seemed to be to offer secret ballots as an alternative if desired.

As a final check-up, we tabulated a number of the states separately by cities and towns, and showed consistency of the Roosevelt trend within a population group. Thus, particularly in Missouri, Ohio and Connecticut, we observed even with small samples a tendency toward agreement among the different localities.

On the basis of all of these checks, we felt justified in predicting that "Roosevelt is expected to be the winner, and he may have a very substantial electoral majority." He was believed to have at least 289 electoral votes, and 488 were considered possible.

## CHECKS TO INCREASE POLLING ACCURACY

By ELMO ROPER

Mr. Roper, who conducts the *Fortune* Surveys, explains how changes of opinion and reasons for these changes were measured in pre-election studies, together with methods of checking final results and the use of an attitude scale to give a gradation of opinion.

FROM THE standpoint of public opinion research in general, it seemed to us even more important than usual that all of the reputable public opinion surveys be as close to "on the nose" as possible in 1940, because of the interest and perhaps confidence with which the public watched the election surveys. We attempted to meet this demand for accuracy by an over-all test of our final results and by constantly reminding ourselves that people could not vote until the actual day of election.

### Survey in Erie County

With the latter point in mind, we made a study in Erie County, Ohio,<sup>1</sup> planned to measure *changes* of public opinion, preceding the election, and the *reasons* for these changes, rather than the final outcome. In this way, a general estimate could be had of the importance of different circumstances and events, and an idea of what sort of change in opinion to expect in the case of future events.

A cross section of 2,800 in a county of 42,000 was divided into four representative samples. The first of these samples we used for a permanent panel; the other groups were used for periodic checks. This permanent group was interviewed approximately once a month for the six months

before election: in May, again in June just before the Republican convention, in August following Roosevelt's nomination, in September, and again in October on the eve of the election. Interviewers carried to each callback a record of the respondent's previous answers, and when a change from an earlier opinion occurred, they were trained to discover the reason for the change together with as specific data as possible on the source of the information which produced it.

Erie County was very strong in Willkie's favor, and it was soon obvious that in this sense it was not representative for this election. Nevertheless, the fact that, at some time during the six months of the study, about 45 per cent of the panel members changed their minds one way or another about how they were going to vote, was evidence that the panel was definitely subject to current trends, which were in this case the only factors under observation. Specifically we were confident that in spite of the county's Willkie strength, any sweeping last-minute rise in Willkie's popularity, which might occur too late to be pictured

<sup>1</sup> This study was done with the collaboration of Dr. Paul Lazarsfeld's Office of Radio Research (Columbia University), and of *Life* and *Fortune* magazines.

by the final *Fortune* Survey, would be accurately pictured there—and similarly, any lack of such a rise.

As it happened, the latter was the actual case. The results of the study for the last few days were these:

	Republican votes	Democratic votes
October 29	55.8%	44.2%
October 30	55.5	44.5
November 1	56.5	43.5
November 4	55.1	44.9

It was plain from this that the rise in Willkie sentiment, which had previously been noted, was most unlikely to accelerate to the point of defeating Roosevelt. Incidentally Erie County's final actual vote was 45.1 per cent for Roosevelt, and we thus underpredicted Roosevelt by two-tenths of one per cent.

#### Missouri Experiment

A less important experiment was made in Missouri. Here we tried to coordinate positive and negative reasons for opinion. For example, if the respondent was expecting to vote for Roosevelt, he was asked not only why he thought Roosevelt would be better, but also why he thought Willkie would not be as good.

In actual practice, the two reasons were sometimes simply the reverse of each other. In the majority of cases, however, independent—and usually interesting—reasons were obtained in answer to each question. Incidentally, we underpredicted the popular vote of Governor-elect Donnell by one-tenth of one per cent (based on unofficial figures), and the Missouri vote of Roosevelt by 1.7 per cent (official).

From these experiments, a great deal was learned about what kinds of questions received the most specific and at the same time true answers, and what kinds of questions were likely to reflect lasting opinions or only temporary feelings. This understanding was of course used in framing the national survey questionnaires.

#### Testing Barometric Areas

We made one interesting incidental test on "barometric" areas. Mr. Louis Bean, Statistician with the Department of Agriculture, in a recent book *Ballot Behavior* made a well-documented case for establishing certain states as barometric. He also amassed a good deal of evidence that, if the polls showed the Roosevelt popular vote at 52 per cent or less, it indicated a Willkie victory in the electoral college.

With his cooperation, we used his device to run surveys of 1,000 interviews each, in St. Louis City, Missouri, and Alameda County, California, about two weeks before the election. In Alameda County, 51.3 per cent of the respondents expressing a definite opinion favored Roosevelt and 48.7 per cent favored Willkie. In St. Louis City, the ratio was 57.2 per cent for Roosevelt to 42.8 per cent for Willkie; from these figures, Mr. Bean predicted, for the national result, between 54 per cent and 55 per cent for Roosevelt. Considering the restricted base of interviews, we felt that this accuracy was most impressive. The actual voting (unofficial) showed us underpredicting Roosevelt by 4.8 per cent

in Alameda County and 0.8 per cent in St. Louis City.

### Independent Check Surveys

The real test, however, on our final results was comprehensive, testing both our interviewers' accuracy and whether we were really contacting the specified cross section. We made two, almost independent, national surveys of 5,000 interviews each, at the same time and using the same questionnaire and the same theoretical cross section; but using different towns, except for a few of the metropolitan areas which had to be included in both, and different interviewers in about 70 per cent of the cases. When the answers had been tabulated, in only one instance was the discrepancy as high as 3.2 per cent. In most cases it was under 2 per cent, and on the significant questions as to how the candidates were regarded, the difference was under 1 per cent.

The accompanying table lists three of the questions and their results on each survey. It will be noted that in these surveys we used an attitude scale, which gave people four possible answers. The *Fortune* Survey has consistently favored the attitude scale because it gives a gradation of opinion and does not force people into straight "yes" and "no" answers. In our last four surveys we used both the four-part attitude scale and the straight yes-or-no question on "How do you intend to vote?" The purpose was to see which of these two methods of questioning people was better. The percentage of the Roosevelt vote on each of the last four surveys was as follows:

	<i>Four-part attitude</i>	<i>Direct question</i>
Survey No. 1	59.5%	56.3%
Survey No. 2	56.7	54.0
Survey No. 3	57.3	54.2
Survey No. 4	55.2	52.5

1. Which one of these four statements comes *closest* to expressing your own opinion of Mr. Roosevelt?

In times like these it is absolutely essential to have a man like Roosevelt for President

There may be some reasons against having Roosevelt as President for another four years, but on the whole it is the best thing to do

While Roosevelt has done some good things, the country would be

<i>Survey No. 1</i>	<i>Survey No. 2</i>
25.4%	25.7%
57.3%	56.7%
28.1	27.4



	Survey No. 1	Survey No. 2
better off under Willkie for the next four years	20.9	21.5
The reelection of Mr. Roosevelt for another four years would be a very bad thing for the country	19.0	19.0
Don't know	6.6	6.4
	42.7	43.3

2. Which one of these four statements comes *closest* to expressing your own opinion of Wendell Willkie?

	Survey No. 1	Survey No. 2
Willkie is just the man the country needs for President during the next four years	11.2%	11.0%
Even though Willkie hasn't as much political and international experience as he needs, he still would make a better President than Roosevelt	26.7	26.8
Willkie is probably an honest and capable business man, but he hasn't had the right experience to be President in times like these	36.5	36.5
The election of a man like Willkie at any time would be a very bad thing for the country	13.9	13.8
Don't know	11.7	11.9
	42.9%	42.9%
	57.1	57.1

3. For whom do you expect to vote in November—Roosevelt or Willkie?

	Survey No. 1	Survey No. 2		Survey No. 1	Survey No. 2
Roosevelt	46.1%	45.5%	Wouldn't answer	2.0%	2.9%
Willkie	38.6	38.3	Won't vote	5.8	6.0
Other	0.3	0.4	Don't know	7.2	6.9

We felt that this correspondence justified us in claiming a good attainment of our planned cross section and a reliable staff of interviewers, as well as in claiming a high

degree of accuracy for our national results—the only goal we as a research organization have ever aimed at in the *Fortune* Surveys.

## EXPERIMENTS IN WORDING QUESTIONS: II

By DONALD RUGG

The author is a research assistant of the Princeton Public Opinion Research Project, which supervised the experiments he describes.

THE RESULTS of the first of a series of experiments on the problem of question-wording in relation to public opinion polling were reported in a previous issue of the *QUARTERLY*.<sup>1</sup> The present article summarizes the findings of the second experiment in this series.

The questions were prepared by the *QUARTERLY* and Mr. Elmo Roper. Alternate wordings of each question were submitted by Mr. Roper to comparable cross sections of the population, chosen in accordance with the criteria used by him for the *Fortune* Surveys. One cross section was asked questions 1(a) and 2(a) below; the other, questions 1(b) and 2(b). This survey was made during September 1940.

The exact wording of the alternate forms of each question was as follows:

1(a). Do you think the United States should keep out of Brazil's relations with Germany?

1(b). Do you think the United States should keep out of Germany's relations with Brazil?

2(a). Do you think the United States should allow public speeches against democracy?

2(b). Do you think the United States should forbid public speeches against democracy?

One might expect more people would favor our keeping out of Brazil's relations with Germany than

vice versa, since the wording of 1(b) carries the implication of a German threat to the Western Hemisphere and a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Actually, this did not prove to be the case. Interchanging the position of the words "Brazil" and "Germany" had no significant effect on the total response, or on the response within the various sub-groups of the population, with just two exceptions.

A reliably larger proportion of people from New England and of those from medium-size cities (25,000 to 100,000 population) thought that the United States should keep out of Brazil's relations with Germany, compared with the proportion who thought the United States should keep out of Germany's relations with Brazil. The percentages are:

	Yes	No	Don't know
National			
1(a)	39%	33%	28%
1(b)	39	35	26
New England			
1(a)	38	38	24
1(b)	21	54	25
Cities of 25,000 to 100,000 population			
1(a)	44	27	29
1(b)	35	41	24

<sup>1</sup> Cantril, H. "Experiments in the Wording of Questions," *PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY*, 4:330-332 (June 1940).

Other sectional and rural-urban groups did not show significant differences between the alternate forms, nor did any age, sex, or economic group.

Apart from the problem of wording differences, it is interesting to see how different sectors of the population vote on the issue of interference or non-interference by the United States in Brazilian-German relations. People in the upper-income brackets are considerably more in favor of U.S. intervention (that is, they show a larger "No" percentage on both forms of the question) than are lower-income respondents.

Curiously enough, the reverse of this—that among upper-income respondents there is a relatively smaller proportion favoring non-interference

—does not hold. Approximately the same "Yes" percentage is found at all economic levels, as the table below indicates. The explanation of this situation is to be found in the "don't know" vote, which becomes progressively larger as the economic level descends.

QUESTIONS 1(A) AND 1(B) COMBINED,  
BROKEN DOWN BY ECONOMIC STATUS

	Yes	No	Don't know
Group A	40%	47%	13%
Group B	36	44	20
Group C	40	33	27
Group D	41	25	34

On question 2, a very striking difference in response to the two forms of the question is apparent. The national figures for each are given in Table I.

TABLE I

Should allow speeches against democracy	["Yes" to 2(a)]	21%
Should not forbid speeches against democracy	["No" to 2(b)]	39
Should not allow speeches against democracy	["No" to 2(a)]	62
Should forbid speeches against democracy	["Yes" to 2(b)]	46
Don't know [2(a)]		17
Don't know [2(b)]		15

The word "forbid" seems to be the key to this difference. Sixty-two per cent say "no" when asked if the United States should *allow* speeches against democracy, but only 46 per cent say "yes" when asked if such speeches should be *forbidden*. Evidently the "forbid" phrasing makes the implied threat to civil liberties more apparent, and fewer people are willing to advocate suppression of anti-democratic speeches when the issue is presented in this way.

This difference runs very consistently through the various subgroups of the population, although it is more pronounced in some than in others. For example, the discrepancy between the percentage who would not "allow" and the percentage who would "forbid" anti-democratic speeches is greatest in the East North Central region of the country, among people in small communities and on farms, and among upper middle class respondents.

# TELLING THE EMPLOYEES

By DICKSON HARTWELL

The annual report as a means of building employee goodwill is discussed by the author, who states that it is an obligation of business management to tell its employees what big business is all about. The essentials of a good report are described and the present reports of major corporations analyzed. Mr. Hartwell is a partner in the firm of Hartwell, Jobson and Kibbee, New York and Chicago public relations counsel.

BIG BUSINESS management has almost completely neglected an opportunity for building understanding and goodwill in two huge and vitally important groups.

The failure of management to educate the first of these—the stockholders—has already been analyzed by the writer in a previous article, "Telling the Stockholders," published in the March 1940 issue of the *QUARTERLY*. In that article it was pointed out that less than ten per cent of our great corporations issued annual reports that could, in any sense, be considered adequate for the purpose of winning the goodwill and understanding of a major proportion of their stockholders.

Management's failure through annual reports to reduce costly ignorance, and its attendant problems, among the second group—the employees—is probably more serious.

## Big Business and Labor

During recent years, the most continuously vexing problem big business has had to face is Labor—Labor with a capital "L." It has been more perplexing than taxation or government regulation. The development of the labor union has not of

itself adversely affected our major corporations. But as a means of spreading the belief that the interests of management, capital's representative, are different from those of labor, the union has been a source of increasingly grave concern to management.

It is the responsibility of management, and of no one else, to correct the erroneous impressions now held by millions of working Americans. Stated simply, the crux of the problem is to build up an understanding on the part of all employees as to the exact function and purposes of a big business corporation. Employees should be told—and in words they can grasp without effort—just what happens to the money a business takes in, and why. The story must be told over and over again until it sinks in and becomes as routine as  $2 \times 2 = 4$ . Management must teach those simple, basic rules, which seem so complicated when stated by the copy book theorists, but which are the "Economic Constitution" under which any sound business must be operated.

Explaining the complications of corporate procedure to labor may appear to be a large order. The question

is not how big the job is, but how important. No group of business men, who in a comparatively short period could conceive, design, perfect, manufacture and create a demand, where none existed, for over 50,000,000 automobiles, 10,000,000 mechanical refrigerators, and 60,000,000 radios, would shirk tackling a job just because it's big. What has been holding them back seems to be a fear of rocking the boat. All management really needs to do is to wake up to the fact that the boat is rocking only because something *hasn't* been done to stop it.

#### **Educating the Employee**

There are numerous opportunities for tackling the problem but there is space in this article briefly to discuss only one of them: the annual report. Such reports, when sent to stockholders, have been regarded as of primary value in the important job of stockholder education. Coupled with sound employee policies, there is no reason why similar reports specially prepared cannot serve equally well in building understanding and goodwill among jobholders.

An investigation<sup>1</sup> of several hundred major corporations throughout the country reveals that this elementary approach to the problem of employee education has been almost wholly overlooked or ignored. Despite the fact that the need is as large and as obvious as the national debt, only a small fraction of our major business enterprises today issue such reports to their workers.

But this small fraction for the most part approach the problem with in-

telligence. The average employee report is much more informative than the average stockholder report. Apparently, where management is sufficiently enlightened to make a special effort to educate its employees, a real effort is made to tell their employees what they want, or ought to want, to know.

The requisites for a good employee report are not easy to determine. The standards which hold for a stockholder report do not, except in a general way, pertain to a report for employees. In the first place, unlike the stockholder, the average employee is not usually eager for information. It is a mistake to assume that he is. Secondly, he may resent and resist (and possibly sometimes with encouragement from union leaders) any effort to win his goodwill, which he may construe as an attempt to divert his crusade for the "rights" of labor. Thirdly, there is apt to be a very wide variance in intellectual capacity within an employee group, much greater than in a stockholder group. Skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labor frequently make up a major proportion of the workers of a company that also may employ a large number of high school and college trained men and women.

But a principal hurdle in the preparation of an employee report is

<sup>1</sup> Of 205 companies replying to a questionnaire sent 525 major corporations, 150 said they issued no employee report, 35 issued a special employee report, 8 reported in their house organs, and 12 said their stockholder reports were sent also to employees. A large majority of those not replying may be presumed not to issue employee reports.



that it sometimes calls for a new kind of courage on the part of management. Men who calmly launch a new product and risk the loss of millions of dollars, frequently shrink from any step that may upset the *status quo* in their labor relations. They move with such caution that they seem not to move at all, and sometimes they don't. Men who are bold enough to tell the whole United States Government to go jump in the lake are white rabbits when it comes to labor policy. But there is no danger and a lot of potential benefit in a carefully developed annual report. This is as good a time as any to start one.

#### Pointers for a Good Report

In preparing an employee report, it is essential to keep in mind the fundamental but often forgotten principle that *both* management and labor are employees. The best report probably is one which fully describes and explains the results of the sum of a year's efforts on the part of both of them to do the best job they know how. In all but the most exceptional instances, in addition to telling what happened during the year, such a report would certainly meet the following conditions:

1. It would be written in the simplest possible language.
2. It would contain a non-technical financial statement with figures in round numbers.
3. It would record any outstanding achievements, such as in production, sales, or safety.
4. It would be illustrated.

5. It would carry a clear explanation of the purpose of the company and how it benefits the community or the nation.

6. It would describe the relationship of employee to management and stockholder, and explain how a prospering company benefits all.

7. It would explain how and why dividends are paid.

8. It would record changes in policies, developments in pension or other employee welfare plans.

9. It would contain an honest appraisal of the outlook for the future of the company, especially as regards employment.

10. It would be well designed and well printed—something the employee would take home and save.

Within these general standards there is room for infinite variation and adaptation to individual requirements. A report can be treated in any way from a quiz contest to a series of believe-it-or-not cartoons. The important thing is to have a complete report that will be interesting and understood.

On the basis of the above standards, how do reports being issued today compare? Those recently studied might be fairly rated as follows:

#### CLASS A

Consolidated Edison Company of New York  
General Motors Corporation  
International Harvester Company  
Johns-Manville Corporation  
New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company  
Standard Oil Company (N.J.)  
Swift & Company

**CLASS B**

Alabama Power Company  
 Bethlehem Steel Corporation  
 Boston Consolidated Gas Company  
 Eastern Air Lines  
 Great Northern Railway Company  
 Illinois Central System  
 National Steel Corporation  
 New Jersey Bell Telephone Company  
 New York Telephone Company  
 The Pullman Company  
 Thermoid Company

**CLASS C**

American Airlines, Inc.  
 The Borden Company  
 Bridgeport Brass Company  
 Caterpillar Tractor Company  
 Cleveland Railway Company  
 Cluett, Peabody and Company  
 Fifth Avenue Coach Company  
 General Electric Company  
 Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company  
 Kansas City Public Service Company  
 Monsanto Chemical Company  
 Nevada-California Electric Corporation  
 Pittsburgh Coal Company  
 Remington Rand, Inc.  
 United Air Lines Transport Corporation  
 Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company  
 Yale and Towne Manufacturing Company

Except for the "A" group, which is uniformly excellent, there is some variation in the reports within the groups. In Class B, for example, the Pullman Company, Bethlehem Steel and Great Northern reports are out-

standing even if they do not completely meet the standards of Class A. If there had been a "D" rating, several reports in the "C" class—Pittsburgh Coal, Kansas City Public Service, Fifth Avenue Coach, and Cleveland Railways—should doubtless have been included in it.

In the "D" classification, however, are listed only those companies which did not issue any report to their employees. Since it includes the overwhelming majority of the companies queried, the list obviously is too long to be included here. However, the following are outstanding examples:

Aluminum Company of America  
 Anheuser-Busch, Inc.  
 Barnsdall Oil Company  
 Boeing Aircraft Company  
 Edward G. Budd Manufacturing Company  
 Celanese Corporation of America  
 Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad  
 Chrysler Corporation  
 Consolidated Oil Corporation  
 Continental Baking Company  
 Continental Can Company  
 Detroit Edison Company  
 Douglas Aircraft Company  
 Ford Motor Company  
 Gimbel Brothers  
 International Telephone and Telegraph Company  
 Kennecott Copper Corporation  
 Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company  
 Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railway  
 R. H. Macy and Company  
 National Dairy Products Corporation  
 National Distillers Corporation  
 Northern Pacific Railway

Owens-Illinois Glass Company  
Packard Motor Car Company  
Paramount Pictures, Inc.  
Procter and Gamble Company  
Public Service Corporation of N.J.  
Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corporation  
United Aircraft Corporation  
United Gas Corporation  
Union Pacific Railroad Company  
United States Rubber Company  
Universal Pictures Company  
Virginia Electric and Power Company  
Ward Baking Company  
White Motor Company  
Wilson Brothers  
Timken Roller Bearing Company

The fact that a company issues an "A" or a "C" report is not of itself an indication of whether it has good or bad employee relations. It certainly would be possible to have good employee relations and issue a "C" report, or even none at all. On the other hand, it would be possible to have unsatisfactory relations and issue an "A" report. In fact, if relations were unsatisfactory, an "A" report would seem to be essential.

#### Other Methods of Reporting

In addition to the special reports to employees rated above, there are two other methods of reporting which have been followed. One of these is to send each employee a copy of the regular report to stockholders. While this might be a successful method in theory, in practice only one of such reports studied would be considered satisfactory for employee consumption. This is the

report of the General Foods Corporation which is so straightforward and simple, with an attractive and interesting format, that it is a model for any company to study.

Other reports of this type, among them United States Steel, Radio Corporation of America, Boston and Maine Railroad and Stewart-Warner Corporation, would not attract the average employee. Among the Class C reports mentioned above, there are several which are addressed to both "stockholders and employees." But none of them qualifies for an "A" rating as an employee report.

Combining stockholders and employee reports into one is on the whole unsound. The stockholder report probably needs more dignity than is necessary for an employee report; in the latter it is possible and may often be desirable to be "folksy" in the approach, strengthening the feeling of unity and company spirit among employees. It is also possible in a separate employee report to devote adequate attention to individual achievement, both as a recognition of past work and as a spur to future endeavor.

In another category are reports included in house organs. An employee magazine would seem to be an excellent place to print an annual report and several companies successfully devote a special issue of their publication to this purpose. However, where the report is run merely as a feature, the results are not usually satisfactory. Those studied in this analysis included:

Socony-Vacuum Oil Company	Very good report, fairly well developed, expressed in clear, understandable English, and well illustrated.
American Rolling Mill Company	Covered in weekly reports of operations in mimeographed bulletin—hardly adequate in view of "A" standards listed above.
Associated Telephone Company	Simple, straightforward and brief, but probably satisfactory for small company.
Brooklyn Union Gas Company	Terse statement with good illustration of finances; inadequate detail.
Niagara Hudson Power Company	One-page highlighted summary; entirely inadequate.
Republic Steel Corporation	Simply expressed, hard-hitting language, but requiring amplification.
Southern Pacific Company	Reprint of stockholders report unsatisfactory for employees.
Western Electric Company	Reprint of stockholders report unsatisfactory for employees.

A number of corporations state that they "encourage" their employees to ask for stockholder reports. "Encouraging" an employee to secure and to read a stockholder report is like "encouraging" a customer to purchase. It simply will not do the job. A report has to be made so exciting and so interesting that an employee will want to read it, just as a consumption product must be made so attractive that the customer will want to buy.

It is noteworthy that a number of companies not issuing a printed report do make verbal reports at employees' meetings. Obviously, this

type of reporting is better than none at all and, properly handled, especially in conjunction with a printed statement, might be highly effective. But the verbal story does not reach the employee's wife or family and their goodwill not infrequently is as important as his own. Moreover, a printed report is a permanent record. It lasts longer than an employee's memory.

#### **Business Explains Itself**

It is important for all employees to be familiar with established company policies, particularly those which directly affect them. While the annual

report would seem to be the logical place to state and reiterate these policies, the danger of becoming repetitious must be avoided. Those who had been continuously employed for several years would probably find such recurrent reports boring and obviously only for the benefit of new job-holders.

This repetition could be avoided by the publication of a booklet entitled "Meet the XYZ Corporation." This booklet would serve as an introduction of the employee to the company, and would describe its policies, practices, pension and betterment plans, methods of reward for merit, and in general present the newcomer with a complete picture of his working conditions. Such a booklet could be made to fill one of the most valuable functions of the annual report at a time when an employee is most impressionable—the first day he joins the company.

#### **Southern California Edison**

Some individual reports contain excellent examples of how somewhat difficult questions can be clearly and forcefully explained. For example, here is how the Southern California Edison Company explains interest and dividend payments:

"In order to obtain the working tools—equipment of all kinds—which present employees use in providing electric service, the Company had to buy an average per employee, of \$80,000 of this equipment. Now the Company could conceivably have rented this equipment from those who provided it. If the Company had rented it, there would be due to the

owners a monthly, quarterly or annual rental for its use. But the Company did not rent the equipment. Instead, it hired or borrowed money from bondholders and stockholders and agreed to pay a certain rental (interest and dividends) for the use of this borrowed money."

#### **Johns-Manville**

Johns-Manville attacks the same problem in the form of a question which it answers fully and frankly in a manner to inspire confidence:

**"DO OUR COMMON STOCKHOLDERS GET TOO MUCH PROFIT?"**

**"ANSWER:** Let's look at the record. Then *you* decide whether or not *you* think it's too much. During the last twelve years our Common Stockholders have averaged \$2.02 per share each year in dividends. Mind you, this is an average per year. In one year they got as high as \$4.75, but in 1932, 1933 and 1934 they got nothing, and in one other year only 50 cents.

"Now, to get a simple picture of what these 'profits' have amounted to, let us suppose that you have bought and own one share of stock. If you had been saving \$1.00 per week out of your pay check to purchase this one share, it would require nearly a year and a half to accumulate enough to buy it from some other stockholder at the price at which it was recently selling on the New York Stock Exchange. On this share, the average dividend of \$2.02 per share for the past twelve years would have amounted to only 3 per cent. Do you think this return



would be too high a rate of interest for the money you had saved?"

### Alabama Power

Another ticklish question to discuss with employees is the problem of government regulation. The Alabama Power Company, recognizing itself as a monopoly, faces its responsibility squarely and conscientiously:

"In purchasing from grocery stores, clothing, hardware, and all other mercantile enterprises, the public usually has a choice of more than one from whom to buy, but in the case of the utility (with certain exceptions discussed later), it usually has no choice,—it can secure the service from only one source. It is for this reason that our business is so closely regulated. It is for this reason that all of us,—the stockholders, the directors, the officers, the department heads and every employee, individually and collectively—must constantly bear in mind our obligation to the public, and fulfill them faithfully and well. Ours is a business affected with a public interest; we must have a vital sympathy with our customers and be prepared to give good service and be ready with advice and suggestions to help them get the most from the service they are buying.

"So—we have a very definite obligation, not only to the Company, but to the public, to be uniformly courteous, to avoid being arbitrary, and to satisfy our customers."

That sort of language is in sharp contrast to the confusing ambiguity found in one employee report:

"Since the depreciation reserve accumulated on the basis of previous estimated lives of the properties is in excess of the reserve balance required on the basis of the new estimated useful lives, adjustments have been made in the depreciation reserve account and the earned surplus account to reflect therein the amounts which would have accumulated if the new bases of depreciation had been applied from the dates the properties were first acquired."

### Standard Oil of N.J.

The Standard Oil Company (N.J.) explains a surplus of almost 26 million dollars in terms which the man in the street could not fail to understand:

"Let us compare our situation with that of a young married couple. As the years go on they are able to purchase a refrigerator, a radio, a car and perhaps a few shares of stock. Let us assume all these possessions are worth \$5,000. But there are still some installments to be paid on the car, there are doctor bills and other amounts to be paid, totaling, say, \$1,000. The difference is \$4,000 and that is their surplus.

"Does that mean that if the husband loses his job they have \$4,000 on which to live? Not at all. Only a small part of that may be cash. To turn the rest into cash they would have to sell their car, radio, refrigerator—many of the things that contribute to their way of living."

### General Foods

From the report of General Foods comes a quotation which has a

political slant. Few employees could read the following in a national election year and feel that management was anything but absolutely fair on the subject of politics:

"The Management hopes each employee will register and will vote at all elections. It's our precious American privilege. But we do not want any employee, supervisor, or executive to use his company connections to influence, directly or indirectly, the vote of any other employee. Such actions would be undemocratic and properly resented.

"Any company employee or official naturally has the right of any citizen to air his personal views. But the company, as such, takes no political stand."

#### **An Intangible Asset**

With such excellent examples to serve as guides, it is obvious that the complexities of any corporation are subject to treatment which will make them understandable to an employee. There is no doubt that understanding is the first step in building goodwill.

The Supreme Court of the United States once declared that goodwill is "the disposition of a customer to return to the place where he has been well served." This is all right as far as it goes, but today goodwill means much more. It is also the disposition of a customer to trade for the first time with a company where he *expects* to be well served. Further, it is the disposition of a person to think favorably of an enterprise even though he may never do business nor come in contact with it.

But there is at least one more highly important angle of goodwill—one which it is a primary job of management to cultivate. A business or industry that really enjoys goodwill has the kind of a reputation that makes a man say, "Gosh, I'd like to work for that company; they're swell." A corporation which has that kind of goodwill doesn't need to be concerned with the A.F. of L., the C.I.O., or N.L.R.B. About all it needs to worry about is possible overtime charges on keeping its halo adjusted. That sort of thing can run into money, but it's worth it.

## PRESSURE POLITICS AND CONSUMER INTERESTS: THE SUGAR ISSUE

By WILLIAM H. BALDWIN

The perpetual "Battle of the Sugar Bowl," as it enters a new phase in its relation to national defense policies, continues to affect consumer interests. The April 1938 issue of the *QUARTERLY* presented an analysis of "Sugar and Public Opinion" by John E. Dalton. Currently, Mr. Baldwin presents his analysis of the contending groups and the issues at stake. He first became interested in this problem during the fight over the sugar schedule of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff. He has worked in the interest of, among others, the American Bottlers of Carbonated Beverages and the Hershey Corporation, an American company producing and refining cane sugar in Cuba, and is a member of the Cuban Committee of the National Foreign Trade Council.

A FAMILIAR object for which one reaches unconcernedly at home or in a restaurant, the sugar bowl has likewise become the symbol for one of the difficult and complex problems which the United States faces in its domestic politics; in its administration of its island territories and possessions; in its relations with Cuba, nearest Caribbean neighbor, and, indirectly, with all of Latin America; and in its present concern with national defense. Above all it is becoming a provocative symbol of the slowly forming attack on the assumption that a producer interest is *ipso facto* paramount to the consumer's.

"The trouble with sugar," P. A. Staples told the twenty-sixth National Foreign Trade Convention, "is that it is infected with political bacteria more virulent than any plant disease which may attack the cane or beets from which it is produced. And political bacteria flourish best where the body politic is kept in the dark. . . . Here is an opportunity for public service, which would seem to be custom built for outstanding research

organizations . . . which have won well-earned public confidence and leadership through their impartial studies of basic public issues."

Mr. Staples spoke as a partisan in the perpetual "Battle of the Sugar Bowl." He is president of Hershey Corporation, producer at Central Hershey, Cuba, of refined sugar for the American market. He spoke on October 10, 1939, roughly six weeks after the United States had experienced a striking demonstration of public interest in sugar: at the first news of the German march into Poland, the housewives of America had rushed the grocery stores to buy and hoard all the sugar they could lay their hands on. Their panic buying created such a shortage in retail stocks and the public excitement became so acute that President Roosevelt suspended all sugar quotas. This upset the delicate balance of the sugar industry which was a year in recovering. But the voice of the consumer had been heard in the land—and had been listened to.

### A Voice in the Wilderness

Six months to the day from Mr. Staples' speech, the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives opened a three-day hearing on bills relating to sugar legislation. The following is taken from the official report of that hearing:

*Dr. Ayres:* Mr. Chairman—

*The Chairman:* We will hear you for 7 minutes, Dr. Ayres. Will you give your full name and whom you represent for the record?

Examination of the report discloses that (a) Dr. Ruth W. Ayres, appearing for the American Association of University Women, was the sole representative of the consumer among the forty-four witnesses listed; (b) twenty of the witnesses were Representatives in Congress, no one of whom had a word for the consumer; (c) Dr. Ayres was kept waiting until the final session, when practically all of the producer interests had had their say; and (d) the nature of the reception accorded her by the Committee led her to reply to her most persistent questioner:

I do not believe for a moment you question the right of someone representing the consumers' point of view to appear in hearings of this kind. It seems to me that is one of the most basic parts of the whole program.

Thus the American consumer, articulate enough when the distant thunder of war aroused blind fears of a sugar shortage, was reduced to a single voice crying in the wilder-

ness of producer politics when the business at hand was discussion of a sugar policy that would control the price and availability of sugar to the consumer for the life of the new legislation.

Although no impartial, fact-finding study has been made by any responsible research organization, we are not entirely devoid of guides and yardsticks in considering the new legislation which Congress must enact to continue or replace the present law which expires on December 31. The U.S. Sugar Administration of World War I has left a record of experience; the U.S. Tariff Commission has made two exhaustive studies and reports in the intervening period; the Senate Lobby Investigating Committee thoroughly probed sugar activities during debate on the Hawley-Smoot Tariff; several federal agencies regularly publish pertinent statistics; responsible officials have made statements, and documented evidence has been written into the published records of sugar hearings.

### The Contending Groups

Within the limitations of this paper, these extensive data will be drawn upon in the following capsule review of the contending groups:

1. *Mainland Production:* This is divided between cane sugar and beet sugar. The former is the older of the two, dating back to Colonial days; but it is accorded only 6.3 per cent of the American market under the quota control plan, as against 23.4 for the beets. For climatic reasons cane sugar cultivation is restricted to Louisiana and Florida, the latter

having become commercially important only within the last decade. The American Sugar Cane League is the organization of the Louisiana planters. Clarence R. Bitting, president of the United States Sugar Corporation, is the spokesman for Florida, his company being to all intents and purposes the cane sugar industry of that State. In terms of what our generation has come to recognize as "pressure politics," the cane sugar interests did not figure until the beet interests pointed the way. From Colonial days until 1890 our national policy was one of tariff for revenue only, so far as sugar was concerned.

In the 'Eighties a group of Eastern capitalists was instrumental in introducing sugar beet culture from Europe. Considering the sponsorship and the era, it was not surprising that "beet sugar" instituted the swing to tariff for support of an infant industry. During the formative period experiments were made with direct subsidy, but the gospel of tariff protection won out and the lustier the infant sugar beet culture grew, the more artificial feeding it demanded and got. Concentrated largely in the sparsely settled States of the Rocky Mountain area, it soon adopted the United States Senate as its foster-parent; for two Western Senators per state can offset whole Congressional delegations in the more populous East. Indeed, sugar beet culture is the outstanding example of a farm activity able to climb aboard the protection bandwagon along with industry and to keep its place in, or close to, the driver's seat. Naturally, the Louisi-

ana cane planters, and subsequently the Florida interests, followed suit.

The main argument of the mainland cane-beet producers is that, until mainland sugar production approaches consumption, it should be fostered as farm relief both directly and, indirectly, through diverting acreage from surplus crops. Present concern about national defense has become the basis for arguing that we should become self-sufficient in so important a food as sugar. It also is argued that sugar sells at a low price in fact and in comparison with retail sugar prices in other nations. Cuba is the whipping boy as a foreign country with "low paid tropical labor" and, tacitly, as the one competitive area which has neither a Delegate in Congress nor even a Resident Commissioner to answer back and keep the record straight.

#### **"Beet State" Strategy**

The beet sugar interests are organized in three major groups: the United States Beet Sugar Association, representing the processors west of the Mississippi; the National Beet Growers' Association, representing the sugar beet farmers in that area; and the Farmers' & Manufacturers' Beet Sugar Association, embracing both groups in Michigan and three neighboring states.

At various times the beet sugar interests have sponsored full-page advertising schedules in national magazines, but it would seem that most of the educational activity of this group has been focussed in Washington. The outstanding factor in their strategy is their success in



maintaining acceptance of the assumption that a few hundred acres planted to sugar beets and a factory or two to process them make any state *ipso facto* a "Beet State" and automatically place its Congressional delegation in the sugar beet bloc. In line with this strategy, the leading trade association of an important industrial city in a so-called "Beet State" was discouraged from its plan to develop and publish a study of the effect of our national sugar policy on our export markets. Seventeen states are currently claimed as "Beet States."

2. *Seaboard Cane Refining*: Scattered along our seaboards from Boston to Savannah, New Orleans and San Francisco is a series of refineries which take raw sugar imported from offshore tropical producing areas (as well as the limited production of Louisiana and Florida), re-melt, wash, whiten and recrystallize that sugar; package it and sell it to the wholesale trade. There are some twenty-seven of these plants currently in operation, and they are owned by fourteen corporations.

The seaboard cane sugar refiners entered the Hawley-Smoot Tariff fracas in an effort to get a special protection against Cuban refined sugar. Although that Congress produced, under the leadership of Senator Smoot, an all-time high rate of two cents per pound against Cuban raw sugar, it refused to put a super-tariff on refined. The refiners then turned to the United States Tariff Commission under the flexible provisions of the Hawley-Smoot Act. Hearings were held and the Com-

mission instituted its own study of comparative refining costs in the United States and Cuba.

Pending its report the refiners next started proceedings before the AAA and NRA. These failing, they started agitating for a classification previously unknown in the sugar trade: direct consumption sugars. These were defined as all sugars, whether refined, semi-refined or raw, which entered directly into consumption. The effect was to segregate all cane sugar which did not pass through the seaboard refineries. Its significance was not immediately recognized.

In the meantime the general sugar situation was going from bad to worse. The embargo tariff against Cuba effectively demoralized that country's sugar industry, and it also proved a boomerang to the domestic cane-beet producers who had overlooked its stimulative effect on production in United States tropical areas—notably the Philippines, Hawaii and Puerto Rico—within the tariff wall. The Philippines were taken care of in the Independence Act which limited the amount of sugar they could put into the United States, and the Jones-Costigan Act of 1934 was devised to stabilize the other factors in production. This was written on the principle of establishing an estimate of annual sugar consumption and then giving each of the recognized producing areas a percentage (or quota) of this total.

### **The Fight for Quotas**

Naturally, each of these areas fought and intrigued to get the largest possible quota. At the strategic

moment the refiners worked into this maelstrom their idea of special quotas for direct consumption sugars. Soon there was a common demand to get some law into operation without further delay, and the Jones-Costigan Act emerged with a series of "D.C." (direct consumption sugars) quotas restricting to small percentages of their total quotas the amounts of refined sugar which the offshore producers, American flag as well as Cuban, could put into the United States. Thus this group of a dozen seaboard refiners won an advantage over their competitors, which the courts, the United States Tariff Commission and the Congress which fathered the Hawley-Smoot Tariff had refused them.

The Jones-Costigan Act was for a term of three years, expiring December 31, 1937. The consequent lull in sugar politics vanished as 1936 drew to a close. The refiners instituted an extensive advertising campaign in which the "art work" featured either photographs of freighters unloading offshore refined sugar, or crowds symbolizing the American consumers lost to American refiners by the "flood" of imports. The debate in committee hearings and on the floor of Congress waxed warm. Statements were issued by members of the Administration, including President Roosevelt, Secretaries Hull, Ickes and Wallace, and Ernest Gruening, then Director of Territories and Insular Affairs. Points they made included:

(a) Refining is a purely manufacturing function, and provision for

its interests should not be inserted into an agricultural measure.

(b) The interests of the great American consuming public will be best served by permitting reasonably competitive conditions to obtain in the refining industry.

(c) Disadvantage of the quota principle is that the public is denied some of the gains of normal increases in efficiency.

(d) "The audacity of one little group of manufacturing monopolists, the cane refiners, in demanding a legalized monopoly . . . illustrates the difficulties . . . in dealing with corporate aggregations of wealth which control the necessities of the daily life of our citizens."

(e) The bill "perpetuates a new geography," creating a continental and an offshore America where "we only know one kind of America."

But the refiners stuck to their knitting. A Sugar Workers Conference, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, entered the picture. According to the Census of Manufacturers for 1937, the maximum number of refinery employees this Conference could represent, if they effected 100 per cent organization, was 14,024; yet the Conference maintained offices in the Shoreham Building in Washington. A working agreement was established with the mainland cane-beet bloc which was seeking larger quotas. The basis of this agreement was that the refiners, who claimed political support in the nine States in which their plants are located, would not fight the quota position of the cane-beet group, provided the latter would support the

refiners in retaining the "D.C." quota provisions in the new legislation and in seeking a sharp reduction in the "D.C." quota for Cuba.

#### Roosevelt Signs Under Protest

Once again the political tug of war turned into an endurance test. Time passed, and the beet farmers became impatient to make their plans for the next crop year. A bill satisfying the demands of both mainland producers and refiners was jammed through Congress, and President Roosevelt signed it on September 1, 1937. In so doing he released to the press a statement in which he said:

The sole difficulty relates to a little group of seaboard refiners who, unfortunately, for many years were able to join forces with domestic producers in the maintenance of a continuing and powerful lobby in the National Capitol and elsewhere. . . . I am approving the Bill with what amounts to a gentlemen's agreement that the unholy alliance between the cane and beet growers on the one hand and the seaboard refining monopoly on the other, has been terminated by the growers. . . . The monopoly costs the American housewife millions of dollars every year and I am just as concerned for her welfare as I am for the farmers themselves.

Nothing was done about sugar legislation in either the 1938 or the 1939 sessions of Congress. During this period, however, the beet sugar

producers, who had not been filling their annual quotas, built up production to the maximum allowed them. In order to dispose of this larger output they had to extend beyond their traditional marketing territory. Beet sugar began invading the Atlantic seaboard in increasing amounts. That is a market which the cane refiners have always considered theirs. Thus, the advantage which they had expected from the reduction in permissible imports from Cuba was pretty well cancelled by the new competition of their confederates in the 1937 legislative battle!

Convening of the Seventy-sixth Congress in January, 1940, was the signal for introduction of a small flood of bills to regulate the sugar industry. It soon became evident that the battle would focus on the alternatives of opening up the whole issue and developing a policy to replace that applied in the expiring Sugar Act of 1937, or of extending that Act for another year, thus dodging at least temporarily the responsibility for making final decisions. Although they naturally have not publicized it, the refiners developed a new strategy in which they recognized that the beet sugar bloc in the Senate was inherently hostile and politically impregnable, and that their best chance was in lining up the Representatives of the populous Eastern seaboard States in which they operate refineries.

Ellsworth Bunker, vice-president of the National (Jack Frost) Sugar Refining Company, was continued as chief of staff for the legislative battle, and John E. Dalton, formerly

chief of the sugar section of the Department of Agriculture, was assigned to developing support among trade and civic groups in the industrial East. He was supplemented in turn by Mrs. Dalton who cultivated the women's club field.

Once again the political tug of war ended when the sentiment became dominant that any legislation was better than further uncertainty. After considerable maneuvering Congress passed the Cummings Bill extending through 1941 the Sugar Act of 1937, but in so doing amended it to restore the controversial "D.C." quotas on offshore production. On October 16, 1940, President Roosevelt signed the Bill as amended.

#### Uncle Sam's Own Islands

3. *Offshore U.S. Flag Areas:* From the mainland producers and refiners with their high political potentials there is a considerable drop in tempo to the program of the offshore areas under the American flag. Being automatically the beneficiaries of the progressive increases in protection won by the mainland interests, and at the same time having the lower cost levels of cane production in the tropics, they have been well content to let the mainland "carry the ball." They participate in all the huddles and identify their players as the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, the Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rican Trade Council.

So long as they all can reasonably satisfy their appetites at the expense of the Cuban quota, this common interest glosses the latent competitive

situation among them; but the intrusion of the "D.C." quota issue into the picture is increasingly embarrassing. Not that the sugar interests in these islands are as yet particularly concerned with the material returns in developing local refining industries; but the peoples of Hawaii and Puerto Rico are sensitive as to their rights and privileges under the American flag and are agitating for Statehood. Hence a federal law, which prohibits them from doing with their main crop what Mississippi can do with her cotton or Minnesota with her wheat, is becoming painfully visible.

4. *Cuba:* Despite all the battering she has received from the successive blows of our nationalistic sugar policy since the end of World War I, Cuba remains the largest single factor in our sugar situation. Her 1941 quota of 1,869,060 tons definitely tops the domestic beet quota of 1,549,898 tons and represents 28.3 per cent of the total for all producing areas. But this volume is only 42.5 per cent of the sugar she sold to the United States in 1922 and puts her back to her 1910 status.

From the viewpoint of organization to protect her interests, the situation is badly confused. Obviously, Cuba has no standing in our Congress; and as yet no Senator or Representative has appeared as champion of her interests where they coincide with our national interests. Fifty-seven per cent of Cuban sugar mill production is owned or controlled in the United States and is super-sensitive to the "Wall Street smear." Furthermore, even the American pro-

ducers in Cuba are divided among themselves. The great bulk of their production is raw sugar for sale to our seaboard refiners, and there are many instances of interlocking investment and control. For example, the president of the largest raw sugar producer in the island is counsel for the United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Association.

During the battle over the sugar schedule in the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, the American interests in Cuba worked together through the United States Sugar Association and the American Chamber of Commerce of Cuba. Their interest was in the tariff rate on raw sugar; after they lost that battle, they disbanded. But the production of sugar remained the backbone of the island's economy, and the wrench given to that backbone by the immediate hothousing of sugar in competitive tropical areas, with consequent economic and political disaster in Cuba, soon commanded the attention of the U.S. Department of State which became the one continuing force in defense of a square deal for our nearest Caribbean neighbor.

#### **Sugar Again Before Congress**

As Congress now prepares to consider the sugar issue anew in anticipation of the present law's expiration on December 31, the situation is that, once again, practically all the other sugar sectors are seeking to increase their quotas in the raw and refined sugar markets of the United States at the expense of Cuba.

The urgent need at this time, therefore, is to bring before impor-

tant groups of the American body politic the points where their best interests are identified with a reasonable participation of Cuban sugar in the American market, and to urge these groups to make, or have made for them, impartial, fact-finding studies of the claims and counter-claims of the conflicting sugar interests. The corollary of this latter position is, of course, that clubs and civic groups are urged not to form opinions and adopt resolutions on *ex-parte* presentations of the sugar issue by any one of the commercially interested parties.

Among the points of mutual interest which are being cited in Cuba's behalf are: (a) The paramount interest of the American people in sugar is the consumer interest; (b) Cuba offers a potentially important export market for a diversified list of American farm produce and factory products, the size of this market depending on the purchasing power which Cuba can develop here through sale of her sugar to us; (c) Under our present structure of sugar control, we are dependent for nearly 2,000,000 tons of our essential supplies on the Philippines and Hawaii which are thousands of miles from our mainland and heavily involved in the Far Eastern trouble zone, as well as for an additional 800,000 tons on Puerto Rico which is nearly one thousand miles distant; (d) The record of our mainland cane-beet production during World War I demonstrated the inability of this source of supply to respond to a national emergency; and (e) Cuba is only 100 miles from our seaboard,



is definitely within the framework of our mainland defense and responded to the emergency of the earlier war with a fifty per cent increase in sugar production for the United States.

This defense has been developed both directly through testimony at all hearings in Washington on sugar and on the Cuban aspect of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements controversy, and indirectly through providing statistical and other information to such groups in the United States as have become interested in some phase of Cuban-American relations. The official hearings afford the best available opportunity, in default of champions within the Halls of Congress, to get into the record corrections of misstatements made in Committee hearings and Congressional debate, and to point out where the interests of Cuba parallel our national interests.

But is the average American consumer-voter sufficiently informed to

appraise intelligently the claims and counter-claims of the contending producer interests? Can a woman's Club or other volunteer study group arrive at an informed opinion on the basis of a presentation of the case by one of the parties to the fight? Is it not all so complex and difficult that the inclination is to take up some simpler issue and let the sugar question go by default?

The omnibus answer to these questions seems to be that the sugar issue will continue in the dark until a research organization with national prestige produces an unbiased analysis.

After all, it took years (as well as leadership) before the public learned to protect the family sugar bowl from the health menace of the common house fly. It will take leadership (and it may take years) to build a similar protection around the sugar bowl in Washington. Certainly it will take more than the seven minutes allotted Dr. Ayres.

# NEW YORK COURSE ON PUBLIC RELATIONS

By BENJAMIN FINE

Dr. Fine, who attended the course described in this report, has been a staff member of the *New York Times* for five years.

BUSINESS executives of New York City and its environs, representing eighty major industries, attended the ninth course on public relations conducted by the American Council on Public Relations, given for the first time in New York City, January 20-24, 1941.

The Council, established on the Pacific Coast in 1939, is incorporated as a non-profit, non-commercial, non-political organization with headquarters in San Francisco. Dr. Rex F. Harlow, Associate Professor of Public Relations at Stanford University, is President of the Council. More than 175 business executives attended the New York course, bringing the total enrollment in courses sponsored by the Council to 1,572.

Experts in the fields of labor, consumer education, industrial relations, government and public relations, presented a composite picture of what the business man faces in the pressure-laden world of today. Placing sharp emphasis upon the rôle of public opinion and public relations in a democracy, the speakers also analyzed the motives that govern dictatorships and stressed the importance of understanding the origin and direction of propaganda—whether conducted by individuals, organizations or governments.

The faculty for the New York course consisted of Dr. Harlow; Dr.

Harwood L. Childs, Associate Professor of Politics at Princeton University; Mr. Harford Powel, Vice President of the Institute of Public Relations, New York City; Dr. Don D. Lescohier, Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin; Dr. Edwin G. Nourse, Director of the Institute of Economics, Brookings Institution; and Dr. Paul H. Nystrom, Professor of Marketing at Columbia University.

## Speakers and Subjects

Five forty-minute lectures were given by members of the faculty every afternoon during the course. The scope of the lectures is suggested by the following program schedule:

### First Day

Public Relations and Social Action  
(Dr. Harlow)  
Is There a Consumer Movement?  
(Mr. Powel)  
Public Opinion and Public Relations  
(Dr. Childs)  
The Solid Basis of *Laissez Faire* (Dr. Nourse)  
Backgrounds of our Current Labor Problems (Dr. Lescohier)

### Second Day

Foundations of Public Relations (Dr. Harlow)  
What Consumers Want from Business (Dr. Nystrom)

- Public Opinion Polls (Dr. Childs)  
 Information and Responsibility vs.  
 Criticism and Irresponsibility (Dr.  
 Nourse)  
 Industrial Statesmanship in Labor  
 Relations (Dr. Lescoghier)

### Third Day

- Public Relations at Work (Dr. Har-  
 low)  
 Changing Tastes and Requirements  
 in Consumer Demand (Dr. Ny-  
 strom)  
 Formation of Public Opinion (Dr.  
 Childs)  
 Divergences of Opinion between  
 Business Men and Bureaucrats  
 (Dr. Nourse)  
 The Closed Shop Problem (Dr.  
 Lescoghier)

### Fourth Day

- The Public Relations Program (Dr.  
 Harlow)  
 Constructive Information Selling  
 (Dr. Nystrom)  
 Dictatorship and Propaganda (Dr.  
 Childs)  
 Government in Business and Busi-  
 ness in Government (Dr. Nourse)  
 Grievance Policies (Dr. Lescoghier)

### Fifth Day

- Public Relations and Current Prob-  
 lems (Dr. Harlow)  
 What Business Wants from Con-  
 sumers (Mr. Powell)  
 Propaganda and National Defense  
 (Dr. Childs)  
 The Challenge of Free Enterprise  
 (Dr. Nourse)  
 Short-Circuited Foremen (Dr. Lescoghier)

### Evening "Quiz"

For two hours each evening, the lecturers, together with five specially invited guests, sat as a panel to answer questions submitted orally and in writing by the enrollees. Frequently as many as thirty questions were discussed during the course of an evening.

The guest members of the panel were:

- CHING, CYRUS S., Director of Public and Industrial Relations, U. S. Rubber Co.  
 CLAREY, NORTHROP, Assistant to the President, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey  
 COLLINS, KENNETH, Assistant to General Manager of *New York Times*  
 COOLEY, VICTOR E., Vice President and Director, New York Telephone Co.  
 CROSSLEY, ARCHIBALD M., President, Crossley, Inc.  
 DICKINSON, ROY, President, Printers' Ink Publishing Co.  
 DIMOCK, MARSHALL E., Administrative Officer, U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service  
 GALLUP, GEORGE W., Director, American Institute of Public Opinion  
 GARRETT, PAUL W., Vice President, General Motors Corp.  
 HERSHEY, LEWIS B. (BRIG. GEN.), Deputy Director, Selective Service Commission, Washington, D.C.  
 HOLLISTER, PAUL M., Vice President, J. Stirling Getchell, Inc.  
 LANDIS, JAMES M., Dean of Harvard Law School  
 LICHTENBERG, BERNARD, President, Institute of Public Relations

LOVEJOY, FRANK W., Sales Executive,  
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.

MONTGOMERY, DONALD E., Director,  
Consumers' Counsel Division,  
Agricultural Adjustment Admin-  
istration

NELSON, DONALD M., Coordinator of  
Purchases and Administrator of  
Priorities, National Defense Ad-  
visory Commission

ROBINSON, CLAUDE, President, Opin-  
ion Research Corp.

ROPER, ELMO, Research Director,  
*Fortune* Survey of Public Opinion

SPATES, THOMAS G., Director of In-  
dustrial Relations, General Foods  
Corp.

SYME, JOHN P., Director of Industrial  
Relations, Johns-Manville Corp.

TEAD, ORDWAY, Editor of *Economic  
Books*, Harper & Bros.

WEAVER, H. G., Director of Custom-  
er Research Staff, General Motors  
Corp.

WINANS, WILFRED H., Manager of  
Industrial Relations, Union Car-  
bide and Carbon Co.

ZIMMERMAN, R. R., Staff Member,  
Council of Personnel Administra-  
tion of U. S. Government.

The proceedings of the New York course are to be published and will include summaries of the afternoon lectures and a verbatim report of the evening discussions.

#### Significance of Course

The strong impression left with all who attended the course might be summed up as follows: When men, busy in their own tasks, will voluntarily sacrifice some of their valuable time to attend classes and sit day after day participating in discussions, then hope for the ultimate survival of democracy is assured.

One enrollee's statement expressed the general feeling: "With democracy threatened throughout the world, with force and bestiality on the march, with all forms of communications under strict control in virtually every country of the world except the United States,—it is imperative that leaders in business, government, labor, industry and commerce understand the rôle of public relations in shaping public opinion."

# PRESS, RADIO, FILMS

This selective survey endeavors to summarize leading events, situations, and research in the various fields of communications that particularly concern problems of public opinion formation and control. The period covered extends from October through December 1940.

## International Communications

THE QUARTER under consideration brings to a close the first year of "The 'Forties." If it is any index of the other nine years of the decade ahead, the period will warrant the name "The Frustrate 'Forties." Never in the midst of so much plenty has man so deeply hungered. Never have the means of communication existed so abundantly, perhaps never have the facts to be communicated been so desperately significant, and certainly never have the means been so bitterly in bondage or the stream of facts so thin and so muddled.

From Europe the prime sources of information have narrowed to two: London and Berlin. From them, or through them, news of the works and days of some 250 million Europeans flowed sometimes sluggishly, sometimes of suspect purity and sometimes not at all. From Asia the news has been thin and colored. Only among the three Americas has news moved with reasonable freedom and without unreasonable adulteration. It may truthfully be said that, while science has been hard at work telescoping time and space to make a smaller world than ever, the policies and the emotions of men have put up bars and opened gulfs to separate the minds of men by astronomical distances.

### News Transmission from Europe

The early part of the quarter showed few differences from the preceding period. Continued reports for newspapers and the radio arrived from Berlin, London, Rome, Vichy and from the Balkan capitals as occasion warranted. Censorship difficulties were substantially as before; two able journalists summed them up in succinct fashion. Said Vincent Sheean about England, "The censors drove us nuts at times. The censorship is confused and contradictory and badly administered, sometimes defeating its own purpose." AP Correspondent Lloyd Lehrbas, speaking of unoccupied France, pointed out the triple censorship existing there: "The Petain-Laval government doesn't want some stories to reach the United States. The Germans insist upon censorship of stories which might reflect on Germany or the German occupation. The Italians are touchy on stories involving any Italian interests." Elsewhere on the continent control was similarly tight.

Late in October the Italian invasion of Greece raised Athens to the rank of a vital news source, and the Greek capital continues until the end of the quarter to be an important center of information. On December 12 the British campaign



against the Italians in Africa added Cairo to the list, a majority of the dispatches on this arena of the war originating there. German activity in the Balkans has also spotlighted that area, with Bucharest as the chief head of news.

Despite these new developments, however, London and Berlin retain their dominance over European news, as is only natural in the war between the two great antagonists. Of the two, London unquestionably led both in quantity and quality of news during the quarter, perhaps because the events of the quarter were hardly suitable to the totalitarian brand of public enlightenment.

The continuation of intensive bombing operations repeatedly endangered international communications during the quarter. Broadcasting House and the Associated Press offices in London both suffered, without any significant interruption, however, in transmission.

#### **News Transmission from the Far East**

Even more severe than European limitations are those which have been imposed increasingly on gatherers of news in the East. From the Chinese, engaged in a life-and-death struggle, relatively little news has been available. The Japanese have been officially vocal but trustworthy news even from American correspondents has been at a minimum. Both telegraph and telephone conversations are heavily censored, scripts for the latter being required in advance.

While the mails are not yet censored, and it is even possible to mail

copy to Shanghai for forwarding via Press Wireless without censorship, this is not only slow but also results in unhappy consequences when traced by the Japanese. At the present time news is almost wholly confined to official handouts.

#### **News across No-Man's-Land**

No survey of international communications today can neglect the deep ignorance within the countries at war of the whole picture of the war's progress. It is true that the English are better informed of continental events than those within Germany's grasp are of events in other parts of the continent or abroad. But for everyone close to the war, communications are so interrupted, and the use of them often so hazardous, that on both sides knowledge and even the wish for knowledge of the whole picture has been supplanted by concern with events as close as the horizon. Richard Mowrer, Chicago *Daily News* correspondent, for example, spent a good portion of his furlough reading back issues of his own paper to get his first coherent picture.

#### **War in Pictures**

It is no libel on the ability or energy of news photographers to observe that Brady covered the Civil War relatively better than the present war is being covered photographically. The reasons are numerous. The simplest is, of course, censorship. From a news story vital information can often be removed without wholly killing the piece. This is much less seldom true of a photograph, and

the result is that pictures are more frequently ruled out altogether than merely edited.

The second is the plain difficulty of getting the picture. Hours after an air battle, a ship sinking or a bombing raid, the newswriter can reconstruct the event by conversation with witnesses, an appraisal of the results and a liberal dose of imagination. No such course is open to the photographer, who must in a lightning war be where the bolt strikes preferably before it strikes if he is to record it photographically. Finally, the transmission of photographs has become an even greater problem than the transmission of news. A recent photograph from Bardia reached New York having been sent from Egypt to Australia, by clipper to San Francisco and by wire to New York.

Those pictures that have come through, however, have been eloquent. The visual stimulus seems more powerful than the verbal, where scenes of havoc and destruction are concerned, nor do deficiencies of style or language interfere. Whereas the Germans exploited this to its uttermost in previous quarters, while their armies were sweeping all before them, it is the British who have used the picture most effectively in this quarter, the number and quality of photographs released having been materially greater than those from the Axis. Particularly powerful as influences on an already sympathetic public opinion have been "before-and-after" pictures showing districts of London and other English

sites first undamaged and then laid waste by German bombers.

### Drawing the War

One of the most interesting results of the war on communications has been the revival of the artist as reporter, which has been particularly marked in this quarter. Almost without exception periodicals have in the last twenty years gone over to photographs to picture news events, leaving the artist only maps and diagrams of murder scenes for his province. But with the coming of war, and especially with the spread of war to remote areas where photographers are not waiting for news to happen, it has been increasingly difficult to picture events photographically.

Consequently Germany and to a certain extent England have released from time to time line-drawings purporting to give a realistic recreation of some war incident. It is hardly necessary to observe that the artists have taken care on both sides not to give the enemy the best of it. An ingenious domestic variation is being practised by Times Wide World Photos, which is syndicating a weekly picture, drawn by an artist here, portraying war scenes as recreated from dispatches.

### Mail Communications

The transmission of information by mail between Europe and the United States changed little during the quarter so far as the continent was concerned. Mail to and from the Axis countries and those they control remained almost at a standstill. Brit-

ish-American mail, in general, was less both in its quantity and in the information it contained than at any time since the war. The heavy toll of British shipping during the quarter sent an unestimated but huge number of communications to the bottom.

Airmail was, if somewhat more certain, slower than ever. At the end of the quarter airmail transmission time between London and New York was from four to six weeks. British censorship became even more severe; actual clipping out of offending passages in letters in some cases replaced the previous method of blacking over.

Even despite the loss of mail and the censorship, however, many publications discovered that private letters furnished more information, not of specific events, but of general conditions of life, than professional news reports. Several metropolitan newspapers published during the quarter collections of private letters for their news value, as did a number of national magazines.

#### War Miscellany

Among the events related to communications and the war the following may be briefly noted:

The promulgation, effective November 3, by the Vichy government of a gag rule prohibiting reception of British broadcasts. At the same time the basic freedom of the press law was amended to permit a fuller control of both domestic and foreign news dissemination.

An order suspending all American correspondents in Spain was issued

November 15, to be effective three days later. On November 16, however, the order was rescinded. The *quid pro quo* may perhaps be found in the granting of a visa by our State Department to the Washington correspondent of E.F.E., Spanish official news agency, authorizing him to set up a bureau in the capital.

The filing from London by Robert J. Casey, of the Chicago *Daily News*, of a "model" dispatch, as the censor would have it. The lead of this effective satire was, "An undetermined number of bombers came over an unidentified portion of an unmentioned European country on an unstated day."

The publication by the Dies Committee of a report on German propaganda agencies in the United States, with particular reference to the Transocean News Service. Not only were attempts to influence the American press in the Nazi favor revealed in the report, but also the intensive drive to place with the South American press material of a violent anti-American nature. Both here and in South America Transocean material was offered on the most favorable terms or free. Quotations in the Dies report from the correspondence of Dr. Manfred Zapp, director, proved, however, that little success was achieved in either direction. The net cost of the propaganda bureau was given in the Dies release as \$128,000 for about twenty months prior to August 15, 1940.

#### Hemisphere Communications

The wooing of Latin America, which has previously been noted with

special reference to international communications, developed during the quarter into what is substantially a shotgun wedding. Needless to say, the media of public influence played a leading part in the high-pressure drive for neighborliness. Among the significant developments which may be mentioned were:

The award of the Maria Moors Cabot prizes for 1940 to James I. Miller, vice president of the United Press Associations for South America, Augustin Edwards, Chile publisher, Enrique Santos, Colombian newspaper executive, and Rafael Heliodoro, Mexican correspondent for many Latin American journals. The gold medals, with honorarium of \$1,000, are awarded annually for service in journalism promoting hemisphere amity.

The first meeting between government officials charged with promoting cultural relations among the American republics and representatives of the leading United States newspaper syndicates. The meeting urged lower mail and wire rates to Latin America and denied any intent to propagandize.

The transmission from Mexico of the first wired pictures to the United States on the occasion of the inauguration of the Mexican President. Both Times Wide World Photos and the Associated Press Photo Service transmitted prints from Mexico City, the former to New York, the latter to Dallas.

HERMAN LIEBERT  
*Executive Editorial Staff*  
*The Paul Block Newspapers*

### British Censorship

Harry Flory, European news manager of the United Press, who returned to the United States for a vacation at the end of December, has prepared the following memorandum for the QUARTERLY on British censorship conditions and procedures:

"Our most continuous contact with the censors is with those stationed regularly in the cable company offices, but we are free to appeal their interpretations of censorship rulings to any higher authority at the Ministry of Information, right up to Duff Cooper.

"Stories which deal with military, naval, or air matters, unless they are absolutely straightforward or based on communiques, must be referred by the cable company censors back to the Ministry of Information and the Ministry must submit them to a representative of the service department involved.

"In general, the British censorship does not permit the transmission of news which would be of value to the enemy, or of news of damage or lack of damage to military objectives.

"Censorship of straightforward stories which do not have to be referred to higher authority is fairly rapid. We normally get 'flashes' through the censorship and into our New York office within not more than ten minutes. Longer stories of course take more time.

"If a censor passes a story, or some part of a story, in error, the correspondent is not blamed. The correspondent is held responsible only when, through some trick, he man-

ages to evade the censorship and slip out information which the British do not want to reveal. No foreign correspondent in England has been expelled. As far as I know, reprimands have been the only penalty for deliberate evasion of the censorship.

"In my opinion, the British censorship has maintained a more or less even course. If anything, some of the censorship rules have been relaxed as the war progressed. At the beginning of the blitz, they had no intention of releasing as much information about the air raids over Britain as they have released. During the first few months of the war, the censors, who were new at their jobs, and even some of the heads of the censorship made stupid mistakes. But they have learned by experience.

"One important point about the British censorship is that it is open. That is, we always know exactly what happens to our messages before they are transmitted. The censors must contact us if they make the slightest change or deletion. We can argue with them, appeal to higher authority, cancel the message entirely if we feel that the censorship makes it misleading, or insist upon the insertion of a note saying that so many words have been deleted."

## Press

THE PERFORMANCE of American newspapers during the Presidential campaign left a majority of their publishers open to the jibes of persons who may be designated as newspaper-haters. Nearly every newspaper in the country has its critics who

may be fair or unfair; just, according to their own standards, or admittedly spiteful. The more vociferous newspaper-haters have taken a considerable delight in baiting the majority of newspaper publishers for their failure to win with Willkie.

This criticism has got under the skin in a good many cases and receives more than passing mention in the trade press and at gatherings of newspapermen. At its dinner on December 14, the Washington correspondents, who comprise the Gridiron Club, put their own employers on the grid and roasted them—if gently—on this theme.

### Press vs. Public Opinion

Arthur Robb, editor of *Editor & Publisher*, wrote in a signed article printed in their issue of December 14: "We're getting plenty tired of repeated assertions, mostly from the same mouths, that the 'press' is losing, has lost, or has not recovered, its 'influence with the people.'"

Charges of unfairness and of "loss of influence" usually are heard during the three months, every four years, of a Presidential campaign. Mr. Robb does not deny a "loss of influence" specifically, but does point out instances of effort on the part of certain newspapers to influence public opinion in the right direction, and with some degree of success.

The fact that there are editorial pages in nearly all newspapers is evidence that the press regards itself as an agency for influencing public opinion. It cannot be denied that, during the campaign, both editorial pages and news columns were used



to attempt to influence the public in its choice of a President; or that a great majority of the newspapers advocated the candidacy of the loser.

Mr. Robb, and the readers for whom he writes, may be "getting tired" of the repeated assertions, but after two elections in which the candidate opposed by a majority of newspapers has been chosen by the voters, it can hardly be denied that the press has at least failed to influence the popular majority of voters in their choice of a national leader.

Many publishers hold that influencing public opinion is not a major function of the newspapers; they contend that the major function is to *inform* the public and that expression of the publishers' and editors' views is a secondary consideration. And it must be pointed out that most of the newspapers advocating the election of the Republican candidate also published polls of opinion which indicated that a majority of voters were likely to vote the Democratic ticket.

#### Gain in Circulation

There actually is no method of measuring the influence of newspapers—whether they have lost or are losing or have not recovered their influence with people. What can be measured, however, is newspaper circulation. *Editor & Publisher* announced in December that the circulation of dailies was up 4.77 per cent over 1939, on the basis of a cross-section survey of publishers' statements to the Audit Bureau of Circulations for the six-month period ending September 30, 1940, as compared with the same period a year

ago. The greatest increase, 4.99 per cent, was among morning papers. Evening newspapers increased 4.56 per cent and Sunday newspapers increased 3.16 per cent.

The Presidential election and the drawing of numbers under the Selective Service Act ran circulations up considerably above normal, but the increase in readers followed a trend exhibited in circulation gains the year before.

#### Report on London

Among individual performances of reporters, the most noteworthy was that by Ralph Ingersoll, editor of *PM*, in going to England and reporting the story of the air raids and the methods adopted by the British for withstanding the German attacks. This series was widely syndicated and probably did much to bolster up the sentiment in favor of all possible aid to Britain "short of war."

#### Wage and Hour Decision

The Lowell (Mass.) *Sun* failed in its effort to obtain a court ruling that a newspaper, because of the First Amendment to the Constitution, occupies a special position as a business institution and therefore is not subject to regulation of wages and hours of employment by the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor.

U.S. District Judge Ford, at Boston, held that there was nothing in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937 to impair the freedom of the newspaper to print anything it pleases under the clause guaranteeing freedom of the press; that the act is

intended purely to promote the well-being of employees of newspapers, as well as of other industrial enterprises; and that the Lowell *Sun* must produce its records for examination by officials of the Wage and Hour Division.

No opinion has, as yet, been handed down in the similar effort made by the Easton (Pa.) *Plain Dealer* and the Easton *Express* and *Morning Free Press*, to prevent examination of employment records by Labor Department officials.

B. P. GARNETT  
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## Radio

THE MOST spectacular development in broadcasting in the last three months has been the final break between the broadcasters and ASCAP, the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers. Trouble has been brewing since 1935, when the last agreement was signed, and came to a head in February of last year when the broadcasters declared their intention of breaking off with ASCAP by furthering Broadcast Music Inc.

There have been many requests for mediation between the two. ASCAP band leaders went to Mayor LaGuardia and asked him to intervene. Frank Hummert, head of Blackett, Sample and Hummert Advertising Agency, wrote to the FCC requesting mediation. A group of orchestra leaders under Fred Waring attempted to bring the two together.

However, at midnight December 31, when ASCAP contracts ran out, ASCAP songs ceased to be played on the major networks. Six hundred and sixty stations out of a possible 796 have subscribed to BMI, but a fairly large group have signed both ASCAP and BMI.

Organizations disagree on the main disagreement between the two. BMI officials say the issue is whether broadcasters shall pay for music on a per program basis or on a percentage of gross revenue. ASCAP officials say the broadcasters are unwilling to pay for the music they use—specifically, to pay the approximately \$4,000,000 increase demanded of the networks in the new contract proposed by ASCAP. Acrimonious charges fly back and forth, with pro-ASCAP commentators alleging that the networks, already a monopoly in the broadcasting and talent-booking fields, wish to extend their monopoly still further.

BMI observers point to the unequal distribution of ASCAP income, with most of the money being retained by a few composers and the majority of the composers getting practically nothing. ASCAPers say the networks would deprive the public of such wonderful songs as "Mother Machree" and "Happy Birthday to You" for the sake of a few dollars. BMIers say ASCAP is a racketeering union entrenching power in the hands of a few old-timers and keeping young talent in poverty.

Sensational turn in events came when the Department of Justice under Robert Jackson, the Attorney General, brought an anti-trust suit

against ASCAP, BMI, CBS and NBC and threatened to extend the charges against other parties in the discussion. It is thought in trade circles that this will lead to a settlement out of court within the next few months.

#### Developments from Monopoly Report

Government action in relation to the ASCAP-BMI fight must be seen in connection with the recent developments in the Monopoly Report argument. Briefs were filed by the networks, the independent radio stations and a few other parties, and were the basis of a hearing December 2 and 3. CBS, NBC and IRNA bitterly attacked the Report.<sup>1</sup> They contended that there were misstatements of fact; that there were grave inconsistencies even if the facts were true; and that the Commission had no jurisdiction over the matters contained in the recommendations to the Commission made by the Committee drawing up the report.

Mutual, on the other hand, while stating that the Report went too far in some instances, on the whole approved every remark in the Report which was against NBC and CBS. They recommended that the FCC make proposals which would forbid a station entering into any agreement with any network if it would: (1) forbid this station from broadcasting programs from any other network; (2) give the network an option on the hours for commercial programs for more than a fixed percentage of its time, the percentage varying with the number of full-time stations with

comparable facilities in the market; and (3) limit the duration of the network contract. As National and Columbia officials pointed out, this would, in effect, do away with networks, since the central organizations would be unable to depend on stations carrying their programs, and hence their whole programming structure would break down.

After the hearing, which largely centered about the FCC's jurisdiction in these matters, the parties requested and were granted leave to file further answers to the Report not due until January. Whatever action is taken will probably depend not only on the Department of Justice's suit, but also on the proposal made by Senator Wheeler to revive in Congress the often-rumored investigation of chain-broadcasting. Either he or Senator White is to introduce a resolution for investigation in the coming session.

#### The Election on the Air

Final figures for the use of radio during the election are not yet available, but certain occurrences may be noted at this time. Early in the campaign, broadcasters were much worried that political business would not be as good as usual because of the effect of the Hatch "Clean Politics" Act, limiting the amount which could be spent by a political party in a campaign. Roosevelt's tendency until late in the campaign to ask for free time as President, rather than paying for time as candidate, with

<sup>1</sup> See PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, September 1940, pp. 518 & 526.

the Republicans demanding the comparable free time, further complicated matters.

In the last weeks of the campaign, moreover, another headache appeared. In order to avoid the provisions of the Hatch Act, innumerable small political groups appeared wanting to broadcast, each claiming to be able to spend the maximum allowed by law. One local New York station reported the following organizations broadcasting for Willkie: The National Committee of Democrats for Willkie, the Republican National Committee, the Women's National Republican Club, the New York State Republican Committee, the Brooklyn Association of Willkie Clubs of America, the Lawyers' Committee Against The Third Term, We the People Committee for Willkie, and the Willkie War Veterans National Committee Eastern Division. The same station reported broadcasting for Roosevelt: The National Democratic Committee, the Democratic State Committee, and the Independent Citizens' Committee for the Reelection of Roosevelt.

The amount of time given to political broadcasting on the major networks decreased considerably from the 1936 campaign to the 1940 campaign. On CBS in 1936, the Democrats produced 85 hours, while in 1940 they produced 57.85 hours. In both campaigns the Republicans took time with 125.25 hours in 1936 and 68.45 hours in 1940. Those who have seen the total published figures of expenditures for Willkie, compared with the expenditures for Roosevelt, wonder why Willkie's greater ex-

penditures, which held true for radio, did not win him the election. At least one answer lies in the CAB rating. Generally when Roosevelt spoke he used both major networks. Willkie usually spoke over only one. When he did speak, Roosevelt's rating was 36.0 to 38.0, while Willkie's rating varied from 16.0 to 30.0. Incidentally, Willkie's highest rating came on the Madison Square Garden speech which used NBC Red and Blue, CBS, and Mutual.

On the whole, campaign talks were confined to generalities with General Hugh Johnson proving the exception. He deviated from his script on a Mutual broadcast election eve to say that Jews were for Roosevelt because he was against Hitler. He mimicked Yiddish dialect unflatteringly and made an embarrassing reference to Major Ginsberg of the United States Army. There was no way of checking what he "ad libbed" and rumor undoubtedly exaggerated what he said, but already several affiliates have notified Mutual that "Johnson is too risky."

#### Labor Challenges NAB Code

John L. Lewis, in his opening speech at the Atlantic City CIO Convention, November 18, denounced the NAB code as "harmful to labor." He asked that the Federal Communications Act of 1934 be amended to prohibit broadcasters from denying labor unions the right to purchase time. This development followed the refusal of Station KYA to renew a program called "The CIO Reporter" which had been on the air five years, saying that it was

under the NAB Code, "controversial" and that, as such, the opposing point of view should be given on the same program. Lewis went on to point out that broadcasting in general gives the point of view of the employer, and cited the Ford Symphony Hour as a case in point.

There was no answer to this charge forthcoming from the broadcasters, but four days later CBS gave Philip F. Murray, the new president of CIO, 78 stations for his address, the first time that labor had had free time on the air before 10 p.m.

#### At Home and Abroad

At the end of November, Martin Dies published a sensational "White Paper" in which he tried to establish a relationship between Transocean Press Service, a German organization, and Transradio News, claiming that the latter was both a receiving and transmitting service for Germany. He also cited instances in which the German information service had tried to "plant" material in news commentary. Herbert Moore, president of Transradio, answered by saying that any arrangements that Transradio had made were known to the Federal authorities, and that, unfortunately, if we were to get the news, press services had to work out arrangements with Germany.

American interest in South America has flowered into elaborate broadcasting arrangements with our Southern neighbors. NBC announced that programs in Spanish and Portuguese would be re-broadcast. The best offerings on both of our networks would be presented, including the

NBC symphony under Toscanini, the Metropolitan Opera, and so forth. In the past, commentary in Spanish on football games and prize fights has been especially popular with this audience.

At the end of December, William Paley, president of CBS, announced that he had organized a South American network consisting of 39 long-wave and 25 short-wave stations, with arrangements for sponsoring programs broadcast either in the North or the South. Sour notes were heard in the trade journals, with observers in South and Central America asking "Who do you think will listen?" The articles pointed out that there are very few short-wave sets, and that these are mostly in the homes of very wealthy people. Articles have appeared, in Mexican magazines especially, criticizing the American jingo spirit which they claim is attempting to subtly break down the growth of the cultural independence of our Southern neighbors.

#### Rural vs. Urban Listeners

A recent decision of FCC is extremely important for the future of the American system of broadcasting. Station WHDH in Boston, Mass., was granted the right to broadcast on the same channel as KOA in Denver, Colorado. This was formerly a clear channel, meaning that KOA was a powerful station serving a very large area because it had no interference. Commissioners Craven and Case dissented from the decision with a long argument showing that the breakdown on the clear channels



(originally 40; now only 25) meant less and less service to rural listeners who depend for the most part on clear-channel stations. The clear-channel question is one which is important to defense because of the necessity, in the event of a crisis, of reaching groups of people not served by small stations.

#### Incidental Intelligence

A majority of 1500 radio critics and writers in newspapers and magazines voted the Jello program the best on the air, with Jack Benny the best radio star.

JEANETTE SAYRE

*Harvard University*

### Radio-Press News Exchange

A SIGNIFICANT development during the last quarter has been an increasing interchange of news between news agencies, primarily serving the press, and news services operated by broadcasting chains. Various kinds of contractual agreements are in force, but the general effect of all of them is to pool information, especially that of foreign origin.

This trend has been assisted by the public appetite for war news, by notable reporting of radio correspondents as well as of correspondents of the standard news agencies, by a decline in the old competitive antagonism between newspaper and radio, and by the desire of both radio and the newspapers to provide a backstop for news in the event of partial interruption of news channels from abroad. The trend further reduces the possibilities of scoops of long duration, but the public is benefited by an increase in the completeness of news coverage, as well as by the speed with which news from any source is made available.

Both the United Press and the International News Service have sold news to radio chains and individual stations for some time, with clauses

written into the contracts providing for an exchange of news. The Associated Press, which had tried to restrict the use of its report to stations owned by member newspapers, or had given away news bulletins without recompense as a "public service," liberalized its rules at the annual convention last spring to meet the competitive situation. Member papers were allowed to sell AP news to local stations, paying 5 per cent of their assessment rate when the news was sold for use on sustaining programs, and 25 per cent when the programs were sponsored.

#### Exchange Agreements

A further step was taken on September 10 when the Associated Press announced that it had signed one-year "exchange agreements" with the National Broadcasting Company and the Columbia Broadcasting System providing for the exchange of all news gathered by the networks, plus a cash differential, for AP news.

The contracts give the AP the right to pass on the suitability of any sponsor who wishes to use the service, as well as the right to stipulate whether or not the AP should be

credited as the source of the news broadcast. Price differentials, similar to those in effect in United Press and INS contracts, are based upon a number of variables, including the size of the station, the amount of news it broadcasts, and ability to pay. Subsequently a similar exchange agreement was made with the Mutual Broadcasting System.<sup>1</sup>

Under the terms of these exchange agreements, news collected by the foreign correspondents of the three broadcasting chains or picked up by their listening posts from foreign stations is placed at the disposal of AP, UP, and INS. Much of this matter is transmitted to the news agencies by teletype. The radio service has been especially useful in speedily supplying translations of speeches taken directly from short-wave receivers by translators employed in the listening posts operated by the chains.

Radio scoops, such as the sinking of the *Graf Spee* and the French armistice, presumably will now be made available immediately to the standard news agencies in New York. Newspaper dispatches under a New York dateline, crediting the chains with being the source of the news, are tangible evidence to newspaper readers of the results of the exchange agreements.

#### News Wire for Radio

Another advance in the efficiency of news distribution was made at the beginning of 1941 when the United Press put into service the first trans-continental news wire operated exclusively for radio. The news report

carried over this wire is "processed" to make it especially suitable in style for immediate oral broadcasting.

Previously the eastern section of the radio wire ended at Hutchinson, Kansas; a west coast wire originated in Sacramento. News from the East and Europe as well as from the West and Far East may now be sent instantaneously to all radio station clients without reprocessing. In December the Associated Press began preparing a radio report for radio clients, presumably to meet the demands of its expanding radio business and to adjust itself to a competitive situation.

#### Latin American Edition

Last fall *Reader's Digest* launched a Spanish language edition, with the announced purpose of promoting good will among the American republics. The subscription price is \$1 a year (compared with \$3 for the United States edition), although the Latin American edition, unlike the domestic one, accepts paid advertising. At the end of 1940, the periodical reported a net paid circulation of 4,100,000, including 180,000 for the British Empire edition and 225,000 for the new Latin American edition.

A weekly quarter-hour program in Spanish for South America was begun by *Reader's Digest* on January 6, 1941, over WGEO, the General

<sup>1</sup> On January 24, the AP announced the formation of a subsidiary, Press Association, Inc., which will handle all AP radio news business. An analysis of this subsidiary will appear in the next issue of the QUARTERLY.

Electric short-wave station at Schenectady. The program consists mainly of the presentation, by reading or dramatization, of excerpts from the Latin American edition of the magazine.

O. W. RIEGEL

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## Films

SENATOR Wheeler's broadside against the motion picture industry for "waging . . . propaganda for war," has brought into public discussion a problem that is likely to remain as acute as the times are critical. Any instrument that may be used to shape or sway public opinion, particularly one that continuously commands the attention of millions, may now become a storm center. The film industry, accustomed to withstanding pressure, as well as to succumbing, may feel that it can take it. But Senator Wheeler's complaint raises a question not amply covered by the "code" nor, perhaps, even by the power of the Hays office.

Assuming that Mr. Hays and the industry were technically correct in denying Senator Wheeler's charges, the fact remains that numerous films are made which appear to Wheeler (and, one imagines, to many people) like war propaganda; and, what is more, no films of a general anti-war or anti-involvement character have recently been shown.

### Seeing Eye to Eye

The relationship between Washington and Hollywood is interesting

in this connection and might be described as follows: Government policy, including aid to Britain, is established in industry through the Office of Production Management; one industry with a liaison connection to the O.P.M. is Hollywood. There is no question of coercion involved—Hollywood voluntarily and enthusiastically organized itself—but the end product is a film policy, along the lines of government policy—aid to Britain.

The government is not, however, officially engaged in propaganda. Such activity would be impolitic in any situation short of actual war. The Films Division of the O.P.M. (Leo Rosten) services the film industry with information, most likely not unmixed with advice. That is all—on the government side. The motion picture industry, on the other hand, has large active committees of producers and exhibitors. Still, it would be difficult to describe the government's situation as one even of remote control. It is simply that Washington has given Hollywood free rein. Hollywood knows what to do. The "propaganda" therefore, comes from showmen, though they would be the last to use the dread word; and when it comes, it has but one central message. The government's minority opposition does not figure. The word *democratic* is thus used in vain when applied to the treatment of war in the movies. For better or worse, that fact has to be faced.

How could it be otherwise? As Hollywood is set up, no movie company could hope, during these times, to make a "Wheeler" movie pay at

the box-office. Hollywood is geared only to majorities. Newsreel men who say, off the record, that one of the chief reasons the "no-war" or "anti-aid" groups cannot get a break is that too many audiences display hostility, do not thereby escape their obligation as journalists of the screen. But who would put up \$200,000 to make an anti-aid-to-Britain feature film—just one—as against all pro-British films?

#### Policy and Profit

Hollywood is first of all a business, now happily combining a friendly government policy and profit. Critics point out that not long ago the industry was afraid to make anti-Fascist pictures; that book titles were changed and any amount of jugglery performed to avoid giving offense to European aggressors; that only when the foreign market faded and anti-Nazism became assuredly popular in America, did Hollywood become so brave. . . . But these are the band-wagon politics and morals of a large, centralized, box-office business. When films cost fortunes, when distribution has only a few main channels, production seems inevitably to follow only main trends.

It is unfortunate in many ways that Hollywood film budgets run so high, and that distribution is so well bottled. For with every film made for everybody, there is little room among the main trends for an interest or taste that is not dominant. If it were otherwise, those who would like films to ignore parts of the "code," and people with this taste or that, such as Senator Wheeler with his

views on the war, would be able to choose and encourage movies as they do books.

Senator Wheeler's attack is disturbing to movie people, not only because to some extent he represents a considerable Middle Western following, but also because he has something to say on the Neely Bill, and he sits on the Interstate Commerce Committee. It would be a great calamity if a solution to the problem raised by Wheeler were to be found in legislation for censorship. The movies have too much of that now. Anxiety is not great, however, as such legislation, if proposed now, would have little chance of success. Hollywood's policy is popular.

#### Films for the Army

The production of an unprecedented number of Army training films has begun in cooperation with Hollywood film companies. An exclusive agreement for the assignment of military film production has recently been concluded between the Signal Corps and the Research Council of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences.

This exceptional use of films in the Army is part of a draft program of visual-aid short cuts, intended to telescope three-years military training into one. The films will not be seen by the public, as many of them concern military secrets.

#### Government Films

The Office of Production Management recently established a unit for the production of defense shorts. These government films will be seen

in perhaps ten thousand theaters as a result of an agreement between O.P.M. and the defense committee of exhibitors.

The production of non-military government films, however, remains slow, awaiting the attitude of the President and Congress. The President has been known to favor civilian non-theatricals. He threw his weight behind the U.S. Film Service (Pare Lorentz) last spring. The last Congress, however, put the damper on that and all other civilian production. The belief seemed to have circulated that government films were *ipso facto* propaganda.

A study of civilian films would on the whole disprove that belief so far as the contents of the films are concerned. They might be said to be propaganda insofar as timing is concerned; but even then the Congressional attitude seems mostly one of fear in the abstract. Almost everyone in the non-theatrical film world hopes that the new Congress will reconsider, and that there will be an increase in films dramatizing natural resources and other appropriate governmental subjects.

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## THE REPUBLICAN RURAL PRESS CAMPAIGN

By RALPH D. CASEY

For the first time in a Presidential campaign, a major party set up a separate rural press section to reach the farmer vote. Dr. Casey, Chairman of the Department of Journalism at the University of Minnesota, describes the techniques employed.

AMERICAN political parties do not adequately analyze the voting constituency of the nation preparatory to launching a propaganda campaign in a Presidential year. Farmers, for example, compose one of the most important occupational groups in America. Yet in past campaigns the Farm Division at party headquarters has emphasized political organization in farm areas at the expense of machinery for preparing and distributing propaganda designed especially for rural voters.

Some of the leaders of the country press have long realized the inadequacy of party propaganda processes in reaching the farmer. After the Republican convention in 1940, a few of these men, under the leadership of Wright A. Patterson, resolved to use their influence to improve propaganda methods at party headquarters insofar as they were directed at rural constituencies. Mr. Patterson, then editorial director of the Western Newspaper Union and onetime country publisher, had spent most of his life supplying rural newspapers with news and editorial material through his syndicate.

As a result of this pressure, the Republican party organization at Washington finally decided to set up a separate rural press section in the Publicity Division, for the duration

of the Willkie campaign, and Franklin Waltman, director of publicity, appointed as the head of the new section Herman Roe, publisher of the Northfield (Minn.) *News* for the past thirty years.

A former president of the National Editorial Association and for four years the field director of this organization of rural publishers, Roe numbered hundreds of weekly newspapermen among his close friends and acquaintances. Moreover, his political experience included work in two Presidential contests in his own state. His appointment by Waltman meant that a political party was willing to recognize that an experienced rural publisher was in a better position to understand the publicity "needs" and requirements of rural papers than either a daily newspaperman, a professional advertising man or press agent.

Roe began work under handicaps on September 16, with only six weeks in which to prepare and distribute Willkie propaganda. Knowing that many country publishers feel that they are entitled to some paid political advertising as a *quid pro quo* for the party publicity material they use, Roe first sought funds from the National Committee with which to finance a modest advertising campaign in the rural press. He

was informed that the National Committee could not provide in its 1940 campaign budget for a single dollar of paid advertising in newspapers, magazines, or farm papers, not because of failure to recognize their value as media but for reasons of economy and especially due to the limitation on campaign expenditures imposed by the Hatch Act. He then proposed a plan for underwriting advertising in newspapers locally, with small contributions solicited by the publisher from many individuals, but the "Go Ahead" signal to this suggestion came so tardily from Washington that little was done during the campaign to capitalize on the idea.

#### **Circularizing Rural Press**

Waltman had prepared the way for Roe's publicity campaign by writing rural editors to ask if they wanted Republican campaign releases. Thirty-six hundred editors returned the reply-postcards in the affirmative, and several releases were sent to the papers before Roe organized his office at Chicago headquarters of the party.

Roe's first act was to send out a letter to publishers over his own name announcing the creation of a rural press section and his appointment as the section's director. "This is the first time in the history of national political campaigns," he added, "that the country press of the nation has been given such recognition." He announced that he would furnish editors with a weekly release "carrying factual information and feature material regarding Wendell

Willkie and Senator Charles L. McNary, summaries of important speeches and short articles relating to the issues of this campaign." A proof sheet of Release No. 4 for rural editors was enclosed.

Although he centered his hopes on publishers in the agricultural Middle West, Roe circularized a list of 6,000 papers. Of the 4,355 publishers who requested publicity releases in response to his letter, a surprisingly large number came from New York, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, with the backbone of support, however, in the mid-continental area which Willkie must win to capture the election. Thirty-three hundred publishers wished material in stereo plate form, 900 wanted it in the form of "mats," and 155 preferred mimeographed copy which they could set themselves on their own type-setting machines. Roe made no attempt to line up editors in the Deep South.

#### **Servicing the Press**

A thorough knowledge of rural newspapers enabled Roe to adopt techniques which would best serve the country press. The practice of sending out three- and four-column cuts made way for plates limited to two columns. News stories carried headlines suitable for use in rural papers. Captions and "under-lines" were written for cuts and cartoons. Each weekly release carried a political cartoon, and a feature entitled "Wendell Willkie Says," as well as short miscellany picked up from the general propaganda booklets—"The Roosevelt Record in Red," "Hidden Taxes," "Cotton to Corn," etc.

Since "mats" and plates were in heaviest demand among publishers, the rural press section was compelled to meet early dead-lines. All copy had to be ready on a Tuesday for use in rural papers on their publication dates of the following week. The plates and "mats" were manufactured by the Western Newspaper Union in Chicago and were expressed to branch managers of the company in the various states. They, in turn, sent the material to the rural papers in their territory which had evidenced an interest in it. Sent on Monday, it arrived in country shops in time to meet Wednesday and Thursday publication dates.

Roe's choice of themes in his publicity stories stressed the national debt and the third-term issue. Rural families owning their own farms would be worried over the debt issue, he reasoned, and he relied to some extent on the result of Emil Hurja's poll of issues to which Illinois farmers had responded. This revealed that the third-term issue was of first importance in the minds of this group. Toward the end of the campaign Roe emphasized Willkie's declaration that he would keep the nation out of war if elected.

#### Data on Distribution

A break-down of papers that requested Roe's services, and presumably used part or all of the releases, shows that Illinois headed the list. The greatest number of individual requests came from these twenty states: Illinois, 302; New York, 256; Iowa, 250; Pennsylvania, 240; Kansas, 237; Minnesota, 225; California,

211; Michigan, 199; Missouri, 194; Texas, 178; Nebraska, 175; Ohio, 174; Indiana, 171; New Jersey, 139; Wisconsin, 125; South Dakota, 118; Oklahoma, 103; North Dakota, 91; Colorado, 90; Massachusetts, 80.

Sixty-one Kentucky and 55 Tennessee publishers wrote for the service. The record of Southern states follows: Florida, 47; North Carolina, 53; Virginia, 35; and Louisiana, 31. Roe did not service any South Carolina publisher and did not deem it worthwhile to seek "clients" in Arkansas, Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi.

There is no way to determine the effect on the rural voter's political attitude of the news stories, feature articles, pictorial matter and miscellany which he read or glanced at in his country paper. Circulation and strength of rural newspapers in certain areas and loyalty of readers to these journals would have to be studied against the vote in the territory served by these media. And the problem of isolating single features in the columns of the papers for their effect on political attitudes would be extremely complex, if not impossible.

That the work of the rural press section had some influence is evident only if the results in certain Middle West counties are analyzed, but Roe makes no positive assertion on this point. While exact results are not measurable, nevertheless his work marked the beginning of a technique of propaganda which may be refined and carried a step farther in future national campaigns.

# GALLUP AND FORTUNE POLLS

This section contains a compilation, topically arranged, of poll results released by the American Institute of Public Opinion and by *Fortune*. It is complete for the time periods covered except for the special surveys listed at the end of the section. The AIPO results cover the period from October through December 1940. (Previous AIPO questions were reported in the July 1938, October 1939, and in all 1940 issues of the *QUARTERLY*.) The *Fortune* questions are those which appeared in the October, November, and December issues of the magazine. (Previous *Fortune* questions were reported in the 1940 issues of the *QUARTERLY*.)

Under each topic, all of the Institute data are given in chronological order, then all of the *Fortune* material, also in chronological sequence. Dates appearing in connection with AIPO questions are those carried in the date lines of Institute releases to subscribing newspapers; dates following *Fortune* questions indicate the issue of the magazine in which the information appeared. Institute questions are designated by AIPO; *Fortune* questions by FOR.; *Fortune* Forum of Executive Opinion questions by FOR. F.E.O.; "DK" stands for "don't know"; "no op." for "no opinion."

In considering these poll data, the reader should bear in mind certain salient points of reference set forth on pages 75 and 76 of the March 1940 issue of the *QUARTERLY*. The *QUARTERLY* wishes to express its appreciation to George Gallup and the American Institute of Public Opinion and to the editors of *Fortune* and Elmo Roper for their cooperation in making these survey results available in convenient form to other students of public opinion.

## Part One: Domestic Issues

### I. POLITICAL

#### ATTITUDES TOWARD CANDIDATES

Reasons why Willkie voters favor him (*in order of frequency*): Oct. 10, '40—AIPO)

1. Opposition to the third term.
2. The country needs a change—Roosevelt has been in long enough.
3. Opposition to New Deal spending and other policies.
4. Willkie is a successful businessman and a good executive.
5. Roosevelt would get us into war.
6. Willkie would get better results out of business leaders.

Reasons why Roosevelt voters favor him:

1. Roosevelt is the friend of the common man, the champion of the masses.
2. The country has confidence in his ability, training and experience, especially in the handling of foreign affairs.
3. The country shouldn't change leaders when there is war abroad.
4. Third term is less to be feared than an untried and comparatively unknown man in the White House.
5. Willkie knocks the administration too much.

Voters were asked which candidate they favored and whether they personally owned homes or other property. The choices of those with opinions in both groups were as follows: (Oct. 12, '40—AIPO)

	<i>Roosevelt</i>	<i>Willkie</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
Property Owners	47%	53%	10%
Non-Owners	67	33	10

Voters undecided at this time on their choice of candidate constitute a highly important factor in the close states. The undecided vote in the states outside the solid South is as follows: (Oct. 17, '40—AIPO)

Nevada	17%	New Mexico	12%	Wisconsin	10%
Arizona	15	Idaho	11	Oregon	10
Montana	14	Colorado	11	Indiana	9
Delaware	14	Missouri	11	Michigan	9
Connecticut	14	South Dakota	11	Minnesota	9
Rhode Island	13	Illinois	11	Wyoming	9
Iowa	13	New Hampshire	10	Maine	8
North Dakota	13	Massachusetts	10	Pennsylvania	8
Vermont	12	New York	10	Kansas	8
New Jersey	12	Maryland	10	California	8
Nebraska	12	West Virginia	10	Washington	8
Utah	12	Ohio	10		

(Asked of persons supporting Roosevelt) Have you, at any time since Willkie was nominated, planned to vote for *him*? (Oct. 19, '40—AIPO)

(Asked of those supporting Willkie) Have you, at anytime since Roosevelt was nominated, planned to vote for *him*?

The results contribute some striking new information as to American political behavior during a Presidential campaign:

1. The overwhelming majority of voters on both sides said they had not changed their minds on the candidates at any time during the campaign. Neither speeches, events abroad, nor the normal efforts of a three-month Presidential campaign had budged their choice.
2. On both sides, however, a small but highly important bloc of voters said they had changed their minds. These are the voters, by-and-large, who will decide the election. Approximately 8% of those who now favor Willkie conceded that, sometime during the campaign, they had planned to vote for Roosevelt.
3. Similarly, over 10% of those now favoring Roosevelt said they had once planned to vote for Willkie. In the net exchange of voters, of course, President Roosevelt has gained more than Willkie has—one fact which helps to explain Mr. Roosevelt's lead in the Institute's state-by-state Presidential studies since September.

What was the main reason you changed your mind? (Oct. 19, '40—AIPO)  
In the case of voters switching from Roosevelt to Willkie the two chief reasons advanced were:

1. An increasing anxiety in the individual's mind about the effect of a third term. Often such voters said they liked "much of what Roosevelt has done, but don't think the third-term tradition should be broken."



2. Belief that Administration foreign policies might involve America in war. "Willkie makes me think he would do a better job of keeping America out of the war," these voters say.

The chief reasons given by those switching from Willkie to Roosevelt were:

1. Disappointment with the speeches and campaign of Mr. Willkie—a feeling that the Republican candidate had "talked too much" without presenting a clear alternative to some of the Administration's measures.
2. Belief that a deepening war crisis abroad had made Mr. Roosevelt's reelection necessary: Roosevelt's experience is needed in this crisis; we shouldn't change now."

Which candidate would do the better job of strengthening our country's national defenses, Roosevelt or Willkie? (Nov. 10, '40—AIPD)	Roosevelt	61%
	Willkie	39
	Undecided	13

If the United States should get into the war, which man would you prefer to have as President, Roosevelt or Willkie? (Nov. 10, '40—AIPD)	Roosevelt	60%
	Willkie	40
	Undecided	9

Which one of the following statements comes *closest* to expressing your own opinion of Mr. Roosevelt? (Oct. '40—FOR.)

In times like these, it is absolutely essential to have a man like Roosevelt for President	26.7%	} 53.2%
There may be some reasons against having Roosevelt for another four years, but on the whole it is the best thing to do	26.5	
While Roosevelt has done some good things, the country would be better off under Willkie for the next four years	22.3	} 38.7
The re-election of Mr. Roosevelt for another four years would be a very bad thing for the country	16.4	
Don't know		8.1

Which one of these four statements comes *closest* to expressing your opinion of Wendell Willkie? (Oct. '40—FOR.)

Willkie is just the man the country needs for President during the next four years	11.5%	} 35.6%
Even though Willkie hasn't as much political and international experience as he needs, he still would make a better President than Roosevelt	24.1	
Willkie is probably an honest and capable businessman, but he hasn't the right experience to be President in times like these	36.1	} 45.5
The election of a man like Mr. Willkie would be a very bad thing for the country	9.4	
Don't know		18.9

Regardless of what you hope, who do you think will win the election—Roosevelt or Willkie? (Oct. '40—FOR.)

	Total	Favoring Roosevelt	Favoring Willkie
Roosevelt	58.1%	84.4%	23.8%
Willkie	24.2	4.0	56.3
Don't know	17.7	11.6	19.9

Do you feel that it will be a close election? (Oct. '40—FOR.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>People expecting Roosevelt to win</i>	<i>People expecting Willkie to win</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
Yes	63.6%	54.7%	77.8%	73.9%
No	26.2	36.4	17.6	4.2
DK	10.2	8.9	4.6	21.9

Will you probably vote for the same party in your local elections (county and state) as you will nationally? (Oct. '40—FOR.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Favorable to Roosevelt</i>	<i>Unfavorable to Roosevelt</i>
Same	57.9%	63.7%	56.1%
Different	24.0	19.1	29.1
Don't know	18.1	17.2	14.8

Which of these things do you think Roosevelt will favor, and which do you think Willkie will favor? (Asked of people *approving* the following policies) (Oct. '40—FOR.)

<i>Selling naval vessels to Britain:</i>	<i>Will favor</i>	<i>Will not</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
Roosevelt	82.0%	3.7%	14.3%
Willkie	42.3	11.7	46.0

*Beginning compulsory military training:*

Roosevelt	91.2	1.4	7.4
Willkie	47.1	9.1	43.8

*Not letting any South American country  
establish a pro-Hitler government:*

Roosevelt	83.9	4.3	11.8
Willkie	65.2	3.7	31.1

Same. (Asked of people *favoring* these policies) (Oct. '40—FOR.)

<i>Place unemployed in war industries:</i>	<i>Will favor</i>	<i>Will not</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
Roosevelt	76.2%	6.5%	17.3%
Willkie	54.2	5.4	40.4

*Increase farm incomes:*

Roosevelt	81.6	7.0	11.4
Willkie	46.1	12.6	41.3

*Continue New Deal measures:*

Roosevelt	96.7	0.8	2.5
Willkie	23.7	43.7	32.6

*Establish regulation of labor unions:*

Roosevelt	56.1	19.3	24.6
Willkie	37.0	15.5	47.5

Which one of these four statements comes closest to expressing your own opinion of Mr. Roosevelt? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

In times like these it is absolutely essential to have a man like Roosevelt for President	25.5%	} 53.3%
There may be some reasons against having Roosevelt as President for another four years, but on the whole it is the best thing to do	27.8	
While Roosevelt has done some good things, the country would be better off under Willkie for the next four years	21.2	} 40.2
The re-election of Mr. Roosevelt for the next four years would be a very bad thing for the country	19.0	
Don't know		6.5

Which one of these four statements comes closest to expressing your own opinion of Wendell Willkie? (Nov. 40—FOR.)

Willkie is just the man the country needs for President during the next four years	11.1%	} 37.9%
Even though Willkie hasn't as much political and international experience as he needs, he still would make a better President than Roosevelt	26.8	
Willkie is probably an honest and capable businessman, but he hasn't the right experience to be President in times like these	36.5	} 50.3
The election of a man like Mr. Willkie at any time would be a very bad thing for the country	13.8	
Don't know		11.8

For whom do you expect to vote in November—Roosevelt or Willkie? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

Roosevelt	45.8%	Wouldn't answer	2.4%
Willkie	38.5	Won't vote	5.9
Other	.3	Don't know	7.1

(If respondent definitely expects to vote for Roosevelt or Willkie) If any of these things happened between now and Election Day, would you be inclined to change your vote for President? (Read across) (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	Yes	No	Don't know
The sinking by the Germans of an American owned and operated ship	2.0%	92.9%	5.1%
The defeat of England	2.4	93.0	4.6
A message from Roosevelt asking Congress for a declaration of war	6.8	85.4	7.8
The discovery of tremendous graft in giving out contracts for war equipment	24.4	61.1	14.5

If "no" or "don't know" to all questions above)	Yes	3.4%	} 15.6%
Do you think that <i>anything</i> —that is, anything that has a reasonable chance of happening—would cause you to change your choice? (Nov. '40—FOR.)	Possibly	12.2	
	No		79.6
	DK		4.8

With which one of these statements concerning a third term do you come closest to agreeing? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	OCTOBER (asked in August)	NOVEMBER (1)* (asked in September)	NOVEMBER (2)† (asked in October)
The idea that a President should not hold office for three terms is a silly and outworn tradition	13.2%	16.0%	15.8%
While it may not generally be a good idea for a President to serve three terms, there should be no rule preventing him at a time of national crisis	51.8	50.1	46.6
Never under any conditions should a President hold office for three terms	29.9	30.2	33.8
Don't know	5.1	3.7	3.8

\* These results, published in November issue, are based on a set of interviews made when the presidential campaign was under way.

† These results, published in November issue, are based on two sets of interviews made simultaneously, after Japan had joined the Axis and Willkie had toured the Pacific Coast.

Does the fact that Mr. Willkie was President of a large utility company make you feel more favorable or less favorable toward him as a candidate for President, or doesn't it make any difference to you? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	OCTOBER (asked in August)	NOVEMBER (1) (asked in September)	NOVEMBER (2) (asked in October)
More favorable	19.8%	21.3%	20.1%
No difference	57.6	58.6	60.6
Less favorable	13.9	14.8	14.8
Don't know	8.7	5.3	4.5

Which do you think would do a better job of rearming this country—Roosevelt or Willkie? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	NOVEMBER (1) Total	NOVEMBER (2) Total	People who say they expect to vote for	
			Roosevelt	Willkie
Roosevelt	51.2%	51.0%	87.8%	8.0%
Willkie	20.5	28.2	.9	67.9
Both	10.4	6.4	4.5	9.5
Neither	.8	1.1	.4	1.1
Don't know	17.1	13.3	6.4	13.5

Do you think that Roosevelt and Willkie agree on the following propositions or do you think they disagree? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>
On the best way to solve unemployment	54.2%	9.4%	36.4%
How to increase business confidence	52.2	10.3	37.5
That most New Deal reforms should be continued	41.5	30.2	28.3
That the government should economize on everything but preparedness	35.3	28.9	35.8
On the foreign policy we should pursue	28.0	30.3	41.7
That the rights of labor should be preserved	20.6	41.7	37.7

Which one do you agree with—Roosevelt or Willkie? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	<i>Agree with Roosevelt</i>	<i>% of pop.</i>	<i>Agree with Willkie</i>	<i>% of pop.</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>% of pop.</i>
Solving unemployment	37.6%	20.4	50.4%	27.3	12.0%	6.5
Increasing business confidence	31.5	16.4	58.4	30.5	10.1	5.3
Continuing New Deal	45.1	18.7	45.0	18.7	9.9	4.1
Government spending	35.9	12.7	56.0	19.8	8.1	2.8
Foreign policy	47.4	13.3	41.6	11.6	11.0	3.1
Rights of labor	57.3	11.8	36.9	7.6	5.8	1.2

Did you read or listen to Willkie's speech of acceptance at Elwood? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Prosperous</i>	<i>Poor</i>	<i>Mountain States</i>	<i>East South Central</i>
Yes	37.4%	64.5%	21.8%	54.3%	20.1%
Part only	17.2	14.2	15.9	12.2	8.1
No	45.4	21.3	62.3	33.5	71.8

(If respondent answered "yes" or "part only" to above question) On the whole did it make you more favorable or less favorable toward him than you had been, or did it leave you feeling about the same? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Prosperous</i>	<i>Upper Middle</i>	<i>Lower Middle</i>	<i>Poor</i>	<i>Negroes*</i>
More	30.7%	39.7%	34.8%	28.6%	24.4%	21.3%
Same	48.5	44.1	46.0	49.5	52.0	59.0
Less	18.6	15.5	17.5	19.5	19.7	19.7
DK	2.2	.7	1.7	2.4	3.9	—

\* Southern Negroes have been omitted.

Do you think that Willkie's campaign so far has been—(Nov. '40—FOR.)



	<i>Total</i>	<i>Prosperous</i>	<i>Poor</i>
Very well run	17.8%	18.4%	18.0%
Fairly well run	31.6	44.3	22.3
Poorly run	25.6	23.1	23.7
Don't know	25.0	14.2	36.0

(If "fairly well run" or "poorly run") Who do you think is mainly responsible for its not being better—Willkie himself, or his advisers, or the Republican party as a whole? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Prosperous</i>	<i>Poor</i>
Willkie	37.3%	30.5%	38.0%
His advisers	19.4	20.9	18.1
Republican party	22.0	27.7	18.6
Don't know	22.8	22.6	26.5

(Percentages add to more than 100 because some respondents gave more than one answer to this question.)

Regardless of what you hope, who do you think will win—Roosevelt or Willkie? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	<i>OCTOBER</i> <i>(asked August)</i>	<i>NOVEMBER (1)</i> <i>(asked September)</i>	<i>NOVEMBER (2)</i> <i>(asked October)</i>
Roosevelt	58.1%	60.3%	66.0%
Willkie	24.2	23.0	18.0
Don't know	17.7	16.7	16.0

#### PRE-ELECTION TRENDS

		<i>Roosevelt</i>	<i>Willkie</i>
If the Presidential elections were held today, [question asked Sept. 20-Oct. 2 inclusive] would you vote for Willkie or Roosevelt? (Oct. 6, '40—AIPO)	Popular vote (major party)	56%	44%
	No. of states	42	6
	Electoral vote	499	32

#### DEMOCRATS LEADING—42 STATES

<i>Electoral</i> <i>Votes</i>		<i>Per cent</i> <i>Roosevelt</i>	<i>Per cent</i> <i>Willkie</i>	<i>Points of</i> <i>change in FDR</i> <i>vote since</i> <i>Sept. 20</i>
8	South Carolina	99%	1%	+1
9	Mississippi	97	3	+2
12	Georgia	89	11	+3
23	Texas	89	11	+6
10	Louisiana	88	12	+2
11	Alabama	88	12	+3
9	Arkansas	82	18	+2
7	Florida	79	21	+4

## GALLUP AND FORTUNE POLLS

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13	North Carolina	75%	25%	+3
11	Virginia	73	27	+3
11	Tennessee	72	28	+3
3	Arizona	69	31	0
3	Nevada	66	34	+4
11	Oklahoma	64	36	+1
3	New Mexico	63	37	0
4	Montana	62	38	+2
11	Kentucky	62	38	+4
8	West Virginia	60	40	+3
8	Maryland	60	40	-1
3	Delaware	59	41	-1
4	Utah	59	41	+2
8	Washington	58	42	+1
22	California	57	43	-1
4	Rhode Island	57	43	+1
4	Idaho	56	44	+1
5	Oregon	56	44	+3
11	Minnesota	56	44	+5
15	Missouri	55	45	-1
8	Connecticut	55	45	-1
16	New Jersey	55	45	+1
3	Wyoming	55	45	+1
6	Colorado	54	46	+2
29	Illinois	53	47	0
26	Ohio	53	47	0
36	Pennsylvania	53	47	+1
12	Wisconsin	53	47	+2
47	New York	52	48	0
19	Michigan	52	48	-2
17	Massachusetts	52	48	+3
11	Iowa	52	48	+6
4	New Hampshire	52	48	+3
14	Indiana	51	49	+2

499 ELECTORAL VOTES FOR ROOSEVELT TODAY [Oct. 6]

## REPUBLICANS LEADING—6 STATES

<i>Electoral Votes</i>		<i>Per cent Willkie</i>	<i>Per cent Roosevelt</i>	<i>Points of change in FDR vote since Sept. 20</i>
7	Nebraska	57	43	-4
5	Maine	56	44	0
3	Vermont	56	44	0

4	North Dakota	54%	46%	0
4	South Dakota	53	47	+2
9	Kansas	51	49	+2

## 32 ELECTORAL VOTES FOR WILLKIE [Oct. 6]

## GALLUP POLL BOX SCORE TODAY (Oct. 17, '40—AIPO)

			<i>Roosevelt</i>	<i>Willkie</i>	
	Electoral votes		414	117	
	No. of states		37	11	
WILLKIE (leading with 54% to 50%)			ROOSEVELT (leading by more than 54%)		
<i>Electoral</i>			<i>Electoral</i>		
<i>vote</i>			<i>vote</i>		
3	Vermont	54%	8	South Carolina	98%
5	Maine	53	9	Mississippi	95
14	Indiana	53	12	Georgia	85
29	Illinois	52	11	Alabama	85
19	Michigan	52	23	Texas	85
11	Iowa	52	10	Louisiana	84
12	Wisconsin	51	9	Arkansas	79
—			7	Florida	76
93	Electoral votes		13	North Carolina	72
WILLKIE (leading by more than 54%)			11	Virginia	71
7	Nebraska	58%	11	Tennessee	69
4	North Dakota	57	3	Arizona	67
4	South Dakota	57	8	Maryland	64
9	Kansas	55	3	Nevada	63
—			8	West Virginia	62
24	Electoral votes		4	Montana	62
ROOSEVELT (leading with 54% to 50%)			11	Oklahoma	62
17	Massachusetts	54%	3	Delaware	61
11	Minnesota	54	3	New Mexico	60
4	New Hampshire	53	11	Kentucky	59
15	Missouri	53	4	Rhode Island	58
47	New York	52	8	Connecticut	58
26	Ohio	52	4	Utah	58
3	Wyoming	52	5	Oregon	57
6	Colorado	51	8	Washington	57
—			22	California	56
129	Electoral votes		16	New Jersey	56
			36	Pennsylvania	55
			4	Idaho	55
			—		
			285	Electoral votes	

If there were no war in Europe today, which Presidential candidate would you vote for, Roosevelt or Willkie? (Oct. 22, '40—AIPO)	Willkie	53%
	Roosevelt	47
	Undecided	8

The trend since the last Institute survey has been: (Oct. 27, '40—AIPO)

	ROOSEVELT		WILLKIE	
	Oct. 18	Oct. 27	Oct. 18	Oct. 27
Popular vote	55%	54.5%	45%	45.5%
Electoral votes in states where leading candidate has more than 54%	285	238	24	23
Electoral votes in states 50-54%	129	172	93	98
Total electoral votes	414	410	117	121

The average "undecided" vote for the nation is 7% as compared with 9% in the October 18 survey.

#### STATE-BY-STATE VOTE IN GALLUP POLL (Oct. 27, '40—AIPO)

##### ROOSEVELT LEADING (By More Than 54%)

Electoral Votes	Per cent Roosevelt	Per cent Willkie	Gain or loss for Roosevelt
8 South Carolina	98%	2%	0
9 Mississippi	96	4	+1
11 Alabama	88	12	+3
10 Louisiana	87	13	+3
12 Georgia	86	14	+1
23 Texas	84	16	-1
9 Arkansas	80	20	+1
7 Florida	77	23	+1
13 North Carolina	73	27	+1
11 Virginia	72	28	+1
3 Arizona	66	34	-1
11 Tennessee	67	33	-2
4 Montana	63	37	+1
11 Oklahoma	62	38	0
3 Nevada	61	39	-2
8 Maryland	60	40	-4
4 Utah	60	40	+2
8 West Virginia	60	40	-2
8 Washington	59	41	+2
5 Oregon	58	42	+1
22 California	58	42	+2
16 New Jersey	58	42	+2
3 Delaware	57	43	-4

11	Kentucky	57%	43%	-2
4	Rhode Island	55	45	-3
4	Idaho	55	45	0

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238 Electoral Votes

ROOSEVELT LEADING  
(54% to 50%)

<i>Electoral Votes</i>		<i>Per cent Roosevelt</i>	<i>Per cent Willkie</i>	<i>Gain or loss for Roosevelt</i>
8	Connecticut	54%	46%	-4
36	Pennsylvania	54	46	-1
3	New Mexico	54	46	-6
11	Minnesota	54	46	0
6	Colorado	52	48	+1
3	Wyoming	52	48	0
17	Massachusetts	51	49	-3
15	Missouri	51	49	-2
47	New York	51	49	-1
26	Ohio	51	49	-1

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172 Electoral Votes

WILLKIE LEADING  
(By More Than 54%)

<i>Electoral Votes</i>		<i>Per cent Willkie</i>	<i>Per cent Roosevelt</i>	<i>Gain or loss for Willkie</i>
9	Kansas	59%	41%	+4
7	Nebraska	58	42	0
4	South Dakota	58	42	+1
3	Vermont	57	43	+3

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23 Electoral Votes

WILLKIE LEADING  
(54% to 50%)

<i>Electoral Votes</i>		<i>Per cent Willkie</i>	<i>Per cent Roosevelt</i>	<i>Gain or loss for Willkie</i>
11	Iowa	54%	46%	+2
5	Maine	54	46	+1
4	North Dakota	54	46	-3
14	Indiana	53	47	0
19	Michigan	53	47	+1
29	Illinois	51	49	-1



4	New Hampshire	51%	49%	+4
12	Wisconsin	51	49	0

98 Electoral Votes

Trend of major party popular vote: (Nov. 3, '40—AIPO)

	POPULAR VOTE	
	<i>Roosevelt</i>	<i>Willkie</i>
August 4 Report	51%	49%
August 25 Report	51	49
September 20 Report	55	45
October 6 Report	56	44
October 18 Report	55	45
October 27 Report	54.5	45.5
October 30 Report	53	47
November 3 Report	52	48

As of Sunday noon [Nov. 3] in a nationwide telegraphic poll the survey showed:\* (Nov. 3, '40 —AIPO)

Major-party vote	
<i>Roosevelt</i>	52%
<i>Willkie</i>	48

\* All minor candidates combined receiving less than 1% of the total vote.

Following are the divisions of major party sentiment in each of the forty-eight States as indicated in Institute returns up to Sunday: (Nov. 3, '40—AIPO)

#### SURE DEMOCRATIC STATES

(Roosevelt leading by more than 54 per cent up to Sunday)

	<i>Roosevelt</i>		<i>Roosevelt</i>
South Carolina	97%	Arizona	61%
Mississippi	94	Maryland	59
Georgia	87	West Virginia	59
Alabama	86	California	58
Louisiana	86	Montana	57
Arkansas	82	Washington	57
Texas	79	Nevada	56
North Carolina	72	Oklahoma	56
Florida	72	Delaware	56
Virginia	70	Utah	55
Tennessee	64		

#### STATES LEANING DEMOCRATIC

(Roosevelt leading with 54 to 50 per cent up to Sunday)

	<i>Roosevelt</i>		<i>Roosevelt</i>
Kentucky	54%	Connecticut	53%
Oregon	54	New Jersey	52
Rhode Island	54	Massachusetts	51
Wyoming	53	Minnesota	51
New Mexico	53		

## SURE REPUBLICAN STATES

(Willkie leading with more than 54 per cent up to Sunday)

	<i>Willkie</i>		<i>Willkie</i>
Nebraska	59%	Kansas	57%
South Dakota	59	Iowa	55
Vermont	58	Indiana	55
Maine	57	Colorado	55

## STATES LEANING REPUBLICAN

(Willkie leading with 54 to 50 per cent up to Sunday)

	<i>Willkie</i>		<i>Willkie</i>
North Dakota	54%	New York	51%
Illinois	52	Pennsylvania	51
Michigan	52	Missouri	51
Wisconsin	52	New Hampshire	51
Ohio	51	Idaho	51

Geographic breakdown of Roosevelt popularity, eliminating "don't know" answers: (Oct. '40—FOR.)

	<i>Favorable</i>	<i>Unfavorable</i>
West South Central	85.3%	14.7%
East South Central	83.2	16.8
South Atlantic	80.6	19.4
Mountain States	56.7	43.3
East North Central	53.3	46.7
Pacific Coast	50.4	49.6
Middle Atlantic	48.8	51.2
West North Central	43.9	56.1
New England	41.4	58.6

Geographic breakdown of Roosevelt popularity, eliminating "don't knows": (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	<i>Roosevelt essential</i>	<i>Roosevelt better</i>	<i>Total favoring Roosevelt</i>	<i>Willkie better</i>	<i>Another term bad</i>	<i>Total opposing Roosevelt</i>
West South Cent.	36.1%	48.5%	84.6%	7.6%	7.8%	15.4%
East South Cent.	41.9	34.6	76.5	10.8	12.7	23.5

South Atlantic	36.8%	38.9%	75.7%	13.2%	11.1%	24.3%
Pacific Coast	26.0	33.1	59.1	25.6	15.3	40.9
Mountain States	19.7	34.2	53.9	19.1	27.0	46.1
Middle Atlantic	26.3	22.8	49.1	27.1	23.8	50.9
East North Cent.	22.4	26.2	48.6	25.6	25.8	51.4
New England	23.8	24.2	48.0	27.4	24.6	52.0
West North Cent.	21.4	26.5	47.9	29.7	22.4	52.1

## Trend of Roosevelt popularity: (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	<i>For Roosevelt</i>	<i>Against Roosevelt</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
October issue			
(asked in August)	53.2%	38.7%	8.1%
November (1)			
(asked in September)	55.3	37.7	7.0
November (2)			
(asked in October)	53.3	40.2	6.5

## SOURCES OF ROOSEVELT SUPPORT

Analysis of vote for Roosevelt by labor groups in Nov. 1940, compared with Nov. 1936: (Dec. 5, '40—AIPO)

	<i>Nov. '40</i>	<i>Nov. '36</i>		<i>Nov. '40</i>	<i>Nov. '36</i>
C.I.O. members	79%	85%	Skilled workers	59%	67%
A.F.L. members	71	80	Semi-skilled	67	74
Other union members	57	74	Unskilled	69	81
Non-union labor	64	72			

Percentages of President Roosevelt's vote in various social and economic groups, according to the 1936 and 1940 preferences of those interviewed by the Institute: (Dec. 8, '40—AIPO)

<i>INCOME:</i>	<i>1940</i>	<i>1936</i>	<i>OCCUPATIONS:</i>	<i>1940</i>	<i>1936</i>
Upper-Income (\$50 and over per week)	28%	42%	Business	34%	47%
Middle Income (\$20 to \$50)	53	60	Professional	38	49
Lower Income (less than \$20, including all relief categories)	69	76	White-Collar	48	61
Relief, WPA and Old-Age Assistance	80	84	Farmers	54	59
			Skilled labor	59	67
			Semi-Skilled	67	74
			Unskilled	69	81
			(All Labor)	66	74

The following table gives the Institute's estimate of where President Roosevelt's 27,100,000 votes came from, as indicated by survey data; and comparable estimates for the sources of Wendell Willkie's 22,200,000 votes: (Dec. 8, '40—AIPO)

	<i>Roosevelt</i>	<i>Willkie</i>
1936 Roosevelt voters	19,400,000	4,700,000
1936 Landon voters	900,000	13,300,000
3rd-Party supporters in 1936	300,000	400,000
First voters (too young in 1936)	3,000,000	1,900,000
Didn't vote in 1936	3,500,000	1,900,000
	<hr/> 27,100,000	<hr/> 22,200,000

## 2. GOVERNMENTAL POLICY

### WAR EMERGENCY

Which of these things would you like to see the next administration do? (Oct. '40—FOR.)

	<i>Would like</i>	<i>Would not</i>	<i>DK</i>
Let any South American country that wants to establish a pro-Hitler government	10.1%	73.9%	16.0%
Help England, even to the extent of selling her naval vessels, but send no soldiers or sailors	70.2	19.6	10.2
Begin compulsory military training for all young men	70.2	22.8	7.0
Serve notice on Japan that any interference with our tin and rubber supply from the Dutch East Indies means war	30.3	39.5	30.2

### JAPAN

President Roosevelt has forbidden the shipment of scrap-iron from this country to Japan. Do you approve or disapprove? (Oct. 20, '40—AIPO)

	<i>App.</i>	<i>Disapp.</i>
Dem.	96%	4%
Rep.	95	5

Do you think our government should forbid the sale of arms, airplanes, gasoline and other war materials to Japan? (Oct. 20, '40—AIPO)

	<i>Dem.</i>	<i>Rep.</i>
Favor embargo	90%	90%
Oppose	10	10
Undecided	8	8

Do you think the time has come for us to take strong measures against Japan? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Pacific Coast</i>	<i>North West Central</i>
Yes	49.4%	56.4%	42.4%	53.0%	42.9%
No	24.2	27.1	21.4	18.1	24.5
DK	26.4	16.5	36.2	28.9	32.6

(If yes) Even military measures?

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Pacific Coast</i>	<i>North West Central</i>
Yes	55.7%	60.8%	48.9%	62.0%	50.4%
No	32.5	31.0	34.6	21.6	34.7
DK	11.8	8.2	16.5	16.4	14.9

**BUSINESS**

During the next four years do you think there should be more or less regulation of business by the Federal government than at present? (Nov. 21, '40—AIPO)

More	27%
Less	51
Same	22
No op.	20

**LABOR**

During the next four years do you think there should be more or less regulation of labor unions by the Federal government than at present? (Nov. 21, '40—AIPO)

	<i>More</i>	<i>Less</i>	<i>Same</i>	<i>No op.</i>
Total	60%	21%	19%	27%
Democrats	61	13	26	
Republicans	59	28	13	

**PRICE LEVELS**

In 1933 Mr. Roosevelt announced his determination to force prices back to the 1926 level. Did you agree with the policy at that time? (Dec. '40—FORTUNE Forum of Executive Opinion\*)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Commercial and retail executives</i>	<i>Utility and railroad executives</i>
Yes	24.0%	26.2%	14.9%
No	76.0	73.8	85.1
Do you think the government should continue its efforts to restore the 1926 price level?			
Yes	11.7	13.5	6.6
No	88.3	86.5	93.4
Do you think industry (through its trade associations, possibly) should try to restore 1926 price levels?			
Yes	25.1	26.8	18.5
No	74.9	73.2	81.5

\* Based on a selective sample of business executives; hereafter referred to as FOR. F.E.O.

In the early days of the New Deal an attempt was made to achieve recovery through the NRA under which trade associations were permitted to raise and fix prices by agreement (provided they also conformed to certain wage and hour codes). Many businessmen and most trade associations approved the NRA program at first. Did you favor the NRA price-raising program at the time? (Dec. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Utility and RR exec.</i>
Yes	34.9%	15.1%
No	65.1	84.9



		Total	Utility and RR exec.
Did you still consider the NRA price-raising plan a sound recovery measure in 1935 when the Supreme Court killed it?	Yes	19.6%	8.5%
	No	80.4	91.5

Do you believe the NRA trade-agreement programs should be revived now?	Yes	15.5	7.3
	No	84.5	92.7

Today the Department of Justice is following almost exactly the opposite policy from the NRA on price fixing, and Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold has launched the greatest campaign in history to enforce the anti-trust laws and prevent price-fixing agreements. He says, "The first concern of every democracy is the maintenance of a free market." Do you agree with Mr. Arnold? (Dec. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

	Total	Commercial and retail executives	Utility and railroad executives
Yes	27.7% } 58.7%	33.3% } 65.1%	21.4% } 54.4%
In most cases	31.0	31.8	33.0
In a few cases	18.3 } 41.3	16.9 } 34.9	21.0 } 45.6
No	23.0	18.0	24.6

As between the NRA pro-price-fixing policy and the Thurman Arnold anti-price-fixing program, which do you prefer as a means of recovery now? (Dec. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)	NRA	22.0%
	Arnold	33.0
	Depends	45.0

## NEW DEAL MEASURES

In the First FORTUNE Forum only 2 per cent of the members said they approved all Mr. Roosevelt's measures designed to achieve recovery, and only 18.9 per cent approved any of them. More specifically, will you tell us, from the *recovery* angle, which of these New Deal plans you think should (a) be continued or revived; (b) which you think were good once but have outlived their usefulness; (c) which you think were always bad for recovery; (d) which you think are still good ideas badly handled. (Dec. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

	Always bad	Obsolete but all right once	Good idea badly handled	Continue or revive
Silver subsidies	90.2%	4.5%	3.0%	2.3%
Guffey Coal Act	75.3	2.3	15.9	6.5
Gold devaluation and President's gold powers	69.6	14.5	6.4	9.5
Taxation policies	67.7	2.8	22.0	7.5
Pump priming	61.7	20.2	16.3	1.8
NRA	57.4	12.5	23.2	6.9

	<i>Always bad</i>	<i>Obsolete but all right once</i>	<i>Good idea badly handled</i>	<i>Continue or revive</i>
AAA	53.6%	6.3%	33.7%	6.4%
Wagner Labor Act	48.2	0.6	47.5	3.7
Export subsidies	42.5	10.7	18.5	28.3
WPA	39.3	10.9	43.2	6.6
Low money rates	32.7	19.4	16.3	31.6
PWA	30.2	14.0	47.4	8.4
Wages and Hours Act	29.2	1.9	47.7	21.2
Hull reciprocal trade treaties	22.4	10.4	14.0	53.2
Drive to enforce anti-trust laws	20.2	7.3	49.4	23.1
Housing and Home Loan acts	16.5	12.6	31.7	39.2

Do you believe that some or all of these New Deal measures are playing an important part in preventing recovery now? If "yes" (94.1 per cent said "yes"), which ones? (Dec. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

Wagner Labor Act	74.5%	AAA	29.3%
Taxation policies	66.8	Guffey Coal Act	27.6
Wages and Hours Act	48.5	PWA	26.5
Pump priming	44.3	Low money rates	25.2
WPA*	42.6	Hull reciprocal trade treaties	14.6
Drive to enforce anti-trust laws	40.0	Export subsidies	14.5
Silver subsidies	39.1	Housing and Home Loan Acts	11.5
Gold devaluation and President's gold powers	38.5		

\* How drastic a modification business would recommend for the WPA is indicated in the replies to the following question:

Do you believe that until private industry makes work for the unemployed, the federal government must take care of them on relief?

More generously than now	0.8%
Just about as generously as now	2.9
Yes, but the relief rolls should be examined much more closely to make sure that relief is limited only to cases of absolute need	45.6
No, the relief problem should be turned back to the state and local governments	50.7

### 3. SOCIAL

#### BUSINESS PROSPECTS

Which of the following statements most nearly corresponds with your opinion of the present prospects for U.S. business? (Dec. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

Irrespective of the current rearmament activity, business is staging a normal recovery on which stable prosperity can be built	7.7%
The current improvement of business is mainly due to a rearmament boom, but it is possible that we may go on from there with healthy activity on all normal economic fronts	24.9
Any temporary prosperity induced by the national defense program will leave us with our economic problems worse than ever because we failed to set our house in order before the boom started	67.4

Do you think that present conditions are such that business as a whole is now justified in making constructive commitments for expansion? (Dec. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)	Yes	13%
	Only in war industries	61
	No	26

Do you believe that a lasting recovery of general business (as distinct from a rearmament boom) is possible until—(Dec. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

	Total	Utility and RR exec.
The building industry takes steps to encourage more building?	Yes 27.4%	26.3%
	No 72.6	73.7
The railroads take steps to stimulate a greater movement of freight?	Yes 36.9	43.4
	No 63.1	56.6
Do you believe that the building industry can stage a healthy recovery—exclusive of defense contracts—without first getting its costs and its prices down much lower?	Yes 18.2	14.8
	No 81.8	85.2
Do you believe that the railroads can establish a healthy recovery until they get their freight rates down low enough not only to compete with the trucks but to stimulate additional traffic?	Yes 21.3	31.2
	No 78.7	68.8

## UNEMPLOYMENT

Disregarding the rearmament boom, do you believe that if certain deterrents are removed, private industry can in time create jobs for practically all the unemployed? (Dec. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)	Yes 85.4%
--	-----------

### OR

Do you believe we must plan for a future in which millions of workers will never be reabsorbed into private enterprise?	Yes 14.6%
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(If you believe that private enterprise could reabsorb the unemployed)  
Do you believe that all these jobs can be created—(Dec. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

	Total	Finance and investment executives	Commercial and retail executives
By removing government deterrents alone?	40.0%	44.2%	34.9%
By changing certain policies of business (for example pricing) without the government's changing its attitude toward business?	1.1	0.3	2.0

Only by a change in the policies of business combined with a change in the attitude of government

58.9%

55.5%

63.1%

Obviously the whole unemployment problem cannot be blamed on the New Deal, since there were 9 million unemployed when the New Deal began. The Brookings Institution has published a carefully documented report arguing that the principal reason for the 1929-32 collapse was that many industries had not expanded their markets by passing on to the consumer, in the form of lower prices, the benefits of increased efficiency and lower costs. Do you agree with the Brookings Institution's explanation? (Dec. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

Yes 16.2%  
In part 49.0  
No 23.2  
DK 11.6

If prices in those industries that had the worst unemployment during the depression had been generally reduced substantially lower than they were, do you believe the lower prices would have developed a substantial volume of additional business that would have made it unnecessary to lay off so many workers? (Dec. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

## EXECUTIVES OF ENTERPRISES ENGAGED IN:

	Total	Manufacturing and industry	Finance and investment	Utilities and railroads	Commerce and retail trade
Yes	27.2%	26.6%	27.4%	22.1%	31.5%
Perhaps	35.4	33.6	40.6	42.1	37.1
No	37.4	39.8	32.0	35.8	31.4

(If "yes" to the question above) Do you believe this additional volume would have made up to business for the smaller unit profit, leaving the total profit or loss about the same? (Dec. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

	Total	Finance and investment executives	Utility and RR exec.
More profit	20.5%	23.0%	12.0%
About the same	45.7	46.8	34.0
Less profit	29.5	24.5	44.0
Don't know	4.3	5.7	10.0

## PUBLIC WELFARE

Would the health of your family be better if you had more money each week to spend on food? (Dec. 22, '40—AIPO)

Yes 40%  
No 60

If you had more money, what foods would you spend it on? (Dec. 22, '40—AIPO)

Meat—with beef mentioned first among specific items	37%
Vegetables—largely unspecified, but with potatoes leading the list of specific items	31
Fruits—including fresh and stewed fruits	27
Dairy Products—with milk specified by nearly three-fourths of those listed in this category	21
Foods which voters simply classed, without details, as "good, solid food." This comment came frequently from persons on relief	16
Bread and Cereals—including "flour" and "cornmeal"	7
Eggs	7
Foods with a large sugar content—such as chocolate, pastries, deserts and other "sweets"	5
Foods with more vitamins	2
All other answers	14
No op.	10

(Since the respondent was not limited to one particular choice, the total percentages add to more than 100%.)

Do you happen to take regular physical exercises now?	Yes	24%
(Dec. 22, '40—AIPO)	No	76

It has been suggested that the Federal government organize a national program to interest more people in taking regular exercise to improve the health of the country. Would you approve of such a program? (Dec. 22, '40—AIPO)	Yes	71%
	No	29

Would you be willing to take part in such a program yourself? (Dec. 22, '40—AIPO)	Yes	65%
	No	35

Which of these things concerning domestic policy would you like to see the next administration do? (Oct. '40—FOR.)

	Would like	Would not like	Don't know
Put all able-bodied unemployed to work in the war industries	82.9%	9.0%	8.1%
Give more aid to the farmers so as to increase their buying power	60.0	26.2	13.8
Continue most of the New Deal measures	51.4	30.3	18.3
Establish government supervision of labor unions	48.4	25.0	26.6
Abolish WPA	38.9	48.1	13.0
Take over and operate all public utilities	21.8	55.3	22.9

#### CIVIL LIBERTIES

Should Communist Party candidates be allowed the same amount of time on the radio as the Democratic and Republican candidates? (Oct. 8, '40—AIPO)	Yes	29%
	No	71
	No op.	10

Do you think Communist Party candidates should be allowed any time on the radio? (Oct. 8, '40—AIPO)	Yes	37%
	No	63
	No op.	13



# GALLUP AND FORTUNE POLLS

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Should Communist Party candidates be allowed the same amount of free time on the radio as the Democratic and Republican candidates? (Oct. 8, '40—AIPD)

Yes 25%  
No 75  
No op. 11

Do you think Communist Party candidates should be allowed any free time on the radio? (Oct. 8, '40—AIPD)

Yes 31%  
No 69  
No op. 15

Do you think the Dies Committee should be continued? (Dec. 3, '40—AIPD)

Dec. '40 Dec. '39  
Yes 65% 54%  
No 7 18  
No op. 28 28

Do you feel that the Federal government is now interfering too much with your individual freedom? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	Total	Prosperous	Poor	Mountain States	Pacific Coast
Yes	27.1%	47.9%	17.2%	41.4%	18.2%
No	63.4	48.9	68.9	50.0	75.1
DK	9.5	3.2	13.9	8.6	6.7

## LINDBERGH

Which of the following statements most nearly represents your opinion of Colonel Lindbergh, in the light of his recent public utterances? (Oct. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

He has unselfishly and patriotically been making a useful effort to straighten out the nation's thinking on the war	30.7%
His purposes, no doubt, are patriotic, but his views are mostly misguided	38.6
He may be guiltless of any conscious subversive connections with foreign interests, but he has been improperly influenced by the personal attentions paid him by Hitler and Göring in Germany	14.2
Lindbergh is unpatriotic, and he may be deliberately working in the interests of Germany	2.8
Don't know	6.9
No answer	6.8

## Part Two: The War in Europe

### I. AMERICAN ESTIMATES

#### LAST WORLD WAR

Do you think it was a mistake for the United States to enter the last World War? (Dec. 15, '40—AIPD)

	Mistake	Not mistake	Undecided
April, 1937 (20th anniversary of U.S. entrance)	64%	28%	8%
November, 1939 (shortly after new European war)	59	28	13

	<i>Mistake</i>	<i>Not mistake</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
December 15, 1940 (after 16 months of war):			
Total	39%	42%	19%
Democrats	33	46	21
Republicans	46	38	16
Age groups:			
21 to 34	36	39	25
35 to 49	37	44	19
50 and over	44	42	14

### WHO WILL WIN

*In each survey voters were asked which side they thought would win.*  
(Nov. 26, '40—AIPO)

	<i>England</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
September 1939	82%	7%	11%
June 1940 (after fall of France)	32	35	33
November 1940	63	7	30

Same. (Dec. 1, '40—AIPO)

<i>Parent Born in:</i>	<i>England</i>	<i>Axis</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
Germany	48%	11%	41%
Italy	35	20	45
United Kingdom	76	3	21
Ireland	69	6	25
Canada	70	4	26
Scandinavia	67	3	30
Central and Western Europe	58	5	37
United States	64	5	31

### U.S. INVOLVEMENT

Do you think the United States will go into the war in Europe sometime before it is over, or do you think we will stay out of the war? (Dec. 1, '40—AIPO)

Go in	59%
Stay out	41

Regardless of what you hope, what do you think the chances are that the U.S. will get into this war? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	<i>Sure</i>	<i>Probable</i>	<i>50-50</i>	<i>Unlikely</i>	<i>Impossible</i>	<i>DK</i>
Total:						
Jan. '40*	9.9%	29.2%	22.8%	22.2%	4.0%	11.9%
Nov. '40	14.7	33.3	22.0	19.3	1.4	9.3
Executives:						
Jan. '40*	7.6	25.8	23.2	35.9	3.5	4.0
Nov. '40	13.2	34.5	23.6	19.6	3.2	5.9

\* Wording of the January question was: "Regardless of what you hope, what do you think the chances are that the U.S. will be drawn into this war?"

## 2. BRITISH REACTIONS

(Based on surveys by British Institute of Public Opinion)

In view of the indiscriminate bombing of this country, would you approve or disapprove if the R.A.F. adopted a similar policy of bombing the civilian population of Germany? (Nov. 14, '40—AIPO)	Approve	46%
	Disapprove	46
	Undecided	8

In general do you approve or disapprove of Mr. Churchill as Prime Minister? (Nov. 14, '40—AIPO)	Nov.	Aug.
	Approve	89%
	Disapprove	6
	Undecided	5

From what you have experienced or read or heard about during the past few weeks, do you think it is possible or impossible for Germany to win the war by air attack alone on this country? (Nov. 30, '40—AIPO)	Possible	6%
	Not possible	80
	Undecided or no op.	14

Do you think the government has been wise or unwise in favouring the building of surface shelters rather than underground shelters? (Nov. 30, '40—AIPO)	Government ill-advised	66%
	No objection to such shelters	15
	No definite opinion	19

If someone in your presence suggested that it would be a good idea to have a negotiated peace with Germany now, what would you do? (Dec. 10, '40—AIPO)	Agree that it would be a good idea	7%
	Contradict him	59
	Report him to the authorities	13
	Say nothing (or undecided)	21

Would you approve or disapprove if the British government were to discuss peace proposals now with Germany? (Dec. 10, '40—AIPO)	March 1940	
	Yes	25%
	No	69
	Undecided	6

Do you think our enemy is the German people or only the Nazi Government? (Dec. 14, '40—AIPO)	German people	52%
	Nazi Government only	48
	(No op. 1%)	

If we win the war, should we impose on Germany terms which are less severe or more severe than those which we imposed after the last war? (Dec. 14, '40—AIPO)	More severe	68%
	Less severe	17
	Undecided	15

Do you think the government should draw up and publish our war aims? (Dec. 21, '40—AIPO)	Favor publishing aims	42%
	Oppose publishing aims	35
	Undecided	23

## 3. U.S. POLICY

## NATIONAL DEFENSE

See Part Three: National Defense

## AID TO ALLIES

If it appears that England will be defeated by Germany and Italy unless the United States supplies her with more food and war materials, would you be in favor of giving more help to England? (Nov. 17, '40—AIPO)

	Total*	New Eng. & Mid.-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West
Yes	90%	92%	87%	86%	94%	90%
No	10	8	13	14	6	10

\* Undecided 6%

Do you think the United States should lend money to Greece for the purchase of arms, airplanes, and other war materials? (Nov. 28, '40—AIPO)	Yes	60%
	No	40
	No op.	15

Should the Neutrality Law be changed so that American ships can carry war supplies to England? (Dec. 7, '40—AIPO)	Yes	40%
	No	60
	Undecided	14

The Johnson Act prevents any country which has stopped paying interest on its debt of the last World War from borrowing money in the United States. Would you approve of changing this law so that England could borrow money from our government? (Dec. 19, '40—AIPO)

	Yes	No	FAVOR CHANGING ACT	Dec. 19, '40	May '40
May, 1940	35%	65%	New Eng. & Mid.-Atl.	57%	32%
Nov., 1940	54	46	East Central	49	30
Dec. 19, 1940*	55	45	West Central	49	32
			South	69	53
			Far West	57	35

\* Undecided 9%

Which of these courses would you like to see the U.S. pursue so far as Great Britain herself is concerned? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

Declare ourselves allies and send supplies and equipment and even men if necessary	15.9%
Declare ourselves allies to the extent of sending supplies and such equipment as planes and warships but never men	41.0
Go on as we are now, selling them what supplies and equipment they can buy	30.7
Stop sending or selling them anything	7.1
Don't know	5.3

Same. (Nov. '40—FOR.)	New England	West North Central	East South Central
Become allies and even send men	5.6%	7.1%	36.3%

	<i>New England</i>	<i>West North Central</i>	<i>East South Central</i>
Become allies and send arms and supplies only	54.4%	35.1%	47.5%
Go on selling as now	26.8	43.2	11.1
Stop sending or selling anything	5.9	10.3	0.9
Don't know	7.3	4.3	4.2

Below is shown the percentage of people who favor an alliance with England according to how likely they think we are actually to get into the war (read across): (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	<i>This many want an alliance with Britain—</i>		
	<i>Sending men</i>	<i>Not sending men</i>	<i>Total</i>
Of people believing war is—			
Sure	34.6%	32.2%	66.8%
Probable	16.8	41.9	58.7
Fifty-fifty chance	12.0	41.4	53.4
Unlikely	7.6	47.1	54.7
Impossible	2.8	48.6	51.4

### U.S. PARTICIPATION

If you were asked to vote today on the question of the United States entering the war against Germany and Italy, how would you vote—to go into the war, or to stay out of the war? (Oct. 13, '40—AIPO)

	<i>Total*</i>	<i>Dem.</i>	<i>Rep.</i>	<i>New Eng.</i>	<i>Mid- Atl.</i>	<i>East Cent.</i>	<i>West Cent.</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>West</i>
Go in	17%	19%	15%	18%	20%	12%	14%	24%	20%
Stay out	83	81	85	82	80	88	86	76	80

\* Undecided 8%

Which of these two things do you think is the more important for the United States to try to do—to keep out of the war ourselves, or to help England win, even at the risk of getting into the war? (Nov. 26, '40—AIPO)

Stay out 50%  
Help England even  
at risk of war 50

If it comes to a question of the U.S. declaring war, in whose judgment would you have the greater confidence, that of the President and the Department of State—whoever they are at the time—or that represented by a vote of Congress after debate? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>People intending to vote for—</i>	
		<i>Roosevelt</i>	<i>Willkie</i>
The President	25.7%	39.3%	12.1%
Depends on who is President	6.2	7.0	4.1
Congress	50.8	37.8	70.2
Both	6.8	7.1	5.9
Neither	1.4	0.9	1.5
Don't know	9.1	7.9	6.2



## IN EVENT OF AXIS VICTORY

Suppose the end of the war finds Germany controlling most of Europe. Do you think we should—(Nov. '40—FOR.)

Restore normal trade with all countries even though Germany does dominate them	53.7%
Have as little as possible to do with a German Europe even if it means a serious loss to our foreign trade	27.7
Don't know	18.6

## PANAMA CANAL AREA

		Dec. '40	Nov. '39
If England offers to pay its World War debt to the United States by giving us islands or land near the Panama Canal, would you approve our accepting this offer? (Dec. 12, '40—AIPD)	Yes	88%	66%
	No	12	34
	Undecided	10	15

## FOOD FOR EUROPE

One of Great Britain's weapons against Germany is a blockade to keep food and supplies out of Germany and the countries she has occupied. If this results in serious famine in these countries she has occupied, do you think we should or should not try to send food to them through the blockade? (Nov. '40—FOR.)

	Total	Prosperous	Poor	West North Central	East South Central
Should	19.1%	12.9%	21.3%	23.1%	6.6%
Shouldn't	67.0	78.0	59.1	64.4	76.8
Don't know	13.9	9.1	19.6	12.5	16.6

## Part Three: National Defense

## PROGRESS OF DEFENSE EFFORTS

Do you feel that our efforts for national preparedness, as they now stand and are now projected, are, on the whole: (Oct. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

As effective as it is reasonable to expect	24.2%
Only moderately effective	51.9
Comparatively ineffective	21.6
Don't know or no answer	2.3

If from your observations efforts for preparedness seem less adequate than they should be, how would you rank each of the following factors as contributory to the situation? (Oct. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

## GALLUP AND FORTUNE POLLS

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*Inadequate interest  
on the part of:*

	<i>Serious</i>	<i>May become serious</i>	<i>Unimportant</i>	<i>Don't know or no answer</i>
public officials	36.5%	15.9%	5.9%	41.7%
industrialists	7.1	12.2	14.5	66.2
labor	21.3	22.5	6.2	50.0
the general public	19.8	15.8	10.6	53.8

*Legislative obstacles  
relating to:*

tax amortization	57.8	13.6	1.9	26.7
financing	17.7	16.3	11.7	54.3
labor	29.6	22.6	3.0	44.8

*Slowness due to:*

government delays in contract placing	44.2	19.5	2.7	33.6
shortage of specialized labor	28.5	30.2	3.3	38.0
interference of labor organizations	22.7	32.8	4.8	39.7
bottlenecks in produc- tion of tools and ma- chine tools	33.1	25.0	2.8	39.1
shortage of essential ma- terials	4.6	25.4	14.7	55.3

Do you feel that businessmen of your acquaint- ance have any reservations about rearmament work? (Oct. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)	Yes	58.8%
	No	37.3
	DK or no ans.	3.9

*If yes, do you attribute their reservations to:*

A belief that the present administration in Washington is strongly anti-business and a consequent discouragement over the practicability of cooperation with this administration on rearmament	77.3%
The government delay over letting them charge off the cost of their new plants for rearmament within five years for tax purposes	64.4
The fear that acceptance of rearmament orders will subject their plants to added interference with their labor policies	45.2
The belief that profits allowed on rearmament contracts are too small to justify the investment of the risks involved	38.4
The fear that an excess-profits tax will wipe out most of their profits on rearma- ment orders	36.6
A feeling that the emergency is not so acute as the President would have them feel	35.0
Public sentiment against war profits, as a result of which businessmen would rather not handle war orders	20.1
No answer	0.3

Total, with multiple answers 317.0%

## PREPAREDNESS vs. U.S. ECONOMY

Do you believe America can prepare for total war without seriously amending any of the social legislation of the past eight years? (Oct. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)	Yes	21.3%
	No	77.1
	DK or no ans.	1.6

If you were required to increase your production by one-third within the next six months, would you find any of the following steps necessary or probably desirable? (Read answers across) (Oct. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

	Necessary	Desirable	Don't know or no answer
Hire more men	59.3%	8.1%	32.6%
A longer work week	33.9	22.8	43.3
Emergency training of men in certain skills	26.7	12.1	61.2
A speeding up of production at your sources of supply	22.0	9.2	68.8
New financing for plant expansion	18.1	8.9	73.0

Manufacturers, whose answers are likely to be based upon a closer relationship with the realities of the problem posed, gave these answers:

	Necessary	Desirable	Don't know or no answer
Hire more men	71.1%	8.2%	20.7%
A longer work week	38.3	27.4	34.3
A curb on labor unions	29.5	23.0	47.5
Training skilled labor	30.6	14.0	55.4
Increase production of supplies	26.0	9.9	64.1
New financing	19.9	9.9	70.2

Do you believe that it will be possible during the period of rearmament to maintain the U.S. standard of living at present levels by continuing to meet our normal peacetime needs, or do you think that building our defenses will have to be done at the expense of production for ordinary use? (Oct. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)	Standards can be maintained	58.1%
	Standards must be lowered	39.7
	Don't know or no answer	2.2

In the event that rearmament or the incidence of war starts a sharp rise in prices, do you believe that: (Oct. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

The government should interfere directly, as in 1917, to fix prices and prevent any sharp rise not directly justified by production costs	34.7%
Trade associations should voluntarily take an active part in holding down prices	24.9
Prices should be allowed to move freely, find their own levels	26.7
Don't know	7.0
No answer	6.7

## REARMAMENT AND TAXES

Assuming that the government must raise added revenue now to pay part of the cost of rearmament, which do you believe would be the most effective means? (Oct. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

Maintain present tax structure and rely upon larger taxable revenues for the increase	10.5%
Superimpose new emergency rates like the Revenue Act of 1940 and the proposed excess-profits tax	23.8
Make a thorough permanent revision of the tax system before attempting to levy temporary surtaxes now	56.3
Don't know or no answer	9.4

Assuming that revenues to be derived from an excess-profits tax would be about equal to those from such a general increase as those provided by the Revenue Act of 1940, which do you think would be preferable? (Oct. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

An excess-profits tax because it would be levied directly upon profits made from any rearmament boom	58.2%
A general increase without excess-profits levies, because the latter would be a deterrent to defense activity	31.9
Don't know or no answer	9.9

As regards government orders, which do you believe is likely to be the result of an excess-profits tax? (Oct. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

It will make those who profit by these orders pay back to the government a considerable part of those profits	55.2%
The extra cost will have to be added to what the government pays, leaving virtually unchanged the profit after taxes that the government will have to allow to get its orders filled	34.0
Don't know or no answer	10.8

If we have to have an excess-profits tax, do you think it should be primarily based on: (Oct. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

The increase in earnings over the average for the past few years	17.9%
The rate of earnings on capital invested, as in 1917	5.6
A mixture of the preceding alternatives	7.5
A taxpayer's choice between these alternatives	21.2

Or: would you recommend instead of any of the above that the principle of the present capital-stock and excess-profits tax be applied with higher rates on declared values and excess profits?	Yes	14.3%
	No	0.5
	DK or no ans.	33.0

Do you believe satisfactory exemptions could be worked out to keep an excess-profits tax from bearing unfairly on new enterprises and enterprises which are on the verge of entering upon a period of greatly increased profits quite independent of rearmament? (Oct. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)	Yes	63.9%
	No	25.0
	DK or no ans.	11.1

## CONSCRIPTION

Would you be in favor of starting now to draft American women between the ages of 21 and 35 to train them for jobs in war time? (Dec. 17, '40—AIPO)

	<i>All voters*</i>	<i>Men voters</i>	<i>Women voters</i>	<i>Women 21-35</i>	<i>Upper inc.</i>	<i>Middle inc.</i>	<i>Lower inc.</i>
Approve	48%	44%	52%	54%	41%	44%	55%
Disapprove	52	56	48	46	59	56	45

\* No op. 6%

Are you in favor of the selective draft in principle? (Oct. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>New York City</i>	<i>Midwest</i>
Yes	84.1%	89.5%	78.3%
No	9.7	4.5	15.0
No answer	6.2	6.0	6.7

Will the selective draft have a seriously adverse effect upon the operation of your business? (Oct. '40—FOR. F.E.O.)	Yes	6.0%
	To some extent	60.2
	No	27.7
	DK or no ans.	6.1

## JOINT DEFENSE BOARD

The U.S. and Canada have set up a joint defense board to organize defense on this continent and to co-operate closely together. Do you approve or disapprove of this? (Nov. '40—FOR.)	Approve	83.8%
	Disapp.	5.2
	DK	11.0

## NOTE

Because of space limitations, it has been necessary to exclude from the preceding tabulation a number of special surveys conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion, based upon selective samples, and several interim reports of pre-election trends. A list of these follows:

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: Special survey of "undecided" vote in New England (Oct. 26, '40); special surveys of presidential preferences of: Massachusetts and Nebraska voters (Oct. 1, '40); California, Oregon, and Washington voters (Oct. 4, '40); Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan voters (Oct. 14, '40); New York State and New York City voters (Oct. 24, '40); New England voters (Oct. 26, '40); New York and Delaware voters (Oct. 29, '40); Connecticut and Indiana voters (Oct. 30, '40); Missouri, Kentucky and Oklahoma voters (Oct. 31, '40); Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota and Maryland voters (Nov. 1, '40); voters in the nine northeastern states (Nov. 2, '40).



PRE-ELECTION TRENDS: Oct. 4, '40; Oct. 6, '40; Oct. 13, '40; Oct. 20, '40;  
Oct. 26, '40; Oct. 27, '40; Oct. 29, '40.

ELECTION RETURNS VS. POLLS: Nov. 9, '40; Nov. 29, '40; Dec. 3, '40; Dec.  
10, '40.

THIRD PARTIES: Vote cast in Presidential elections since 1900 (Oct. 5, '40).

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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DIES, MARTIN, *The Trojan Horse in America*. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1940. 366 pp. (\$2.50)

LAVINE, HAROLD, *Fifth Column in America*. New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1940. 240 pp. (\$2.50)

Martin Dies' *The Trojan Horse in America* hardly possesses the "unprecedented national importance" which the jacket claims. Apparently basing his book on material gathered by his House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities, Mr. Dies devotes 303 pages to Communist activity, 20 to the German-American Bund and one other Nazi group, 15 to Mussolini's minions, a mere 8 to William Pelley's Silver-shirts (none to the Christian Front or other native fascist groups), and reserves the final 20 for his own conclusions.

Unfortunately, though naturally, the book reflects the shortcomings of the Committee itself. Lists of organizations considered subversive are given (as on p. 109)—but without corroborating evidence. Several pages (p. 337 *et seq.*) are devoted to material from "an Italian witness": who is he, and is there substantiating background and documentation? Persons are "known" or "avowed" members (p. 16) of groups considered un-American: known or avowed by whom, and with what evidence?

Quotations are made (as on pp. 131-136, 13, 45, and 46) without documentation, notes, dates, or context. Much of the Italian material is ascribed to a witness in behalf of whose credibility it is merely stated that he is "an Italian citizen who has been residing in the United States since 1926 and whose occupation is that of a printer" (p. 345).

Some serious errors of fact are likewise apparent. Mr. Dies glosses over (p. 33) the adverse comment upon his publication of 700 names seized in a raid upon the Washington office of the American League for Peace and Democracy; the list was not a membership list, as Mr. Dies states, but merely a mailing list. He gives no evidence, nor has this writer ever seen any, to substantiate his charge (p. 154) that the series of sit-down strikes of several years ago were "ordered from Moscow." The German-American Bund does not and never did have 100,000 members (p. 306); a more accurate estimate would be 6,000. Those familiar with current literature will smile at the use of two quotations (p. 300) lifted from the English poet W. H. Auden's satiric drama "Dance of Death" as evidence of the subversive character of the Federal Theatre Project.

Outcroppings of Congressman Dies' extreme conservatism appear

early in the book, but only in the last half does he go hammer-and-tongs after the "New Deal suckers" (p. 285), among whom he apparently includes the President and Mrs. Roosevelt, Vice-President Wallace, Secretaries Ickes and Perkins, Attorney General Jackson, Associate Justice Murphy, A. A. Berle, Robert M. Lovett, E. S. Smith of the Labor Relations Board, and others.

He considers (p. 353) the National Labor Relations Act as a "typical example of class legislation"; he regrets (p. 357) that "organizations have been formed to secure passage of a wide variety of crack-pot bills designed to guarantee jobs and economic security"; and he outlines his concept of democracy (p. 351) as follows: "To place upon democratic government the responsibility for abolishing poverty and unemployment is to seal its doom as a form of government and as the spirit of a free people." In conclusion he warns America against the refugee menace and the alien menace, and urges the outlawing of all groups which his Committee has condemned.

*The Fifth Column in America* by Harold Lavine is in many ways the antithesis of Congressman Dies' book. Instead of being pontifical it is chatty and "incisive." Of its 240 pages, 212 are devoted to foreign and domestic fascist activity (the latter receives an interesting but by no means comprehensive treatment), and 28 to the Communists. Mr. Lavine says of previous fifth-column stories and *exposés*, "The stories were all pretty much the same. They came

from the same files, and they were all written from approximately the same point of view. . . ." Unfortunately the reader is likely to feel that the same comment applies to Mr. Lavine's work. Both books bear unmistakable signs of hasty preparation in an effort to exploit the current public concern with the subject.

D. A. SAUNDERS  
New York City

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FREEMAN, ELLIS, *Conquering the Man in the Street: A Psychological Analysis of Propaganda in War, Fascism, and Politics*. New York: Vanguard Press, 1940. 356 pp. (\$3.50)

There are many misconceptions current concerning the nature of propaganda, and one of them is the belief that there are no limits to what it can accomplish. Among those persons who have themselves witnessed the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany, this belief is held with particular conviction, but it is frequently shared also by ordinary Americans.

Freeman recognizes that propaganda is not alone responsible for the success of the dictators. "Social, political, and economic conditions were such as to favor the rise of this kind of leader who happened to be on the scene" (p. 4). At the same time, he believes that Hitler would never have obtained power except for his skillful use of propaganda, which enabled him to conquer the German *Man in the Street*. This book is evidently written to help keep the

American Man in the Street from succumbing to similar influences.

As a thorough social scientist, Freeman approaches the problem of the manipulation of public opinion from a variety of viewpoints. Using as his principal texts Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and Mussolini's *My Autobiography*, he applies to their contents and to their influence many of the principles of interpretation used by social psychologists, but not usually familiar to the layman. In this connection the chapter on "Flogging the Dead Horse" is particularly effective, and Freeman shows how the solemn reiteration by the propagandist of what his hearers already firmly believe, and his use of unobjectionable but irrelevant matters, may "raise the dust and conceal issues which it would be inopportune to disclose or to face" (p. 203).

The chapter on "Social Futurism" defends the thesis that Futurism as a form of art "is symptomatic of the social conditions which provoke Fascism as a possible solution for difficulties" (p. 266). Fascism is in Freeman's opinion akin to Futurism in its raptures over war and death, its emphasis on orgiastic excitement, its cult of brutality and its worship of force. "The higher Futurism registers, the more likely Fascism is to appear, or at least to make a bid for power" (p. 289).

Fascism is likened also to a form of "Political Psychiatry," perverted in its goals but giving to the patients a temporary illusion of progress. These are interesting chapters, although there is danger in pressing too far the analogy of Fascism with

either an art-form or a variety of psychotherapy. The extensive discussion of the fallacies in the theory of the Group Mind, previously considered more briefly by Freeman in his *Social Psychology*, is excellent.

From psychoanalysis Freeman takes over the mechanism of rationalization, projection and sublimation, in accounting for many of the phenomena of Nazi-Fascist totalitarianism. Hitler rationalizes his attacks upon his enemies in terms of their alleged, but largely imaginary, characteristics; he projects upon these same enemies the motives which he will not acknowledge in himself; he sublimates sadism into a relentless crusade against those whom he labels the enemies of the state. The specific examples which Freeman has given lend considerable substance to this type of interpretation.

The use of ethnological parallels is somewhat less satisfactory. For Freeman, totalitarian propaganda represents in many respects a return to the beliefs of primitives. The Fuehrer is likened to a Medicine Man, and National Socialism to a primitive group brotherhood. "The kind of mentality which Totalitarianism endeavors to develop is in the most literal sense that of the primitive but, incongruously enough, in a culture which is, industrially at least, civilized" (p. 98).

In view of the many criticisms directed by anthropologists against the notion of a distinctive primitive mentality, and in the light of the wide variations found among different "primitive" peoples, this type of analogy is to say the least unconvincing. Freeman appears in general

to neglect these variations. With reference to crime, for example, he states that among aborigines "so strong is each one's identification with the tribe and the sense of his duty toward it, that the culprit on discovering his unintentional misdemeanor volunteers a confession for the infliction of penance" (p. 99). This is certainly not the case in aboriginal Africa, in which courts of law functioned for the administration of justice, and in which oaths and ordeals were used in order to determine the guilt of the accused. A good case may be made for Fascism's regression to the level of barbarism, but that is not the same as identifying it with the pre-literate societies described by the anthropologist.

The book fulfills its task well, however, and its errors are of a minor character. It is clear and well written, and its argument on the whole carries conviction. It ends as it begins, with an emphasis on the interpretation of propaganda in the light of the whole social and economic setting in which it operates. It sees an escape from Fascism in this country not in propaganda directed against it, but rather in an attack upon those institutions and forms of behavior on which Fascism breeds. A wide reading and assimilation of its contents should contribute to a saner and sounder liberalism.

OTTO KLINEBERG  
Columbia University

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DOOB, LEONARD W., *The Plans of Men*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940. 411 pp. (\$3.00)

Concluding from a review of man's activities that planning is more or less necessary and probably desirable, Dr. Doob seeks to indicate the form and direction such planning should take. Specific proposals, to be sure, constitute but a small part of the book for the author explicitly states that he "has not had the courage to delude himself into acquiring the belief that he possesses attractive panaceas which all Americans should adopt."

A major portion of the book is devoted to an analysis of the contributions of the various sciences to our knowledge of man, his physical and social environments, and his goals—upon which all planning, unlike utopian thinking, must be based, and from the analysis of which the author concludes that "what is known about man . . . is known only tentatively and, more frequently than not, the connection between this knowledge and a concrete plan is tenuous and uncertain."

Another large portion of the book is devoted to a description and analysis of individual, social, economic, political and regional planning, especially as they have been tried in the United States.

It is the thesis of the book that "the plans of men should be designed for men" and that the goal of planning should be "a rich personality in a society with diverse opportunities." How satisfactorily the author succeeds in giving concrete and specific expression to his thesis is a question which each reader must answer for himself. The failure to be more definite in formulations and conclu-



sions will be interpreted by some as a manifestation of an unclear analysis but by others as the expression of a cautious and scientific attitude in handling so complex a problem.

The individual plans of men fail when they come into conflict with each other. For this reason some sort of social, economic, and political planning is necessary, but since plans are inventions, they, like all inventions, tend to multiply in time. Consequently the trend today is everywhere toward an increased planning of man's activities, which unless stopped will result in the development of master plans.

Where the proper balance is to be drawn between master planning, the culmination of which in other parts of the world has been government by dictators, and the anarchism which would result from a complete absence of plans, is a problem which faces every American today. The answer to this problem suggested by Doob is regional planning.

Whether or not one agrees that in some form of regionalism lies the greatest likelihood of a maximum of gratification and a minimum of frustration for the individual, he will find Doob's argument that such is the case both stimulating and worthy of careful study.

DONALD W. MACKINNON  
*Bryn Mawr College*

HOLCOMBE, A. N., *The Middle Classes in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940. 304 pp. (\$2.50)

In this book Professor Holcombe has gathered together various papers

and addresses (some of them already printed elsewhere), with a new introductory section "In Defence of the American Way." The earlier material here brought together covers regional and class factors in American politics, including the influence of the rural and of the urban middle classes; a paper on the future of democracy in America, originally printed in the Fiftieth Anniversary volume on Bryce's *American Commonwealth*; and his presidential address before the Political Science Association on "The Political Interpretation of History." Students of political polls will want to read his analysis of the relative power of the rural and urban electorate.

Professor Holcombe, himself, has such a complacent middle-class outlook that it is difficult to read the book without irritation. He writes about a popular theme with manifest satisfaction:

"The ascendancy of the middle class under the American Constitution, I conclude, seems likely to be maintained, and to endure through a period of time of which no end is in sight. Middle-class consciousness, it must be added, furnishes a solid foundation for a reign of law sustained by the consent of the governed. The foundation is solid, because middle-class consciousness is not primarily class self-consciousness, but rather consciousness of equal participation in a rational organization of the state for the common good. It produces an attitude toward the state which gives to political ideals an intrinsic force of their own, independent of economic interests and psychological complexes. It tends to give reality to the vision of the state as a true commonwealth, in which power rests ultimately, not on physical force and organized official violence, but on the good will of the people."

The first page launches "an inquiry into" the Messianic rôle of the middle class in the United States; but by page 42 the "inquiry" has become "the argument of this book." As over against his faith in the middle class's "positive spirit of participation in the common welfare" and their "clear destiny to be the guardians of rational ideals of justice and liberty," one can urge as a corrective: Veblen, volume three of Parrington, and Laski's *Democracy in Crisis* (especially p. 55).

The author hates and fears socialism with the same sort of hate and fear that made the German middle classes embrace Hitler. Over and over he remarks in different contexts on "the fatal defect of the Marxist system—." To the reviewer it looks as if the storm signals are set for this world of "moderation" Professor Holcombe cherishes. Despite his preference for "political ideals" as against "economic forces," it appears that the latter are in the saddle.

ROBERT S. LYND  
Columbia University

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*Industrial Conflict: A Psychological Interpretation* (1939 Yearbook of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues), by 26 authors, edited by George W. Hartmann and Theodore Newcomb. New York: Cordon Co., 1940 (now obtainable from the Dryden Press). 583 pp. (\$3.00)

It has by now become a truism that social phenomena are, at bottom, human behavior; but it is one

which has dropped a man-sized problem into the laps of the psychologists. The swift pace of change in current social phenomena has rocked many an ivory tower, and the interests of numerous psychologists have been turned toward some of the more dramatic aspects of social processes. The formation of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues within the American Psychological Association is eloquent testimony of this direction of interest.

Industrial conflict is the subject chosen for this first collective effort of the Society, which is to be congratulated, together with the editors of this volume, on a choice which indicates a live sense of social realism. The volume concentrates on those aspects of social processes which can be put into quantitative terms. With varying success, the several authors report their attempts at gathering verifiable data on the general topic of industrial conflict. The psychologists are under no illusions about the difficulty of achieving objectivity in their data. Note, for example, Chapter 10 in which the same events are reported by an employer of labor and a labor organizer, in parallel columns on the same page.

The volume is full of real "pay dirt" for the student of public opinion and social attitudes. There is, for instance, the case study in Chapter 4 of the use of the "Mohawk Valley Formula" in the Johnstown strike of 1937. But it is Parts III and IV that will be of greatest interest. Here are excellent summaries of studies of class allegiance and variations in attitudes in relation to economic

status. Here are the answers for those who deny the existence of differences in social attitudes between the different income groups. Professor Kornhauser's tables show a regular and consistent gradient of attitudes from the higher to the lower income brackets. With the aid of a little arithmetic and a table of consumer incomes in the U.S., one can obtain percentages for the entire population.

The results will go a long way toward explaining why the recent Republican campaign, well-financed and supported by the majority of American newspapers, failed to elect its man. Astounding variations in attitudes are to be found in the various economic fractions of the 88 per cent of Americans who, according to recent public opinion polls, consider themselves "middle class." There are determinants of social attitudes other than identification with a symbol, however potent such symbols may have been in the past.

We need more comparisons of the attitudes of students still in the technical schools, with those of foremen actually in industry, such as Bruce Moore's study in Chapter 14. It will come as a surprise to many that the foremen are more objective and liberal in their attitudes than the proverbially "pink" students. Anyone confronted with the practical problems involved in sampling attitudes of workers will find many of his problems anticipated in Blankenship's Chapter 15 on measuring industrial morale.

In many ways, one of the most significant studies in the volume is

Newcomb's study of labor union members' views of labor unions. Various types of unions, "company," A.F. of L., and C.I.O., are compared on the really critical factor of difference; namely, the extent to which their respective members think of themselves as a potentially dominant class. Here are attitudes with historical significance. Social changes are anticipated by shifts in attitudes of some sort. Many such shifts may well be on a non-verbal level, but shrewd devices can go a long way toward translating un verbalized attitudes into choices of alternatives which then reveal basic sets. The hardest task the student of attitudes has before him is the choice of attitudes and opinions for observation and study, so that the data may come to have predictive value. Newcomb's contribution appears to be an excellent example of the choice of an attitude well worth a long-term program of study.

Chapter 17 presents a review of the various devices that have been employed to prevent the formation of class attitudes and to keep the employees feeling and holding a common set of values with their employers. This has represented no mean effort on the part of the employing groups during the last quarter-century. The efforts begin before a man is hired, when experts attempt to suit an employee to his task in the hope of increasing essential job satisfaction. It runs through a gamut including wage adjustments, health and safety measures, stock ownership and various gestures in the direction of economic security. The success of

these measures is probably not unrelated to the decline in unionization during the twenties.

Chapter 20 by Menefee on symbol manipulation is an excellent summary of the techniques used by employers and workers—the chief conflicting forces in contemporary society. The experimental study of the symbol value of the stereotypes used in an actual conflict situation is evidence that objectivity, if not impartiality, can be attained by the psychologist.

GEORGE VETTER  
New York University

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LAZARSFELD, PAUL F., *Radio and the Printed Page*. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1940. 354 pp. (\$4.00)

This book treats of serious listening, of effects of radio on the reading of newspapers and of books, and of its cultural significance. It concludes that radio is unlikely to have profound social consequences in the near future. "Broadcasting is done in America today to sell merchandise and most of the other possible effects of radio become submerged in a strange kind of social mechanism which brings the commercial effect to its strongest expression."

The style is clear and simple, the interpretation of facts scrupulous and fair. The book disposes of the illusion that radio can make of America an educated people overnight and shows why this is so. The author's main concern is with three types of broadcast programs, serious programs (these are specifically defined), so-

called service programs, and news broadcasts and commentaries.

He discloses facts of great social and psychological interest, and by nicely adapted methods of research explains their cause and their bearing on the future of radio, particularly on its educational side. Listening increases in quantity as you descend the cultural scale, but listening to serious programs decreases. Commercial programs convey information to millions but lack standards which might make them socially significant.

The study of these and similar facts leads to a disturbing conclusion. "If literacy is defined as competence to understand the problems confronting us, there is ground for suggesting that we are becoming progressively illiterate today in handling life's options." Dr. Lazarsfeld deals with this paradox of intellectual poverty in the midst of plenty. How does it come about? Apart from the dearth of such programs (over five stations in Buffalo no more than 4.4 per cent of the total hours of broadcasting throughout a week were devoted to serious programs as thus defined), Dr. Lazarsfeld attributes it to failure of method.

His main preoccupation is with this question of method. "Not what to do but how to do it has become the problem of the day." Even if this statement may seem to some to overlook the fundamental conflict of values, of what to do, in our society, the author's emphasis of method as applied to radio on its more serious side is timely. For, assuming that educators know what they want,

their failure to achieve their ends through radio becomes patent from these studies.

Serious programs fail because they are ill adapted to ordinary people's needs. "Upper class people try to enforce their educational standards over the radio, but lower class people do not accept them because such standards are not adjusted to their point of view." They fail also because too often the listener has no 'frame of reference' to which the program can be related. They fail again through lack of adequate publicity.

Of all the studies that bear upon this problem of method, that of the audience to Professor Quiz, if statistically the least valid, is from a social and psychological point of view the most enthralling. For here the character and circumstances of radio's "ordinary listener" is disclosed in all its pathetic nakedness. Thwarted of the advantages of education, he pours out his resentment at the college man in frenzied competition with him in answering Professor Quiz. If he can down the college man, his self-esteem is vindicated. Wanting in self-confidence, he worships through the ritual of Professor Quiz at the altar of the average man, identifies himself with a god created in his own pathetic image. Conditioned, as this study suggests, by the American system of education, he mistakes information for knowledge, and diversified information at that.

These listeners "have never known the educational ideal of specialization and they have no longing for it." For the average man the Professor

Quiz program *means* education. On perception of the implications of such facts as these depends that redirection of educational endeavor which, by radio and by other agencies, may make it more relevant to people's needs. Quotation cannot convey the pathetic interest of this study. It has to be read.

Educators, Dr. Lazarsfeld suggests, have much to learn from the commercial broadcasters in matters of program technique and much to contribute in respect of standards. The problem of radio is thus seen as wider than that of its manipulation by those in the business. It involves collaborative effort on the part of educators, social workers and radio men, a pooling of experience in the matter of skills and a clarification of purpose relevant to radio's audience, which is the vast illiterate majority of America today.

The facts and the conclusions of this book derive from the application of various research techniques, each method having been used but once. Their application should be of interest to the research specialist. The general reader and the practical man may, however, be allowed to question here and there whether such scrupulous and detailed research has achieved more than confirmation of the obvious. There is much in the book that common sense and common knowledge might have predicted or assumed.

But its real value stems less from the facts or the methods of research than from the quality of mind of the author. Scrupulous, almost to a fault, in not adventuring beyond



what the facts of research would seem to justify, he yet discloses (in his introduction as in later summaries and comments at the end of chapters) an outlook and a grasp of social issues, which is contemporary, practical, humane. It is this live intelligence, this sense of the crucial relation of means to ends which gives to *Radio and the Printed Page* a context of interest far wider than that of its immediate subject matter.

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NAFZIGER, RALPH O., *International News and the Press: An Annotated Bibliography*. New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1940. 193 pp. (\$3.75)

Ten years ago bibliographical aids in the field of communications, journalism, public opinion, and propaganda were meager and undependable. The past decade, however, has seen the publication of Bömer's *International Bibliography of Journalism*, Lasswell, Casey, and Smith's *Propaganda and Promotional Activities*, Child's *Reference Guide to the Study of Public Opinion*, the extensive bibliography in Groth's *Die Zeitung*, and the current bibliographies in the *Public Opinion Quarterly* and the *Journalism Quarterly*.

To this list Professor Nafziger has made a most welcome addition with his annotated and classified bibliography on international news and the

foreign press. The scope of the work is broader than the title indicates, for he includes not only materials on contemporary international communications but significant historical references as well.

Divided into two parts, the first covers "International News," the second "The Foreign Press," with a further breakdown on a regional and national pattern. Part One presents citations on general communications, the world press associations, conditions of news-gathering and transmission, including censorship and press laws, the press and diplomacy, and the functioning of the press in relation to war in modern times. Particularly valuable are the numerous citations from historical and sociological journals, technical, trade, and professional periodicals.

With due allowance for the author's principles of limitation and sampling, some place ought to have been found for Max Grünbeck's recent two-volume work on the British press (*Die Presse Grossbritanniens*). However, it is not what has been withheld that is important, but what has been given. Professor Nafziger has increased our stock of informational and research tools and, at the same time, has advanced another step the work of integrating and coordinating a rapidly developing area of study and research.

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# BIBLIOGRAPHY

Compiled by **BRUCE LANNES SMITH**

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In each issue, *THE PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY* publishes a continuation of an annotated bibliography which appeared in 1935 in book form (Harold D. Lasswell, Ralph D. Casey, and Bruce Lannes Smith, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography*. Minneapolis: Published for the Social Science Research Council by University of Minnesota Press, 1935. 450 pp.)

## PART I. PROPAGANDA STRATEGY AND TECHNIQUE

**BERNAYS, EDWARD L.** *Speak Up for Democracy: What You Can Do—A Practical Plan of Action for Every American Citizen*. New York: Viking Press, 1940. 127 pp. Noted public relations counsel urges all U.S. citizens to "speak up for democracy" through every available channel of communication. He outlines "twenty common charges against democracy," and answers them. He maps out a complete public relations program, utilizing the "group leadership approach," and a multitude of channels such as holiday celebrations, press conferences, direct-mail, forums, radio, movies, youth groups. Symbols involved include celebrated American documents (emphasis on Bill of Rights), patriotic ceremonies, birthdays of famous Americans, and lists of appeals to special interest groups. Includes extensive bibliography on democratic practice, dictatorships, U.S. customs, leadership techniques, and public opinion.

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Indexed list of 233 titles. "An attempt has been made to include all pertinent references published in English."

**CHAKHOTIN, SERGE.** *The Rape of the Masses: The Psychology of Totali-*

*tarian Political Propaganda*. New York: Alliance Book Corporation, 1940. London: Routledge, 1940. 317 pp.

By well-known Russian psychologist who has been a leader of European social democracy for many years. Propagandist activity, he says, is of two types: "propaganda by persuasion, mainly for militants, and by suggestion, for the masses. For the former, doctrine is the essential thing, together with technical hints in the manoeuvring of the masses. For the latter, the important thing is to find for the doctrine the equivalents of a mysticism—a myth and suggestive expressions, rites, symbols, slogans. . . . This is at present, unfortunately, the monopoly of the dictatorships, and has been the cause for this very reason of their success. It needs studying and putting into practice without loss of time, on behalf of democracy and humanity. . . . In this emotive propaganda, all dishonest forms, all aesthetically and morally debased forms, all crudities that shock the onlooker, must be absolutely avoided." Bibliography, pp. 289-91.

**MANNHEIM, KARL.** *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, translated by Edward A. Shils. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940. 469 pp.

By well-known German sociologist, now

at University of London. Based upon his *Mensch und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Umbaus* (Leiden, Holland, 1935), one of the outstanding treatises of contemporary social science. Essays a comprehensive developmental theory of social control. Elaborately classified bibliography, pp. 383-455.

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Study of Italy's use of atrocity stories in the Ethiopian campaign, by University of Louisville political scientist. Conclusion: the stories may have influenced opinion inside Italy, but they seem to have been ignored in the world press. They "created not the slightest ripple in a country [U.S.] where German atrocities had been so gullibly devoured some two decades earlier."

### Methods of Collective Management Closely Related to Propaganda

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BURNS, ARTHUR EDWARD; and WATSON, DONALD S. *Government Spending and Economic Expansion*. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1940. 176 pp.

Two economists, George Washington University, assert that the Roosevelt spending program "must stand indicted," because it was begun too late and did not spend enough. They advocate resumption of public investment on a scale "large enough to be effective" in stimulating industrial production and keeping America out of war. Bibliographic footnotes.

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A comparative study of the investigations into national income which have been made in all the principal countries. By Oxford economist. Bibliographic footnotes.

GREER, GUY. "Arming and Paying for It," *Harpers*, 181:650-64 (November 1940).

Careful study of cost of U.S. armament program, by U.S. investment specialist.

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Brookings economist analyzes measures U.S. might adopt to prevent runaway prices during the defense boom.

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Efforts of U.S. government to cope with monopolistic businesses, through market maneuvers and publicity. Of Thurman Arnold, *Fortune* says: "In the long run

and in terms of peace Arnold defines the issue behind government price control well: it is whether to stand for competitive pricing or to pass along the road to socialism and turn production and distribution over to the bureaucrats. Arnold the radical is in this sense the conservative. Rarely has he been more needed in Washington."

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**COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.** *Civil-Military Relations: Bibliographical Notes on Administrative Problems of Civilian Mobilization.* Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940. 77 pp.

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## PART II. PROPAGANDA CLASSIFIED BY THE NAME OF THE PROMOTING GROUP

### National Governments and International Agencies

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**DIES, MARTIN.** *The Trojan Horse in America.* New York: Dodd, Mead, 1940. 366 pp.

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**LAVINE, HAROLD.** *Fifth Column in America.* New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1940. 240 pp.

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#### PART IV. THE SYMBOLS AND PRACTICES OF WHICH PROPAGANDA MAKES USE

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A special committee of prominent leaders in secondary education prepared and submitted this report under the chairmanship of Ben G. Graham, Superintendent of Public Schools, Pittsburgh, Pa.

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About 1,250,000 high school students (over one-sixth of the total high school population) participated in the second annual essay competition sponsored by *American Magazine*, through individual entries or classroom discussion projects. Essays were written on "New Frontiers for American Youth" and "What I Owe America and What America Owes Me"; 317,161 were submitted. The papers revealed a serious interest in social issues, "high moral standards," faith in our "democratic institutions," and "lessened emphasis" on making money the chief goal in life. These young people view education in terms of the jobs for which

it can prepare them. They express a veneration for science. They are optimistic about their future prospects. Rural youth are turning to agricultural occupations, since fewer jobs are available in the cities.

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U.S. fascist theorist analyzes the future of U.S. foreign and domestic policy in terms of world trends toward collectivism. "The fact is that democracy worked only while an aristocracy ruled. . . . The world is getting back to aristocratic rule by new élites. . . . As the plan of War and Navy Departments to replace the traditional American system with a totalitarian dictatorship by the Chief Executive in the exercise of his war powers is both legal and highly patriotic, I cannot possibly be prosecuted, investigated or even criticized for applauding . . . the new order which this plan and its governmental agents are eminently well suited to initiate under the smoke screen of a war to preserve the American system and check the march of dictatorship abroad. . . . The function of this war for us will be to facilitate the socialization of American industry under the war powers of the President. . . . At some stage of the game it will be the task of a new élite to take over the new revolution made by the President as a war dictator. . . . Order and action versus anarchy and stagnation are the issues, not democracy and liberty versus dictatorship and regimentation."

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Chicago: University of Chicago for the Commission of Modern Languages of the American Council on Education, 1940. 441 pp.

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*umph of American Capitalism: The Development of Forces in American History to the End of the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940. 460 pp.

An American history by a Columbia University historian. Bibliography, pp. 439-45.

HARTSHORNE, EDWARD YARNALL. "Metabolism Indices and the Annexation of Austria: A Note on Method," *American Journal of Sociology*, 45:899-917 (May 1940).

University of Vienna faculties before and during the process of Nazification. In the course of the first year, 49.5% of the faculty were dropped, according to data obtained by comparing faculty lists in successive University of Vienna catalogues.

HEINDEL, RICHARD HEATHCOTE. *The American Impact on Great Britain, 1898-1914: A Study of the United States in World History*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1940. 439 pp.

Heavily documented study of the influence of the United States upon Great Britain's industrial, social and literary development, by University of Pennsylvania historian. Bibliography at ends of chapters.

HERRING, PENDLETON. *The Politics of Democracy: American Parties in Action*. New York: Norton, 1940. 469 pp.

Historical analysis of the American party system by Harvard political scientist. Bibliography, pp. 437-54.

HERRING, PENDLETON. *Presidential Leadership: The Political Relations of Congress and the Chief Executive*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1940. 173 pp.

Includes a summary of the statutes conferring war powers on the President.

HEUER, GERTRUDE. "Economic Train-



ing of German Youth," *Education*, 59:333-7 (February 1939).

How National Socialism interprets the study of economics in the schools.

HINTON, HAROLD B. "Is Latin America News?" *Quarterly Journal of Inter-American Relations*, 1:41-49 (January 1939).

Reasons why U.S. papers do not give much coverage of Latin American affairs. By New York Times specialist on Latin America.

HOLCOMBE, ARTHUR NORMAN. *The Middle Classes in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1940. 304 pp.

Historical studies by Harvard political scientist. Bibliography, pp. 289-99.

HOLLAND, KENNETH. *Youth in European Labor Camps*. Washington, D.C.: American Youth Commission, 1939. 303 pp.

Former C.C.C. supervisor reviews his personal experiences and research in the labor camps of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Poland, Scandinavia, and Switzerland. Bibliography at ends of chapters.

HOOKE, SIDNEY. *Reason, Social Myths and Democracy*. New York: John Day, 1940. 302 pp.

Studies in contemporary political thought, by New York University professor of philosophy.

INSTITUTE OF WORLD AFFAIRS symposium on propaganda and public opinion, in its *Proceedings*, 1939, pp. 67-81.

Speakers: Russell M. Story, political scientist; Albert Guérard, historian; Manchester Boddy, editor and publisher.

JOSEPHSON, MATTHEW. *The President Makers: The Culture of Politics and Leadership in an Age of Enlightenment, 1896-1919*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940, 584 pp.

By the author of *The Robber Barons* and *The Politicos*. Bibliography, pp. 567-71.

KLEIN, D. B. "Colored Shirts and Politics: A Psychological Analysis," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 5:326-37 (July 1940).

Donning a uniform makes for (a) self-aggrandizement, (b) loss of individuality, (c) uniformity of thought and impulse, (d) boldness in the shy, "dignity" in the big shot, (e) the "prestige of esoteric knowledge."

LABOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATION. *Youth Arsenal of Facts*. New York: International, 1939. 126 pp.

Pocket-sized reference booklet covering all phases of current youth problems. The topics listed in the index are: population and occupation, unemployment, working conditions, apprenticeship, rural youth, Negroes, health, marriage, and sex problems, leisure-time activities, crime, government aid, proposed legislation, organizations, world youth congresses, and youth in Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. In each of these sections are statistical data compiled from such sources as *Youth Tell Their Story*, by Howard M. Bell; *Rural Youth*, by Bruce L. Melvin and Elna N. Smith; *A New Deal for Youth*, by E. K. and Betty Lindley; and others.

LAVES, WALTER H. C.; and WILCOX, FRANCIS O. *The Middle West Looks at the War* (Public Policy Pamphlet no. 32). Chicago: University of Chicago, 1940. 64 pp.

Two midwestern political scientists attempt to summarize the sentiments of the round tables of the Harris Foundation Institute, June 25-July 2, 1940. "The participants in the Institute were drawn entirely from the Middle West."

MCPHERSON, WILLIAM HESTON. *Labor Relations in the Automobile Industry*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1940. 173 pp.

MEADE, JAMES EDWARD. *The Economic Basis of a Durable Peace*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940. 192 pp.

Mr. Meade has been a member of the Secretariat of the League of Nations, where he has recently been responsible for its annual World Economic Survey. He asserts that future world order in the economic field must rest upon the existence of both liberal and planned economies, and proposes that certain general controls over money, trade, capital movements, and migration of peoples be entrusted to an international organization.

ODEGARD, PETER H. "The Political Scientist in the Democratic Service State," *Journal of Politics*, 2:140-64 (May 1940).

RAM, VANGALA SHIVA. *The State in Relation to Labour in India*. Delhi: University of Delhi, 1940. 175 pp. Ten lectures, delivered at the University of Delhi in 1938, by a professor of Lucknow University who has served on the Secretariat of the League of Nations. A concise survey of labor legislation and labor conditions in India.

ROUCEK, JOSEPH SLABEY. "The Sociology of the Diplomat," *Social Science*, 14:370-74 (October 1939).

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. *Nationalism*. London: Oxford, 1939. 360 pp.

Report by a study group, dealing with bases of nationalism in various countries and among various sections of the population. Bibliographic footnotes.

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. *Political and Strategic Interests of the United Kingdom*. London: Oxford, 1939. 304 pp.

SCHMECKEBIER, LAURENCE FREDERICK. *Government Publications and Their Use*, second revised edition. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1939. 479 pp.

A guide to catalogs, indexes, bibliographies and other aids that may help in finding public documents. Author is a member of the Institute of Government Research of the Brookings Institution.

SMITH, CHARLES W., JR. "The Intelligence Factor in Public Opinion: A Comment on Some Recent Publications," *Journal of Politics*, 1:301-11 (August 1939).

Rapid review of a dozen major books of recent years, by University of Alabama political scientist.

VAN TIL, WILLIAM. "The Making of Their Modern Minds: The Study of Public Opinion," *Social Education*, 3:467-72 (October 1939).

Experiences of an Ohio State professor of social science education, attempting to teach propaganda analysis. Includes a remarkable list of "good" and "bad" words compiled by junior and senior high school students.

WOOLF, LEONARD SIDNEY. *After the Deluge* (Vol. 2): *A Study of Communal Psychology*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940. 317 pp.

WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF RESEARCH. *Urban Youth: Their Characteristics and Economic Problems* (Series 1, no. 24). Washington, D.C.: W.P.A., Division of Research, 1940. 52 pp. Preliminary report of the survey of youth in the labor market, undertaken in 1938 in seven representative large cities. Samplings of grade school graduates for the years 1921, 1931, and 1933 yielded over 40,000 interviews and 30,000 detailed work histories. Records of each individual's experiences from the date of leaving school were obtained.

ZIMMERN, ALFRED, editor. *Modern Political Doctrines*. New York: Oxford University, 1939. 306 pp. Selections from theorists, Burke to Hitler.

## PART V. CHANNELS OF PROPAGANDA

## Agents Who Specialize in Managing Propaganda

BARNARD, INMAN. *Cities and Men*, preface by Sisley Huddleston. New York: Dutton, 1940. 264 pp. Memoirs of a U.S. foreign correspondent, private secretary and confidant of James Gordon Bennett the elder.

BAYLES, WILLIAM D. *Caesars in Goose Step*. New York: Harpers, 1940. 262 pp.

Studies of the Nazi leaders, originally written for *Life*, *Time* and *The New Yorker*.

BLOOR, ELLA REEVE. *We Are Many: An Autobiography*. New York: International, 1940. 319 pp.

A veteran labor leader and a D.A.R., this daughter of a New York Presbyterian business man is now the "grand old woman" of the U.S. Communist Party.

DU BOIS, W. E. BURGHARDT. *Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept*. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1940. 334 pp.

Autobiography of Director of Publications and Research, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

HARRIMAN, MARGARET CASE. "The Candor Kid," *New Yorker*, January 4 and 11, 1940.

Profile of Clare Boothe Brokaw Luce, journalist-playwright-politician and wife of Henry R. Luce, publisher, of *Time*, Inc.

HOMBOURGER, RENÉ. *Goebbels*. Paris: Sorlot, 1939. 320 pp.

LOCKWOOD, ARTHUR. "Press Agent Tells All," *American Mercury*, 49:173-80 (February 1940).

Confessions of a case-hardened P.A.

STRASSER, OTTO. *Hitler and I*, translated by Gwenda David and Eric

Mosbacher. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1940. 249 pp.

In the early days of the Nazi movement from 1920 onward, Strasser was a member of the party hierarchy. In 1933 he fled from Germany. His brother, Gregor, stayed behind, only to be riddled with bullets in 1934. Otto Strasser became conspicuous as the self-appointed leader of the "Freedom Front," a band of exiles hoping to destroy Hitler as a "betrayed" of the German Revolution.

STREET, ELWOOD VICKERS. *The Public Welfare Administrator*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1940. 422 pp.

Deals with internal administrative practices, personnel, finance, property, purchasing, and public reporting and relations. Mr. Street was for five years director of public welfare in the District of Columbia. Bibliography, pp. 406-07.

## Agencies Used in Disseminating Propaganda

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR ADULT EDUCATION. *Checklist of Free and Low Cost Books and Pamphlets for Use in Adult Education*. New York, 1940. 23 pp.

AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION. MOTION PICTURE PROJECT. *Films on War and American Neutrality*. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1939. 44 pp. Annotated list of "educational" films.

AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS' ASSOCIATION. BUREAU OF ADVERTISING. *The Newspaper as an Advertising Medium*. New York, 1940. 170 pp.

A presentation of the advantages newspapers can offer to advertisers. Includes much statistical material on the press. Bibliography and source-list, pp. 161-63.

*The American School of the Air: Teacher's Manual, 1940-41*. New York: Columbia Broadcasting Sys-

tem, Department of Education, 1940. Pamphlet.

Aid to class-room instruction, designed for use in all the nations of the Americas.

ANGELL, JAMES ROWLAND. "International Relations in Broadcasting," *Bulletin of Pan-American Union*, 73:70-74 (February 1939).

By NBC advisor.

ANGELL, JAMES ROWLAND. *War Propaganda and the Radio*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1940. 19 pp.

Howard Crawley memorial lecture at the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce.

ARCINIEGAS, GERMÁN. "Journalism in Colombia," *Quarterly Journal of Inter-American Relations*, 1:89-95 (July 1939).

By Colombian magazine editor (*Revista de las Indias*).

ARKIN, HERBERT; and COLTON, RAYMOND R. *Graphs, How to Make and Use Them*, third edition, revised. New York: Harpers, 1940. 236 pp.

Revision of standard treatise illustrating nearly every type of graphic presentation.

ATKINSON, CARROLL. *Education by Radio in American Schools* (Ph.D. thesis; George Peabody College for Teachers, Contributions to Education, no. 207). Nashville: George Peabody College for Teachers, 1938. 126 pp.

Bibliography, pp. 124-26.

BIRD, WINFRED W. *The Educational Aims and Practices of the National and Columbia Broadcasting Systems* (University of Washington Extension series, no. 10). Seattle: University of Washington, 1939. 82 pp.

Dr. Bird is Instructor in Speech, University of Washington. In consultation with experts, educational criteria were applied to a sample of "educational" radio programs. Finding: 12.7% of all CBS programs and 7.2% of NBC programs were judged to be "educationally significant." Rated highest: *American School of the Air* (CBS); *Music Appreciation Hour* and *America's Town Meeting of the Air* (NBC); University of Chicago Round Table; National Farm and Home Hour (U.S. Department of Agriculture). This report also contains summaries of the educational philosophies of the networks, based on interviews with their officials.

BROWN, R. C. "Business Turns Increasingly to Movies and Slide Films: Commercial Movies Now Reaching Millions," *Commerce*, May 1940, pp. 16-18.

CLARKE, W. HARVEY, JR. "Radio in Japan Now Housed in New Magnificent Home," *Far Eastern Review*, 35:275-82 (July 1939).

Equipment, policy and programs of Broadcasting Company of Japan. Japan now has 35 stations and 24% of the households have receivers.

COOK, K. M.; and REYNOLDS, F. E. *Opportunities for the Preparation of Teachers in the Use of Visual Aids in Instruction* (U.S. Office of Education pamphlet no. 189). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940. 13 pp.

GARLAND, J. V.; and PHILLIPS, C. F., compilers. *Discussion Methods Explained and Illustrated* (Reference Shelf, 12 no. 2:283-329). New York: H. W. Wilson, 1940.

Includes a section on propaganda analysis.

*Educational Film Catalogue*, supplement. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1940. 57 pp.

Classified list of 177 non-theatrical films, with subject and title indexes.

EDWARDS, NEWTON. *Equal Educational Opportunity for Youth: A National Responsibility*. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1939. 189 pp.

Report to the American Youth Commission, prepared by Dr. Newton Edwards of the University of Chicago, shows state and regional variations arising from uneven geographical distribution of children and of taxable resources, usually in roughly inverse proportion to each other. Includes extensive data on birth rates and population trends, internal migration, economic status, educational expenditure, per capita income, and taxable wealth, by states and by regions.

FREDERIC, KATHERINE AMELIA. *State Personnel Administration: With Special Reference to Departments of Education* (U.S. Advisory Committee on Education, staff study no. 3). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940. 271 pp.

"The first extensive study of personnel administration for key units in the educational system, the 48 State departments of education. An up-to-date summary of general provisions for State government personnel administration. New data on the qualifications, experience, salaries, selection, and tenure of chief state school officers and their staffs. Suggestions for improving the adequacy of personnel."

GARNETT, BURT P. "New Experiments in Newspaper-Making," *Editorial Research Reports*, May 1, 1940, pp. 331-47.

New papers with new methods: their investments, circulation, advertising, innovations; their effect on newspaper employees and readers.

GRAHAM, ROBERT X., compiler. *A Bibliography in the History and Backgrounds of Journalism*, revised edition. Pittsburgh, Pa.: Uni-

versity of Pittsburgh, November 1940. 20 pp.

Unannotated.

GRAMLING, OLIVER. *AP: The Story of News*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1940. 506 pp.

History of Associated Press by director of AP's membership department, assisted by William A. Kinney of the Washington Bureau.

HETTINGER, HERMAN S. "Marketing of Radio Broadcasting Service," *Harvard Business Review*, 17:301-17 (Spring 1939).

Surveys the market positions of broadcasters, networks, transcription companies, advertisers, advertising agencies, station representatives, program-builders, talent bureaus in recent years.

JOECKEL, CARLETON BRUNS. *Library Service* (U.S. Advisory Committee on Education, Staff study no. 11). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940. 107 pp.

"Public library service is accessible to 92 percent of our urban people, but to only 26 percent of rural residents. The Northeast and the Far West have more than their share of our 15,000 libraries and their quarter of a billion volumes while the South is very much undersupplied. Ten specific recommendations are made as to what the Federal Government might properly do to improve this important educational service throughout the nation."

JUDD, CHARLES HUBBARD. *Research in the United States Office of Education* (U.S. Advisory Committee on Education, Staff study no. 19). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940. 133 pp.

Former head of department of education, University of Chicago, points out many new studies which he feels the U.S. Office of Education should undertake, and recommends enlarged support and additional personnel. Contains bibliography.



LEATHERWOOD, DOWLING. "Outline of a Course in Radio Journalism," *Journalism Quarterly*, 16:259-63 (September 1939).

News broadcasting has led to a new academic specialty, now offered by 14 schools. This article describes the Emory University offering. Included are new techniques of speech training, news "processing," making and analysis of transcriptions, a practice studio, actual broadcasts from local stations.

PITKIN, WALTER B. *The Art of Useful Writing*. New York: Whitteley House, 1940. 261 pp.

Rules for writers, by Columbia professor of journalism.

SAMPER-ORTEGA, DANIEL. "Mass Education in Colombia," *Quarterly of Inter-American Relations*, 1:71-76 (April 1939).

By Counselor of Colombian Embassy, Washington.

SMITH, PAYSON; WRIGHT, FRANK WATSON; and associates. *Educa-*

*tion in the Forty-Eight States* (U.S. Advisory Committee on Education, Staff study no. 1). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939. 199 pp.

"The panorama of American education at all levels from kindergarten to the graduate school and adult education. Historical sketch of the century 1830-1930, and a look at the future. Statistics of enrollments and institutions at all levels. The curriculum, health education, teaching service, and the school plant. Education for children in rural areas, for Negroes, and for handicapped children."

"United Artists," *Fortune*, December 1940.

U.S. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION.

Publication of the 19 staff studies of the Advisory Committee on Education is now completed. They constitute "a library on many of the most important topics in education for the modest sum of \$4.80."

## PART VI. MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA

"A.D. 1940: A Review of Public Opinion," *Fortune*, January 1941.

Review of shifts in U.S. opinion on foreign policy during 1940, based on Gallup and Roper surveys and other data.

BEAN, LOUIS H. *Ballot Behavior: A Study of Presidential Elections*, introduction by Charles Edward Merriam. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1940. 101 pp.

Analysis of factors in Presidential elections by well-known statistician and agricultural economist.

FORD, RICHARD. *Children in the Cinema*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939. 232 pp.

Examines attitudes of producers, teachers, authorities, children and the clergy

toward the psychological and physical influence of the movies on children. By a producer of children's film matinees. Bibliography, pp. 14-16, 221-22, 227-29.

"Fortune Forum of Executive Opinion," *Fortune*, September, October, December 1940.

Membership in this opinion forum, by invitation only, consists of (a) presidents of all businesses rated AA-1 by Dun and Bradstreet; (b) directors of the 750 largest corporations in the U.S.; (c) "executives of U.S. business whose salaries are at a level that assures that each of them is a man of high executive responsibility qualified to speak for Management." Topics considered include government, foreign policy, labor policy and monopolistic pricing.

GALLUP, GEORGE HORACE. "Ebb and Flow of the Third-Term Issue,"

*New York Times Magazine*, October 13, 1940, p. 9 ff.  
Gallup poll results.

GOSNELL, HAROLD FOOTE; and PEARSON, NORMAN. "The Study of Voting Behavior by Correlational Techniques," *American Sociological Review*, 4:809-15 (December 1939).

1932 and 1936 Presidential elections.

GUNDLACH, RALPH H. "Emotional Stability and Political Opinions as Related to Age and Income," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 10:577-90 (November 1939).

Sample: 250 college students, 700 adults, living in Seattle. Findings: Neuroticism, radicalism increase with poverty. But usually the radicals are not neurotic.

GUNDLACH, RALPH H. "The Psychologists' Understanding of Social Issues," *Psychological Bulletin*, 37: 613-20 (October 1940).

"For nearly ten years we have suffered through a national social and economic crisis; yet, from an examination of our professional journals and the programs of our professional meetings, one might conclude that psychologists were oblivious of the fact that our social institutions are rattling about our ears." A questionnaire study was made among members and associates of American Psychological Association and among University of California students. The questions measured attitudes toward "items of general social significance." *Conclusions:* (1) In every case, a plurality or a majority of psychologists select "liberal, progressive, democratic" answers. (2) Views of students differ considerably from those of psychologists, being less "liberal, progressive, democratic." (3) Intercorrelation shows that "apparently, the more fascistic ideas and attitudes one has, the less one recognizes them as fascistic." (4) If this questionnaire's outcome indicates the intentions of psychologists, "we can expect at least

something of a shift in the emphasis in the teaching of psychology and in the press releases of the organizations of psychologists."

HARTWELL, DICKSON. "Business Asks the Public How It May Serve Best," *Nation's Business*, May 1940, pp. 26-28 ff.

Commercial research specialist states that business needs to know public opinion no less than the politician, and through scientific research is finding out about it.

HARTWELL, DICKSON. "What the Public Thinks of Food Manufacturers: Survey of Consumer Opinion Reveals Where Public Relations Are Weak," *Food Industries*, May 1940, pp. 39-41.

HAYES, SAMUEL P., JR. Series of studies on voters' attitudes, *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1936-1939.

Elaborate statistical studies in the interrelations of attitudes and in their etiology, by social scientist, Sarah Lawrence College.

LOCKE, HARVEY J. "Changing Attitudes Toward Venereal Diseases," *American Sociological Review*, 4: 836-43 (December 1939).

Study of propagandas and of poll results. By University of Indiana sociologist.

"The People's Choice: *Life* Survey Discloses Why People Voted as They Did in This Week's Election," *Life*, November 11, 1940, pp. 95-103.

Erie County, Ohio, was chosen for an investigation sponsored jointly by Columbia University's Office of Radio Research, the Elmo Roper organization, *Life*, and *Fortune*. Citizens of this highly representative county were interviewed repeatedly to determine reasons for their Presidential vote. Income, party preference, religion, age, rural or urban residence, occupation and sex were among the factors controlled. Basic results: "Those who were in poor to mid-

dling economic circumstances, those who were young, those who were Catholic—all of these tended to vote Democratic." Those who were "undecided" in May, when the interview series began, tended by October to cast their votes according to these factors in the same proportion as those whose minds had been made up all the time.

ROBINSON, EDGAR EUGENE. *The Presidential Vote, 1936*. Stanford Uni-

versity, California: Stanford University, 1940. 91 pp.

Supplement to *The Presidential Vote, 1896-1932* (Stanford University, 1934. 403 pp.), standard compilation of voting statistics by counties.

"Who Hears What? A. C. Nielsen Company Goes Ahead With Its Radio Survey Service," *Business Week*, December 7, 1940, p. 38.

## PART VII. PROPAGANDA AND CENSORSHIP

AMERICAN MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION. *Regulation of Handbill Distribution: Legal Problems Involved* (Report no. 136). Chicago, May 1, 1940. 20 pp.

ARMSTRONG, W. C.; and WOOD, LA VERGNE. "Analyzing Propaganda," *Social Education*, 4:331-37 (May 1940).

FEINBERG, I. R. "Picketing, Free Speech, and 'Labor Disputes,'" *New York University Law Review*, 17:385-405 (March 1940).

JONES, ROBERT WILLIAM. *Law of Journalism, Including Matters Relating to the Freedom of the Press, Libel, Contempt of Court, Property Rights in News, and Regulation of Advertising*. Brooklyn, N.Y.: Metropolitan Law Book Co., 1940. 395 pp.

SIEGEL, SEYMOUR N. "Radio and

Propaganda," *Air Law Review*, 10:127-45 (April 1939).

General statement on techniques of radio propaganda by Director of Programs of New York City's Municipal Broadcasting System. Makes use of the "Seven Propaganda Devices" of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis.

SWINDLER, W. F. "Law of the Press: A Supplementary Bibliography," *Journalism Quarterly*, 17:159-60 (June 1940).

Technical articles in legal periodicals since July 1938.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES EDUCATION AND LABOR COMMITTEE. *Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, Hearings, . . . to Investigate Violations of Right of Free Speech and Assembly and Interference with Right of Labor to Organize and Bargain Collectively . . .* (Parts 37-45). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939.